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came to be established in France, towards the end of the twelfth century, bands of adventurers, all foot soldiers, and known under the significant and appropriate names of "Cotereaux," " Soudoyers," "Tardsvenus," "Cantatours,"*" Malandrins," "Routiers," Brabançons," "Chaperons, "Escorcheurs," "Pastoureaux," "Ribauds," "Tondeurs," "Millediables," &c. These mercenaries, the scourings of divers countries, were no better than troops of undisciplined vagabonds, who sold their services to the highest bidder, and when not engaged in fighting, occupied themselves in indiscriminate and impartial pillage. A leader of one of these bands called himself, "The friend of God and the enemy of every one else." These worthies existed with varied fortune for more than two centuries, employed equally by the kings of France and England. Louis VII. had some twenty thousand of them in his pay, but his successor Philip Augustus, exasperated by their brigandage, sent an army against them in 1183, which routed and dispersed them at Bourges. They reappeared however two years afterwards, and continued their career of pillage and rapine, till the reign of

*In the words of the Chronicle of St. Denis, they were "pillards, voleurs, larrons, infâmes dissolus, excommuniés. Ils ardaient les monastères et les églises ou le peuple se retirait, et tourmentaient les prêtres et les religieux, les appelaient cantatours, par allusion à euxmêmes, qu'on avait ainsi nommés parce qu'ils avaient l'habitude de chanter sur les routes en marchant, puis leur donnaient grands buffes, et grosses gousses."

Charles V. That monarch, surnamed "the Wise," seeing with grief the devastations committed by these bands in his provinces, determined to get rid of them. He entrusted this difficult task to Bertrand Du Guesclin, Constable of France, who persuaded the leaders of the several grandes compagnies, on the promise of plunder and absolution from the Pope for their sins, to accompany him into Castile, there to uphold the cause of Henry Trastamare against Peter the Cruel. Du Guesclin entered Spain on the 1st of January, 1366, at the head of 30,000 of these ruffians, and there they were finally exterminated in the wars that followed.

The bands of " condottieri," under Bracio, Sforza, the Englishman Sir John Hawkwood, and others, that flourished in Italy, cotemporaneously with the adventurers above mentioned, were also mercenaries, but, unlike the latter, were for the most part composed of cavalry. "The chiefs of these military forces," says Machiavelli in his 'Prince,'* "began by dispensing with the infantry to enhance the reputation of their own forces; for, as they had no dominions of their own, and being mere soldiers of fortune, they could undertake nothing with a small body of infantry, nor could they support a more considerable force. They found, therefore, that cavalry was more advantageous, a small number of which enabled them to support their reputation; so that not more than two thousand foot soldiers were considered necessary in an army of twenty thousand men.” * Chap. XII.

Before the creation of the communal militia in France, a similar force had existed both in Castile and Portugal. The exposure of the Castilian towns to the depredations of the Moors, had early necessitated the enrolment of the citizens for self-defence, and this species of national force, in all ages, so favourable to the cause of political freedom, had been the means of anticipating in Spain the era of popular representation, in advance of all other nations.

The same cause that had produced a militia in Spain, also operated in Portugal. In the latter country they were called ordonenzas. By the Portuguese law every person was bound to serve in this force for the defence of the country, from eighteen to sixty years of age. They were organized in battalions of 250 men each, under the command of the chief landed proprietors of the district, and invariably, whether against Moors or Spaniards, rendered more important services to their country than the regular army.

The Crusades, which for two centuries gave employment to the most warlike spirits in Europe, were essentially wars of chivalry, emanating from the romantic enthusiasm and fanaticism of the times. As such, they did not exercise much influence on military science, and did still less to restore the prestige of infantry. At Antioch, indeed, the victory of the Crusaders, over the countless swarms of the infidels, who had hemmed them in, was entirely owing to the destruction of their horses by famine, whereby they were compelled to fight their way out on foot.

But, truly has it been said, that such victories were only "Blind achievements, performed by strength, and recorded by ignorance,”—when we find the victors unable to perceive and profit by the real cause of their success, and ascribing it to the miraculous interposition of the Saints!

Indirectly the Crusades may have been said to have paved the way for a change in the military systems of Europe, since by impoverishing the nobles it sapped the foundations of chivalry. Unable, to the same extent as before, to support or defy the kingly power at the head of their feudal levies, the importance of the barons was sensibly diminished. The efforts of several monarchs to render themselves independent of these dangerous vassals, by creating the first approaches to national forces, contributed further towards the revolution in the composition of armies, and have already been mentioned. Beyond this indirect gain, the knowledge and experience acquired in the Crusades, have been thus sarcastically summed up by more than one writer; "ques les milices d'occident n'avaient rapportés de ces expeditions lointaines, que l'usage des timbales, des cymbales et du tambour, assez triste et assez incommode instrument de musique militaire." The French infantry continued in its chaotic state until the reign of Charles VII., although St. Louis attempted in 1226 to give them some kind of an organisation, and placed them under the command of an officer, called the "Grand Master of the Cross-bowmen." The part that it continued

to play in battle was still a very inferior one, and it was always more ready and efficient at plundering than fighting. At the battle of Bouvines, 1214, between Philip Augustus and the Emperor Otho, the French infantry was ordered to attack that of the Germans, which, according to the old chroniclers, was "very good and trained to fight on the level, even against cavalry." The French however fared very badly, and in their flight, nearly caused the King to be taken prisoner. The Count of Boulogne, who was fighting on Otho's side, does not seem however to have known in what particular manner to employ his infantry, so he formed them into a hollow square, where he and six other knights retired every now and then to take breath, from the fatigues of the combat. It was at Crecy, 1346, that the unfortunate French infantry had its culminating disaster. The first "battle" or line of the French army was composed of 15,000 Genoese cross-bowmen, whom Philip of Valois had taken into his pay, and these certainly did not justify, on that day, the high reputation that was attached to them. No sooner did they see the English men-at-arms bearing down on them than they broke and fled. This shameful flight is attributed by some to the strings of their cross-bows having been injured by rain, and by others to the noise of the cannon, which the English are now generally allowed to have been the first to use in this action. Whatever may have been the cause, Philip, on witnessing their flight, called out to

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