the touch-hole, so that time was gained by the absence of any necessity to prime. A further saving of time was also effected by not requiring to turn the iron ramrod in loading, as it was cylindrical throughout and equal at both ends. The infantry was thus able to attain a marvellous degree of rapidity in its fire, and could load and fire six times in the minute. The weapon heated rapidly in consequence, but in order to counteract this inconvenience, the soldier was provided with a piece of leather for his left hand. Another piece of leather was also provided, to protect the lock and pan from the effects of rain or damp.

Frederic's battalion was ranged on three ranks, and was subdivided tactically into eight pelotons or divisions, thus retaining the old vicious separation of the tactical and administrative fractions. Frederic acknowledged the error of this, but for reasons of his own, the desire to injure as little as possible the stability of his troops by frequent changes, and economy, being perhaps the principal ones,―he decided to retain the old organisation, and harmonise it as much as possible with the new tactic. The officers occupied the intervals between the pelotons in the front rank; behind each was a non-commissioned officer. Four paces to the rear was formed a supernumerary rank, consisting of all the remaining officers and non-commissioned officers. The colours divided the battalion into two equal wings, each wing consisting of two divisions, and each division of two

pelotons. At each side of the colours were three files, who always reserved their fire. In front of them was the commandant of the battalion. The major and adjutant were mounted, and stationed themselves in positions necessary for the proper direction of the different movements. The company, considered singly, was divided into four sections. A non-commissioned officer occupied the right of each section, and two others posted themselves behind the first and fourth sections, and one behind the second and third. The captain and drums were in front of the first section, the ensign before the second, the second lieutenant before the fourth. The supernumeraries, formed in three ranks, were stationed in rear of the company. When marching right in front, the captain led the first section with the drums behind him; the ensign the second, the second lieutenant the third, the first sergeant the fourth, and the first lieutenant brought up the rear. Marching left in front the first lieutenant led the company, and the captain the first, now become the fourth; any officer closing up the rear.

Frederic principally relied on the fire of his infantry, though he also used the bayonet attack, when occasion required, especially at Hohenfriedberg and Lowositz. In general he preferred the fire of the three ranks, the first kneeling, and given by pelotons, successively from the right, and in such a manner that the battalion had always half its fire in In advancing or retiring the fire was also

reserve.

given by pelotons from the right, without the march being checked. Guibert, in his Essai general de tactique, condemns this practice of firing on the march. There is no doubt, however, if troops can be drilled into sufficient steadiness and precision to execute it properly, that it possesses great advantages when opposed to a slow and unready enemy, like Frederic's chief opponents, the Austrians.

As for the exercises and evolutions of the Prussian infantry, it is sufficient to say, that they were much the same as those of the present day, of which they were the origin and base.

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CHAPTER XIV.

EUROPEAN INFANTRY.

From the time of Frederic the Great to the present.

THE "Prussomania," as it was called, took nowhere such a firm root at first as in France, though it required no very great sagacity to perceive, that Frederic's tactics, and the German discipline of the cane, were entirely opposed to the national character of the French. The introduction of the Prussian system was an error, which Frederic himself would never have committed in France; for he held that in the military organisation of a country, the first care should be to adapt it to the idiosyncracy of the nation. In 1775 the indiscipline and disorganisation of the army were such, that Louis XVI., by the advice of the Minister Turgot, appointed the Count of St. Germain Minister of War. He was an intrepid soldier and an able general; had saved the wreck of the French army after the rout at Rosbach, and had covered its retreat from Minden; but was intractable as a colleague, fantastic as a reformer, and decidedly unsuccessful as a War Minister. His long absence from France in various foreign services, had caused him to forget the peculiarities of his own