Abbildungen der Seite
PDF
EPUB

1901, June 24.-Convention between Great Britain and Denmark for regulating the fisheries outside the three-mile limit in the ocean surrounding the Fare Islands and Iceland.

1991, November 18.-Treaty with the United States to facilitate the construction of a ship canal establishing protective zones of three marine miles from either end of the canal.

1905, June 15.-Act of the Government of Newfoundland respecting foreign fishing vessels.3

Be it enacted by the Governor, the Legislative Council, and House of Assembly, in legislative session convened, as follows:

1. Any justice of the peace, subcollector, preventive officer, fishery warden or constable may go on board any foreign fishing vessel being within any port on the coasts of this island or hovering in British waters within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors in this island, and may bring such foreign fishing vessel into port, may search her cargo, and may examine the master upon oath touching the cargo and voyage; and the master or person in command shall answer truly such questions as shall be put to him under a penalty not exceeding 500 dollars; and if such foreign vessel has on board any herring, caplin, squid, or other bait fishes, ice, lines, seines, or other outfits or supplies for the fishery purchased within any port on the coasts of this island or within the distance of three marine miles from any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of this island, or if the master of the said vessel shall have engaged, or attempted to engage, any person to form part of the crew of the said vessel in any port or on any part of the coasts of this island, or has entered such waters for any purpose not permitted by treaty or convention for the time being in force, such vessel and the tackle, rigging, apparel, furniture, stores, and cargo thereof shall be forfeited.

1906.-Act of the Government of Canada respecting the customs.*

154. If any vessel is found hovering in British waters, while within one league of the coasts or shores of Canada, any officer may go on board and enter into such vessel and stay on board such vessel while she remains within the limits of Canada or within one league

1 See ante, p. 517.

2 See post, p. 680.

* Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, vol. 25, p. 872; 5 Edward VII, cap. 4.

Revised Statutes of Canada, 1906, chap. 48; British and Foreign State Papers, vol. 105, p. 46.

thereof; and, if any such vessel is bound elsewhere, and so continues hovering for the space of twenty-four hours after the master has been by such officer required to depart, such officer may bring the vessel into port and examine her cargo.

1906, March 14, April 16.-Decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in the ship "North" v. the King.1

DAVIES, J. The "North" was an American fishing schooner and was found by the Dominion fishing cruiser "Kestrel" on the 8th July, 1905, fishing off the coast of British Columbia within the three-mile limit or zone.

On being discovered the poaching schooner immediately endeavored to escape into the high seas beyond the three-mile limit. She was at once pursued by the "Kestrel " and two of her boats, which were out fishing and which she was unable to pick up while endeavoring herself to escape, were captured. The schooner was not overtaken till she had passed out beyond the three-mile limit into the high seas. She was, when overtaken, taken possession of for illegal fishing, brought into port, libeled in the Admiralty Court, and after trial, condemned.

Some questions were raised on this appeal by Mr. Wilson as to the legality of the condemnation on the ground that the fisheries along the coast belonged to the province and not to the Dominion and that the legislation for their protection should have been provincial and not Dominion. The simple answer to such objections is that the British North America Act, 1867, conferred upon the Dominion the exclusive power of legislation with respect to seacoast and inland fisheries and that the judgment of the judicial committee in the case of Attorney General of Canada v. Attorney General of Ontario (1), determines affirmatively the exclusive right of the Dominion Parliament to make or authorize the making of regulations and restrictions respecting the fisheries of Canada.

1906, May 10.-Act of the Government of Newfoundland respecting foreign fishing vessels.2

Be it enacted by the Governor, the Legislative Council, and House of Assembly, in legislative session convened as follows:

1. Any justice of the peace, subcollector, preventive officer, fishery warden, or constable may go on board any foreign fishing vessel, being within any port on the coasts of this colony, or hovering in British waters within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays,

1 Canada, Supreme Court Reports, vol. 37, p. 392.

Hertslet, Commercial Treaties, vol. 25, p. 875; 6 Edward VII, cap. 1.

creeks or harbors in this colony, and may bring such foreign fishing vessel into port, may search her cargo, and may examine the master. upon oath touching the cargo and voyage, and the master or person in command shall answer truly such questions as shall be put to him, under a penalty not exceeding 500 dollars.

2. If any foreign fishing vessel be found within any port on the coasts of this colony, or hovering in British waters within three marine miles of any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors in this colony, and having on board any herring, caplin, squid, or other bait fishes, ice, lines, seines, or other outfits or supplies for the fishery, purchased within any port on the coasts of this colony, or within the distance of three marine miles from any of the coasts, bays, creeks, or harbors of this colony; or if the master, owner, or agent of the said vessel shall have engaged, or attempted to engage, any person to form part of the crew of the said vessel in any port, or any part of the coasts, of this colony, or has entered such waters for any purpose not permitted by treaty or convention for the time being in force, the master, owner, or agent shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 100 dollars, or such vessel and the tackle, rigging, apparel, furniture, stores, and cargo thereof shall be forfeited, as the magistrate before whom the proceeding is taken shall determine.

1906, July 19.-Mortensen v. Peters, High Court of Justiciary of Scotland.1

The Lord Justice General: The facts of this case are that the appellant being a foreign subject, and master of a vessel registered in a foreign country, exercised the method of fishing known as otter trawling at a point within the Moray Firth, more than three miles from the shore, but to the west of a line drawn from Duncansby Head in Caithness to Rattray Point in Aberdeenshire; that being thereafter found within British territory, to wit, at Grimsby, he was summoned to the sheriff court at Dornoch to answer to a complaint against him for having contravened the seventh section of the Herring Fishery Act, 1889, and the by-law of the fishery board, thereunder made, and was convicted.

It is not disputed that if the appellant had been a British subject in a British ship he would have been rightly convicted. Further, in the case of Peters v. Olsen, when the person convicted, as here, was a foreigner in a foreign ship, the conviction was held good. The only difference in the facts in that case was that the locus there, was upon a certain view of the evidence, within three miles of a line measured across the mouth of a bay, where the bay was not more than ten miles wide, which cannot be said here. But the conviction

1 American Journal of International Law, vol. 1, p. 532.

proceeded on no such consideration, but simply on the fact that the locus was within the limit expressly defined by the schedule of the sixth section of the Herring Fishery Act; and the three learned judges in that case did, I think, undoubtedly consider and decide the question, whether the sixth section of the Herring Fishery Act (which in this intention is the same as the seventh) was, or was not, intended to strike at foreigners as well as British subjects. But as this is a full bench, we are at liberty to reconsider that decision.

My lords, I apprehend that the question is one of construction and of construction only. In this court we have nothing to do with the question of whether the legislature has, or has not done, what foreign Powers may consider a usurpation in a question with them. Neither are we a tribunal sitting to decide whether an act of the legislature is ultra vires as in contravention of generally acknowledged principles of international law. For us an act of Parliament duly passed by Lords and Commons and assented to by the King is supreme, and we are bound to give effect to its terms. The counsel for the appellant advanced the proposition that statutes creating offenses must be presumed to apply (1) to British subjects; and (2) to foreign subjects in British territory; but that short of express enactment their application should not be further extended. The appellant is admittedly not a British subject, which excludes (1); and he further argued that the locus delicti, being in the sea beyond the three mile limit, was not within British territory; and that consequently the appellant was not included in the prohibition of the statute. Viewed as general propositions the two presumptions put forward by the appellant may be taken as correct. This, however, advances the matter but little, for like all presumptions they may be redargued, and the question remains whether they have been redargued on this occasion.

The first thing to be noted is that the prohibitions here, a breach of which constitutes the offense, is not an absolute prohibition against doing a certain thing, but a prohibition against doing it in a certain place. Now, when a legislature, using words of admitted generality-" It shall not be lawful," etc., "Every person who,” etc.— conditions an offense by territorial limits, it creates, I think, a very strong inference that it is for the purposes specified, assuming a right to legislate for that territory against all persons whomsoever. This inference seems to me still further strengthened when it is obvious that the remedy to the mischief sought to be obtained by the prohibition would be either defeated or rendered less effective if all persons whomsoever were not affected by the enactment. It is obvious that the latter consideration applied in the present case. Whatever may be the views of any one as to the propriety or expediency of stopping trawling, the enactment shows on the face of it that it

contemplates such stopping; and it would be most clearly ineffective to debar trawling by the British subject while the subjects of other nations were allowed so to fish.

It is said by the appellant that all this must give way to the consideration that international law has firmly fixed that a locus such as this is beyond the limits of territorial sovereignty; and that consequently it is not to be thought that in such a place the legislature could seek to affect any but the King's subjects.

It is a trite observation that there is no such thing as a standard of international law, extraneous to the domestic law of a Kingdom, to which appeal may be made. International law, so far as this court is concerned, is the body of doctrine regarding the international rights and duties of States which has been adopted and made part of the law of Scotland. Now, can it be said to be clear by the law of Scotland that the locus here is beyond what the legislature may assert right to affect by legislation against all whomsoever for the purpose of regulating methods of fishing?

I do not think I need say anything about what is known as the three-mile limit. It may be assumed that within the three miles the territorial sovereignty would be sufficient to cover any such legislation as the present. It is enough to say that that is not a proof of the counter proposition that outside the three miles no such result could be looked for. The locus, although outside the three-mile limit, is within the bay known as the Moray Firth, and the Moray Firth, says the respondent, is intra fauces terra. Now. I cannot say that there is any definition of what fauces terre exactly are. But there are at least three points which go far to show that this spot might be considered as lying therein.

(1) The dicta of the Scottish institutional writers seem to show that it would be no usurpation, according to the law of Scotland, so to consider it.

Thus, Stair, II, i, 5:

The vast ocean is common to all mankind as to navigation and fishing, which are the only uses thereof, because it is not capable of bounds; but when the sea is inclosed in bays, creeks or otherwise is capable of any bounds or meiths as within the points of such lands, or within the view of such shores, then it may become proper, but with the reservation of passage for commerce as in the land.

And Bell, Pr. § 639:

The sovereign.

is proprietor of the narrow seas within cannon shot of the land, and the firths, gulfs, and bays around. the Kingdom.

(2) The same statute puts forward claims to what are at least analogous places. If attention is paid to the schedule appended to

« ZurückWeiter »