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Spanish vessels he would find there, and then sail to the rendezvous at Martinique.

4. Thus there would be, if all things went well, united at Martinique, twelve vessels under Villeneuve, six or seven under Gravina, five under Missiessy, twenty-one under Ganteaume, together with the Franco-Spanish fleet of Ferrol, making between fifty and sixty sail of the line. "A larger fleet," says M. Thiers, echoing Napoleon himself, "than was ever at any one time united upon one sea." So united, they were to return to the Channel.

Napoleon himself, during the whole period, that is, between March and July, determined to remain in Italy, living an ostentatious life, reviewing troops, giving fetes, and otherwise spending his time so as completely to hide from England the imminent danger which threatened her very existence as a nation, and which, if the projected scheme succeeded only so far as to bring a hostile fleet of fifty or sixty sail in one body into the Channel, would, it was supposed, require all, and more than all, the means she possessed to shield her from the ruin which impended.

5. The most profound secrecy was to be The means of England were, however, observed. The Spaniards were to be kept vast, and Mr. Pitt at this period was busy in entirely ignorant of the object of the enter- forming the last coalition of the European prise, and were ordered to obey without in- powers against Napoleon, which fate perquiry. The two French admirals, Ville-mitted him to accomplish. England, Ausneuve and Ganteaume, were alone to be cognizant of the plan and its purpose; and they were to learn that purpose at sea. Lest the secret should escape if they were made acquainted with it while in communication with the land, they would receive sealed orders, which were to be opened at sea. None of the captains in the fleet were trusted, but were told merely the names of certain places of rendezvous in case of accidental separation.

tria, Russia, Sweden, Naples, united with the determination of assailing the French emperor immediately. Prussia was expected to join the coalition, and 500,000 men were, by the will of Mr. Pitt and the money of England, to be equipped and organized into invading armies, and thrust rapidly forward upon the forces and the territories of Napoleon.

Before these armies, however, could be brought to bear effectively upon him, Napoleon hoped to make his descent upon England. England alone stood between him and dominion over the whole of Europe; but so long as she remained erect, and mistress of the sea, his present power was precarious, and every extension of his dominion increas

6. In the meantime reports were to be industriously circulated that the fleets which had escaped had proceeded to India; and in order to give a color to this statement, a certain number of soldiers were embarked as if for the purpose of attacking our forces in Hindostan. There were, however, in realityed the chances of disaster. England's chief only about 5000, who were to be left in the West Indies, in the French garrisons there, in the place of the old soldiers, who were to be brought back and added to the army at Boulogne.

*

Such was the plan. In furtherance of it the fleets were to escape at the end of March; taking a month, it was expected, to reach Martinique, April would be passed before they arrived; May was to be occupied in joining and arranging the fleets; and June would be passed in the passage back to Europe. So that the united fleet was to be expected in the Channel early in July.

Knowing now what Napoleon's plan was, we can find various indications of it in the events of the day. But Nelson was evidently unaware of the object for which Villeneuve was sent to Martinique,

and was mistaken as to his destination on his return. Writing on the 17th August, 1805, Nelson says,-"By all accounts I am satisfied their original destination was the Mediterranean, but they heard frequently of our track.”—Desp. vol. vii. p. 5.

strength lay in her navy; without it at that time, against such a gigantic military power as that wielded with unrivaled skill by Napoleon, she could not have stood a day— with it, in that full supremacy she sought and attained, she kept him a prisoner in Europe. The cage, indeed, was a large one, and he possessed nearly the whole of it; still he felt the humiliation, and in an evil hour for himself, and perhaps for the world, he staked his power against that of England, and in his anger determined to risk that great stake at every throw, rather than forego the chance of destroying the sole remaining but mighty obstacle which lay in the way of his ambi

tion.

"Avec son regard perçant le premier consul aperçut bientôt la portée de cette guerre, et il prit sa résolution sans hésiter. Il forma le projet de franchir le détroit de Calais avec une armée, et de terminer dans Londres même la rivalité des deux nations. On va le voir pendant trois années consécutives, appliquant toutes ses facultés à cette

prodigieuse entreprise, et demeurant calme, con- | tion, which always occurs in French history fiant, heureux même tant il était plein d'espérance so soon as the fleet gets into action? Then en présence d'une tentative qui devait conduire, ou à être le maître absolu du monde, ou à s'en every necessary quality is attributed to commanders and men. gloutir lui, et son armée et sa gloire, au fond de They are skillful as well Pocéan."-Vol. iv. p. 386. as bold. Everything succumbs to their valor and their admirable sagacity. They are conquered, it is true, but only by superior numbers, which at the commencement we have learned to be on their own side, but which suddenly changes sides. Napoleon speaking of Nelson's fleet, which destroyed the French fleet at the Nile, says:

So soon as the hollow peace of Amiens was broken, Napoleon turned his whole thoughts to this one object of curbing, if not of conquering, England; and the time had now arrived, viz., in the spring of 1805, when he hoped for the fulfillment of his long-deferred and most earnest hopes. His orders were issued, and Villeneuve escaped from Toulon. Missiessy had already, in January, sailed for the Antilles, and had excited the attention of England by causing alarm for the safety of some of her West Indian colonies. Villeneuve, escaping from Toulon on the 30th of March, had, in compliance with his orders, sailed to Cadiz, taken Admiral Gravina, with six Spanish ships and one French ship, l'Aigle, under his command, and sailed thence to Martinique. But Ganteaume was unable to escape from Brest. An uninterrupted course of fine weather allowed the English fleet to keep steadily before that port, and no opportunity was offered of getting out without fighting; but fighting was not judged expedient, and the expression of M. Thiers upon the subject, escaping from him by accident, reveals the whole mystery of the matter, if mystery there be, to anything but a willfully blinded national vanity:—

"Il n'y avait d'autre ressource que de livrer un combat désavantageux à une escadre qui était à peu près égale en nombre à l'escadre française, et très supérieure en qualité."

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"L'escadre de Nelson était une des plus mau-" vaises que l'Angleterre eût mises en mer dans ces derniers temps." And then says of his own:"L'escadre française était composée à son départ de Toulon de treize vaisseaux de ligne, de six frégates, et d'une douzaine de bricks corvettes ou avisos. L'escadre Anglaise était forte de treize vaisseaux, dont un de 50 canons, tous les autres 74. Ils avaient été armés très à la hâte, et étaient en mauvais état. Nelson n'avait pas de frégates. On comptait, dans l'escadre française, un vaisseau de 120 canons et trois de 80."

Now this description, which is all perfectly true, is given to exculpate himself. He sought to prove, and he did prove, that the French admiral had every means of defending himself. Yet, in spite of this overwhelming superiority of force, Napoleon considered the French fleet in danger so long as it was within reach of the English inferior fleet commanded by Nelson, and with strange inconsistency says:

"Son étonnement (Napoleon's, who writes in the third person) fut grand d'apprendre que l'escadre n'était par en sûreté, qu'elle ne se trouvait ni dans le port d' Alexandrie, ni dans celui de Corfu, ni même en chemin pour Toulon; mais qu'elle était dans la rade d'Aboukir exposée aux attaques d'un ennemi supérieur.”

Let us stop here a moment. We find in all French accounts of their naval affairs two classes of description relating to the same circumstances. The description of a fleet This superior enemy being that same fleet and the crews which man it before an action which he had just described as the worst ever and during an action are in striking opposi- sent out by England, composed of small vestion one to the other. In the first case, that sels, about half the size of the magnificent is, before the action, every effort is made to ships which conveyed his army to Egypt, prove the fleet ineffective, and inferior to its and which sailed away from that country English opponent in everything excepting captive to the English. M. Thiers adopts simple valor, which a French writer never the same system. The enemy, that is, the allows to have forsaken his countrymen. English, are always superior just when going They may lack spirit, audacity, presence of into action during the action they are beatmind, coolness, but never courage. They en at every point, and in every seamanmay be weak, vacillating, anxious, despond-quality-but at the end they always come ing, but never cowardly. We believe this; out the conquerors, and that is simply the and herein lies the explanation of what we result of their overwhelming superiority of are about to describe. But, then, what is force. Now we shall be able to prove just the meaning of the second class of descrip- the reverse of this to be the truth. In num

-like

bers the French, strange to say, were at each point superior. At all points they were inferior in skill and in seaman-like qualities of every description-in daring and in hardihood. The English Government and the English commanders relied upon this, and never looked for a superiority of numbers or of metal on their own side, but were satisfied if their fleets approached in these particulars to the force opposed to them. The consequence was, that all our great naval victories were gained with inferior force. According to the showing of M. Thiers himself, Ganteaume had one-and-twenty vessels, Admiral Cornwallis had about twenty (une vingtaine― a very convenient phrase, because an ambiguous one. We feel certain that Cornwallis had not at that time twenty line-of-battle ships). Admiral Calder blockaded Ferrol with seven or eight, according to M. Thiers (here again we have no doubt the numbers are given in this loose way in order to make the number appear larger than reality), but in Ferrol he acknowledges that there were five French and seven Spanish ships. Thus Calder kept twelve ships in port with seven or eight-no slight disparity, even taking the numbers from M. Thiers, whom we shall prove immediately to be wholly untrustworthy in questions of figures.*

We will now return to our narrative. Ganteaume was kept in Brest. This, however, need not have disconcerted the plan. Napoleon had provided for the supposed case of Ganteaume not being able to escape, and of Missiessy having returned to Rochefort, and commanded Villeneuve under those circumstances to return at once with Gravina, and then effect that which Ganteaume was to have performed, viz., relieve Ferrol from blockade, which, seeing that Calder had only five or six ships and Villeneuve eighteen, was practicable; he was then, if possible, to touch at Rochefort, to which place Missiessy would probably have returned; and now, having fifty-six vessels, he was to proceed at once up the Channel and protect the flotilla, which would then pass from Boulogne to England.

Villeneuve, however, did none of these

*In vol. v. page 417, the ships under Calder are said to be seven or eight; in page 419 they are called five or six. In the first instance he wanted to excuse Ganteaume for not fighting; in the second, he wishes to show how Napoleon's plan ought to have succeeded. The object changing suddenly, he as suddenly changes the figures to suit his purpose.

Villeneuve had in fact twenty line-of-battle ships, two having joined him from Rochefort.

things. He was haunted by the terror of Nelson being at his heels, and the narrative of his miserable voyage, as given by M. Thiers, has only to be compared with the history of Nelson's wondrous pursuit, if we wish to know why victory was the certain reward of the one chief and defeat the inevitable portion of the other.

Villeneuve, having escaped from Toulon, fled upon the wings of the wind to Cadiz. Nelson, in the hope of enticing the fleet out of Toulon, and believing that they were desirous of going to the south of Italy, gave out that he intended to cruise off Barcelona, but went in reality to the south of Sardinia. Thither he expected the French would come, and as he never doubted of victory, they would thus, he supposed, fall into his hands. The real object of Villeneuve was, however, aided by this proceeding. So soon as he was out of Toulon harbor he learned the true destination of Nelson, and was happy for the moment to be relieved of this terrible adversary, the thought of whom hung upon him like a nightmare. On the 9th of April he passed the Straits, and that same evening anchored off Cadiz. There, according to the French accounts, everything was in disorder, and Gravina requested forty-eight hours' delay to enable him to get ready.

"Mais (says M. Thiers) Villeneuve etait pressant, et disait qu'il n'attendrait pas si on ne le joignit sur-le-champ. Quoique un peu remis du trouble de sa première sortie, l'amiral français etait cependant poursuivi sans cesse par l'image de Nelson, qu'il croyait toujours voir sur ses traces." --Vol. v. p. 442.

This haste and terror increased the confusion. Gravina, a bold and excellent officer, sailed that night, but one of his vessels grounded in consequence of the precipitate mode in which he was obliged to proceed. A fair wind in the morning took Villeneuve off. On the eleventh he was " en plein océan," says his historian, " ayant échappé à la redoubtable surveillance des Anglais." Being at sea, he thought himself for the moment safe, and awaited that day and the next for the Spaniards. Two only joined; he thereupon made sail, and proceeded to Martinique. On arriving there he found that four of the Spanish vessels, which at Cadiz he dared not wait for, had passed him on the voyage out, and had arrived before him. Thus proving that these much-decried Spaniards were at least equal to the French in the conduct of their ships.

Arriving at Martinique on the 14th of May, | only a dozen. He was said, indeed, to have Villeneuve was by his orders to remain there taken Cochrane under his command, with till the 23d, in the hope that Ganteaume the ships that were with him. "Villeneuve might escape also and join him. This forced saw continually before him Nelson, with fourdelay excited fresh alarms in the mind of the teen, sixteen, perhaps eighteen vessels,-that French Admiral, who, still haunted by the is to say, with a force nearly equal to his terrible spectre of Nelson, exclaimed that own, ready to join and attack him." These that time was given to Nelson to arrive and are the words of M. Thiers,―an English fleet blockade him in Martinique, and beat him if of eighteen ships he calls nearly equal to a he attempted to escape. A chief who in- French fleet of twenty sail of the line and dulged in such expectations was sure to have seven frigates; and he is the first to blame his prophecies fulfilled. The time was spent Villeneuve for exaggerating the fighting suby Villeneuve in preparing for little expedi- periority of the English.* Villeneuve now tions against the English strongholds in Do- resolved to sail at once for Europe, spite of minica. These preparations were, however, the remonstrances of General Lauriston, the rather pretences than reality; nothing was secretary of Napoleon, who was on board in done, though much was talked about. At the character rather of a reporter than anylength, on the 4th of June, Admiral Maugon thing else. He, unlike Villeneuve and M. arrived with two vessels from Rochefort, Thiers, considered, that as Cochrane had only whence he had been sent by Napoleon to two ships and Nelson twelve, the French, communicate to Villeneuve his change of having twenty sail of the line, three fifties, plans in consequence of the forced detention five frigates, and two brigs, were nearly of Ganteaume. Villeneuve was ordered to double the force of their opponents, and return on the 21st to Brest, the blockade of might safely risk a battle:— which he was to raise, and having thus freed Ganteaume, he was to perform the same service to the fleet in Ferrol, and the whole united forces were then to sail direct for the Straits of Dover. He was commanded to remain till the 21st, because there was yet a chance for the escape of Ganteaume, who, if he could get out before the 21st of May, would proceed, as originally intended, to the rendezvous at Martinique, and would then return according to the present arrangement with the united squadron. Ganteaume did not succeed, however, but still continued in Brest watched by the English fleet. Villeneuve, therefore, determined to return, and in passing by Antigua saw and captured a large convoy of our West Indian merchant-ships. From the passengers on board Villeneuve obtained news of Nelson, and was, according to M. Thiers, utterly paralyzed in consequence. This prostration of mind M. Thiers will not permit to be called cowardice; it was responsibility that Villeneuve dreaded, according to the historian, not danger. This, nevertheless, is very much the same thing, and certainly produced the same effects. At this time the French fleet amounted to twentyseven sail, and Nelson, according to the varying report of the passengers, had a squadron of twelve or fourteen.* Generally, how passengers said that Nelson had

ever, the

*He really had nine, and with these he hesitated not to chase this vast French fleet from one hemisphere to the other.

'Lauriston, au contraire, s'appuyant sur l'assertion des prisonniers, qui ne donnaient que deux vaisseaux à Cochrane, ce qui en devait faire supqu'avec vingt on était en mesure de le combattre poser tout au plus quatorze à Nelson, soutenait avantageusement, et qu'après débarrassé de sa poursuite par une bataille il serait bien plus assuré de remplir sa mission.”—P. 450.

Villeneuve resisted all his arguments, and sailed for Europe, being so utterly terrified lest Nelson should discover him as to determine not to take back to Martinique the soldiers whom he had withdrawn from that island when about to attack Dominica. He therefore put as many as he could into four frigates, retaining still between four or five thousand of these troops, whom M. Thiers calls a "singularly embarrassing charge;" yet they must have been of service during the engagement which soon after took place between the French fleet and that of Sir Robert Calder.

The history of Nelson's proceedings during this period forces from M. Thiers an expression of grudging and unwilling admiration. On the 16th of April, he learned that the Toulon fleet had sailed through the Straits; and he at once decided to pursue it. West winds kept him in the Mediterranean till the

* M. Thiers knew the exact force of Villeneuve when he wrote this sentence: it was twenty ships of the line, three ships of fifty guns, five frigates, and three brigs. We shall see immediately that this shrouding of the numbers has a purpose.

30th. On the 10th of May he was in Lagos | line, and in the action which followed the Bay, whence he detached one of his vessels meeting of the two fleets captured too Spanin charge of a convoy, and sailed himself ish sail of the line. M. Thiers calls this a with the remainder to the West Indies, where victory on the part of the French, and the he believed the French fleet to be. He English seemed something of the same mind. reached Barbadoes* early in June, after a Sir Robert Calder lost the command of the voyage of what M. Thiers calls "une rapi- fleet, and was tried by a court-martial, and dité prodigieuse," sailing "sans crainte sentenced "to be severely reprimanded" for avec neuf vaisseaux seulement." Nelson, with not having done his utmost to renew the nine vessels, rushed after a fleet of twenty, action. The English decried their fleet beand was grieved only because they escaped cause they had not captured the greater part him. M. Villeneuve, on the contrary, was of the enemy: the French deemed themabsolutely frightened out of his wits lest with selves victorious because they had lost only his vast fleet he should fall in with this small two ships. M. Thiers blames Villeneuve for English force led by Nelson. Once in his not renewing the action, saying (we can life he had met Nelson, and the impression hardly understand on what grounds), that as made on his mind by that terrible day never the combined fleet had only lost two vessels wore out. He had learned at the Nile while they were twenty strong,* they would how Nelson and his followers fought, and the next day, when they were only eighteen, was now scared by the bare idea of again en- have utterly defeated the English had Villecountering him, even with the odds of twenty neuve renewed the conflict. With the cirto fourteen in his favor. On arriving at Bar- cumstances of this engagement we have in badoes Nelson imagined that the French this paper no further concern. It led, howfleet had gone to Trinidad, with the intention ever, to two important results, the full force of reconquering it for Spain. He thereupon of which was not at the time really undertook 2000 men (soldiers) whom he found at stood. Nelson, who, on his return to Europe Barbadoes, ordered Cochrane with his two in August, had left his ship, and retired to ships to join him, and proceeded without Merton in order to recruit his shattered delay at once to the Gulf of Paria in Trini- health, was led by the unsatisfactory result dad. There not finding the French, he sailed of Sir Robert Calder's action to offer his straight to Grenada, which he reached on services to Mr. Pitt. His offer was accepted, the 10th of June. Being still baffled in his and he assumed in consequence the command search, he went back to Barbadoes in order of the Channel fleet. The other important to return the troops which he had taken effect was that Villeneuve, thoroughly territhence, and sailed with his eleven back to fied by the action, though incomplete, and Europe in hot pursuit of the enemy:— even favorable as it was considered by the French, resolved to disobey the positive command of Napoleon, rather than run any further risks. He had been commanded to relieve the blockade of Ferrol and Brest. In

"Que d'activite! (here exclaims M. Thiers,) que d'energie quel admirable emploi du temps! C'est une nouvelle preuve qu'a la guerre, et dans la guerre de mer plus encore que dans la guerre de terre, la qualite des forces vaut toujours mieux que la quantite. Nelson avec onze vaisseaux etait en confiance sur cette mer où Villeneuve tremblait avec vingt vaisseaux, montes cependant par des matelots heroïques!"

Villeneuve at the Azores found the frigates he had detached, and now proceeded to Europe, with his twenty sail of the line, three fifties, five frigates, and two brigs, and at length encountered an English fleet-not, however, commanded by Nelson; and the result showed how much depends upon the character of a chief in war. Sir Robert Calder had, indeed, only fifteen sail of the

* M. Thiers, in order to describe Villineuve's state of mind, is obliged to use the word "fear." On this occasion his narrative runs thus:-"Nelson qu'il craignait tant était arrivé à la Barbade," &c.

place of doing this, he determined to take refuge in Cadiz. Lauriston vehemently opposed this resolution, and insisted on the necessity of obeying the Emperor's commands. Villeneuve compromised the matter by anchoring at Vigo. Leaving three vessels at that port, he thence proceeded toward Ferrol, and on the 2d of August entered the open road which separates Ferrol from Corunna. At this place he was met by agents sent by Napoleon, and received

* The real force of Villeneuve, which M. Thiers anxiously veils, was in reality, as we have said in the text, twenty sail of the line, three fifty-gun ships, five frigates, and three brigs. Sir Robert Calder had fifteen sail of the line and two frigates. There can be no doubt of this, as the inquiry upon Sir Robert Calder necessarily brought out the exact force on both sides.

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