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to understand this. And yet the more modestly practical part of the Mīmānsā also contains not a little material for the historian of linguistic theories. And since this part is far greater in bulk, and also in importance,2 in the eyes of the Mimänsä writers themselves, it seems worth while to call attention to some of that material.

First, a principle of interpretation which is not only absolutely sound and scholarly, but of great practical value. It is one which many etymologists of the present day need to ponder. The Mimānsă distinguishes two methods of interpretation of words: yoga, or the meaning based on analysis and etymological derivation, and rūḍhi, or conventionally establisht meaning. And it lays down the firm principle that 'rudhi is stronger than yoga'. In other words, it is our duty to define the meaning of a word as used in actual texts or speech; and, if that is possible, to interpret the word always in that way, without regard to its derivation (real or apparent). It is not always possible to do this; and when it is impossible, we may make use of etymological interpretation, but only faute de mieux. This vigorous recognition of what we call 'philological' interpretation, in the true and original sense of that word, as distinguisht from etymological interpretation, is very creditable to the sound sense of the Mimānsakas. Many a western scholar has erred thru failure to live up to the principle that rudhi overrules yogaor more precisely thru failure to investigate with sufficient thoroness the rūḍhi of particular words, that is, their meaning in actual usage.

This rule is called the rathakara-nyāya, from the stock example given of it in the Mimānsā texts. A Vedic injunction says that 'a carpenter (rathakāra) shall lay the sacred fires in the rainy-season'. By rūdhi, a carpenter means a member of a particular low caste, which has no right to lay the sacred fires at all (a privilege reserved for Aryans). It might then be suggested that, by yoga or etymology, the word 'carpenter' means 'maker of wagons' (ratha-kāra), and so might be applied to an Aryan who makes wagons. This would seem to simplify the task of an interpreter of the Vedic text; we might expect the scholastic Mīmānsă gladly to avail itself of such a dodge. But no: rudhi prevails, ruat caelum, and tho it forces us to accept a difficult and rather far-fetched

2 For instance, the Mimāǹsā Nyāya Prakāśa of Āpadeva never once refers to the doctrine of the eternality of the word. Yet this is the most widely-known and popular introductory text-book on the Mimānsa. My translation of it, with text, introduction, and glossary, will shortly be issued by the Yale University Press. This article is based entirely on it.

explanation, the word rathakāra cannot be assumed to have any except its standard meaning, namely, a member of a certain low caste.3

Coming to matters of linguistic analysis, we find first that words are analyzed into root or stem, and ending. Let not the modern linguist sniff, however much he may deprecate the composition-theory of wordformation (which seems to be enjoying a certain revival at the moment, by the way). For that theory is not involved. The Mimansa is thinking in psychological, not formal, terms. This is sufficiently shown by the fact, to be mentioned later, that it sometimes finds more than one 'meaning' in a single unitary ending. It means only that in any inflected word there must be at least two semantic elements, the entity designated by the 'stem' or 'root', and the syntactic relationship designated by the ending. For an inflectional language, I see no possible scientific objection to this.

Furthermore, these two psychological elements cannot exist baldly and independently side by side; nor, obviously, can they be in a state of equal correlation (as in a copulative compound, meaning 'A and B'). One must be in dependence on the other. And according to the Mimānsā it is invariably the root or stem which is subordinate; the meaning of the ending is the principal element, upon which the stem-meaning depends. This might sound at first like mere perverse pedantry. But a very little reflection will show, I think, that if any such analysis is to be made at all, the Mīmānsa is quite right. The meaning of the ending cannot depend on that of the base. The syntactic connexion of the noun, for instance, or the modality of the verb: it is these concepts which, logically and psychologically, are predominant, as bringing the word into relationship with other words. The base is connected with other words only thru the ending. And, as the Mimānsā says, what is dependent on one concept cannot be wrenched away from that and made dependent on another; 'otherwise in response to the command "bring the king's servant (rāja-puruşa)", one might undertake to bring the king!' Just as 'king's' is dependent on 'servant', so the base-meaning of a word is dependent on the meaning of the ending.

This may not seem of very much practical importance; but in the code of logical principles evolved by the Miīmānsā it does, in fact, repeatedly come into play, and proves its value in actual practice. It would take

3 The fact doubtless is that the particular rūḍhi in question, in this instance, grew up after the date of the Vedic text quoted. Historic change in the meaning of words is not recognized by the Mimāǹsā. But tho the example may not be entirely a happy one, the principle is none the less sound and valuable.

us too far afield from linguistic interests to illustrate this here. I wish, however, to refer to one special case of the principle just laid down, which is at the same time regarded by the Mīmānsakas themselves as perhaps the most fundamental element in their entire system-the heart of its heart.

According to their theory, the primary purpose of the Veda is to expound human duty (dharma). It follows that the heart of the Veda is found in its injunctions (vidhi). All else is subsidiary to them. In an injunction, such as 'who desires heaven shall sacrifice', the central element is the injunctive verb, 'he shall sacrifice' (yajeta). Typically, this is an optative form (liñ, in the technical vocabulary of Hindu grammar); the fact that other verb-forms than the optative may be so used is abundantly recognized in practice, but when so used they are regarded as equivalents of optative forms.

The optative yajeta, 'he shall sacrifice', is analyzed, of course, into the root yaj(-i; so roots are technically quoted), and the ending (e-)ta. As always, the ending is the 'principal' part, the meaning of the root being subordinate to it. And the verbal ending expresses what is called the bhāvanā, which is the heart of the injunction.

This bhāvanā is the Prunkstück of the Mimānsā. Until one gets a clear understanding of it, it is impossible to understand the system. Derived as a nomen actionis from the causative of the root bhū, the word bhāvanā means 'efficient-force', 'bringing (something) to be'; or more precisely, 'a particular kind of operation in an efficient-agent which is conducive to the production of the effect', or, yet more literally, 'a kind of activity in someone-who-is-bringing-(something-)about which is conducive to the coming-into-being of that-which-is-to-come-intobeing' (bhavitur bhavanānukulo bhāvakavyāpāraviseṣaḥ).

Every verb has an efficient-force, bhāvanā. It is the active verbalitynotion. But in an optative (injunctive) verb there are two bhāvanās, two efficient-forces, tho both are exprest by the same ending. One is the general-verbality (ākhyātatva) which is exprest by any finite verbform; this the optative shares with all the rest. The other is the specific 'optativeness' (liñtva) which is exprest only by the optative forms, and which is the ultra-central element in the whole injunction and therefore in the whole Veda, because it is that which instigates a person to perform the action suggested by the verb. That is, the word yayeta, 'he shall sacrifice', expresses (1) an instigation (exprest by the 'optativeness' in the ending, the injunctive efficient-force) to (2) effect (exprest by the 'general-verbality' element in the ending, the general-verbal efficient

force) (3) something (viz. the object which the performance is to secure, such as 'heaven'),-by means of (4) a particular course of action (exprest by the verbal base, in this case yaj-, 'sacrifice').

Parenthetically, I may note that in certain injunctions (of accessory elements, guna-vidhi) the base-meaning (as 'sacrifice') is regarded as object or end of the general-verbal efficient-force; and this might seem to us a more natural analysis for all injunctive words (we might express it by the three English words '1. shall, 2. perform, 3. sacrifice'). But for good reasons of its own-specifically, in order to bring the 'fruit' or reward of the sacrifice into relation with the bhāvanā—the Mīmānsā teaches that in primary or originative injunctions of rites (utpatti-vidhi) the 'base-meaning' (sacrifice) is rather the means or instrument of the efficient-force, its end being the 'fruit' (as heaven).

It will be noted that the term bhāvanā, efficient-force, fits both the injunctive idea and the idea of general-verbality. Both mean 'bringing (something) into being'; tho the objects are different. The object of the injunctive efficient-force is the general-verbal efficient-force ('shallwhat?', answer, 'effect' [the desired end]); the object of the latter is the desired end ('[shall] effect-what?', answer, 'the desired end', as e.g. heaven).

The general-verbal efficient-force is called arthī bhāvanā, 'efficientforce of the end or goal' (artha=phala, 'fruit'), because its object is the end or fruit or reward of the performance; yajeta means yāgena iṣṭam bhavayet, 'by sacrifice he shall effect the desired end'.

* An accessory, guna, is a subordinate element in a rite, as e.g. the material offered in sacrifice. An accessory-injunction, guna-vidhi, is one which merely enjoins a particular accessory for a rite which has been enjoined in another injunction; as, dadhnā juhoti, ‘he shall make oblation with sour-milk', referring to the agnihotra oblation already enjoined by the injunction agnihotram juhoti. In these accessory-injunctions, the rite itself (exprest by the verbal-base, as hu-, homa, oblation) is the object of the efficient-force; 'with sour-milk he shall effect the oblation (which has been enjoined previously).' But unless the oblation has been already enjoined, it is clear that this interpretation would leave us without proper motivation for the instigating force. Why perform the oblation at allwith or without sour-milk? Despite the insistence on Vedic authority-nay, rather because of the repeated Vedic appeals to human self-interest-it is felt that a 'fruit' must be found; otherwise man will not perform the rites. This fruit (which is exprest by an 'injunction of qualification', adhikāra-vidhi) is then regarded as the end of the efficient-force in primary or originative injunctions.

5 Hence the general-verbal efficient-force is dependent on the injunctive one; the latter is the principal of principals.

The injunctive efficient-force is called sabdi bhāvanā, 'efficient-force of the Word', because in Vedic injunctions the force behind the injunction rests only in the Word, the Veda,—not in any agency, human or divine. (In worldly injunctions, on the other hand, it rests in the will of the person who issues the injunction; to these the term 'word-efficientforce' could not apply.) That is, the Word says man is to do certain things; this Word is absolute, and is its own authority. There is no commanding agent-not even God, who, if He exists, is not the power behind the Veda, and does not enforce Vedic commands, nor deal out rewards for their performance. (It has been held that the Mīmānsā originally denied the existence of God. It seems that it would be truer to say that it ignored God, simply as having nothing to do with its subject-matter. Many later Mīmānsakas, in any case, were theists.)

Every element in the entire Veda is brought into relation to one of these two bhāvanās or efficient-forces-in relations of end, means, or manner. For instance, the explanatory-statements (arthavāda) have no other purpose than to glorify ritual actions, and so provide the manner of operation of the injunctive efficient-force (sabdī bhāvanā); that is, the instigation is helped to be effective by statements which glorify the action to which it instigates. And so finally the entire Veda is made to depend upon the injunction; of which the injunctive verb is the core; and of this in turn the core is found in the ending, expressive of efficientforce of two kinds, the general-verbality force, and the injunctive force, this latter being the ultimate of ultimates, the peg on which the whole system of Vedic duty hangs.

This is not the whole story. Various Mīmārsā scholars try to define even more precisely the exact psychological values of each of the two bhāvanās. They argue hotly against one another, and vie with each other in subtlety. But these discussions are of less interest to linguists. If any one cares to follow them, he can do so shortly by looking into the book mentioned in note 2.

Let me close by quoting from a brief but very valuable sketch of the system by Thibaut, in his Introductory Remarks (page xiv f.) to his edition and translation of the Arthasaṁgraha, a Mimānsă treatise (Benares Sanskrit Series, No. 4; 1882). This Introduction deserves to be much better known than it is; it has not its equal as a careful, penetrating, and lucid statement of the practical intent of the Mimānsakas. Thibaut says: "The Mīmānsã certainly deserves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed none of the attractions which

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