the Koran," were neglected for the more romantic but desultory combats of mailed knights on horseback, of which the chief features were hopelessly confused mélées, and slaughter without an intelligent aim. CHAPTER V. FEUDAL PERIOD. From the reign of Charlemagne, 768, to that of Charles VII. of war. IN the wars of Charlemagne, the decadence of infantry was as rapid as that of the military art itself. Throughout all history, it is observable, that the existence and organisation of infantry, in all its vicissitudes, have been identical with, and consequent on-not only the political and social condition of the age, but also the progress or abeyance of science in The exaggerated, and in most cases, the apocryphal deeds of the Imperial Paladins created a romantic desire of emulation, which caused revenues to be squandered on costly armour and trappings, and chargers covered with iron. This was the beginning of the Age Chivalry. Charlemagne died, and his feeble successors were for a time content to hold a nominal suzerainty over turbulent vassals, who as counts or seignieurs exercised sovereign powers, each in his own territory, and who led their own vassals, or not, as it suited them, at the call of the monarch, to the defence of the kingdom. Among themselves they were at constant war. This was the commencement of the Feudal period, when the selfish nobles sought only their own aggrandisement, and when the peasantry and burgesses, the main strength of armies, were reduced to the lowest state of degradation. At the close of the reign of Charlemagne, cavalry formed the half of his armies; under his successors it was the sole combatant force; for infantry had become merely a disorderly rabble of camp-followers. Anything deserving the name of an organised force did not exist. The national strength, weakened by being wielded by so many different hands, presented nothing but a crowd of undisciplined barons, each at the head of his own tumultuous band. Even when these barons came to combine for a common purpose under some temporary leader, they seldom could brook any kind. of control, and in battle each man fought for his own hand. An intelligent distribution or direction of the forces under his command never troubled the feudatory chief. Personal prowess was held to be the principal ingredient of success, and it is scarcely necessary to say, that isolated efforts of valour and desultory duels are incompatible with discipline and unity of action. The feudal infantry, that followed its lords into the field, was composed of a rabble of varlets, servants of the men-at-arms, and of miserable peasants dragged from their fields. Their duties were of the most ordinary kind. They watched the conflict from a respectful distance, and reserved their strength to plunder and despatch the prostrate knights, who often lay helpless for hours, unable to move from the weight of their armour, till "cracked like a lobster in his shell" by the dagger or mace of some low-born churl. Louis VI. of France, surnamed the Fat,* wearied and disgusted with the turbulence and insubordination of his barons, devised a scheme to raise troops without their intervention or assistance. By an arrangement with the inhabitants of the principal towns of his kingdom, they, in return for the concession of certain political rights and privileges, agreed to furnish him with a fixed number of horse and foot, as well as a contribution in money. This force was called the "communal militia," and to it is to be traced the origin of the National Guard. Although this measure did not dispense with the attendance of the feudal levies, it considerably lessened their importance, by destroying the monopoly of the barons in military service, and struck the first blow at the feudal system and institution of chivalry. It gave a new importance to the lower classes, who, equally worn out by the tyranny and exactions of the nobles, eagerly joined with the monarch to curb their power and pride. This communal militia, though never worth very much, was nevertheless superior to the feudal levies * Began to reign, 1108. Fat as he was, this monarch displayed, during his reign of 29 years, such an amazing amount of energy and activity as to have gained him the additional surname of "le Batailleur." in organisation, equipment, discipline and courage, and in time, came to prove to the haughty barons, that trained foot-soldiers were capable of sustaining a combat with horsemen in armour. The number of soldiers in each commune seldom exceeded 500. Two-thirds of the infantry, were armed with long or cross-bows, the remainder with clubs, leaden mallets, halberds, or the implements of trade or agriculture. They were not clothed in any uniform, but retained their habitual dress. The footmen were mustered under their respective parochial banners, and commanded by a nominee of the bishop, the chief man of the commune, or a king's officer. They were not obliged to go out of the limits of their respective communes, beyond a certain distance, calculated by a maximum of 40 days' march. Beyond that distance their keep devolved on the king, and, as very often happened, in the absence of pay and subsistence, the militia disbanded themselves and returned to their homes. In the line of battle, the communal bands, ranged three or four deep, were placed between the squadrons of the men-at-arms, and this intermixture seems to have been all the tactical knowledge that was possessed of their use. The creation of this militia in France, which did more than anything else to restore the kingly power, was also copied by Frederic Barbarossa in Germany and by Henry II. in England. Besides the feudal and communal infantry, there *They were called sergents (servientes). |