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us too far afield from linguistic interests to illustrate this here. I wish, however, to refer to one special case of the principle just laid down, which is at the same time regarded by the Mīmānsakas themselves as perhaps the most fundamental element in their entire system-the heart of its heart.

According to their theory, the primary purpose of the Veda is to expound human duty (dharma). It follows that the heart of the Veda is found in its injunctions (vidhi). All else is subsidiary to them. In an injunction, such as 'who desires heaven shall sacrifice', the central element is the injunctive verb, 'he shall sacrifice' (yajeta). Typically, this is an optative form (liñ, in the technical vocabulary of Hindu grammar); the fact that other verb-forms than the optative may be so used is abundantly recognized in practice, but when so used they are regarded as equivalents of optative forms.

The optative yajeta, 'he shall sacrifice', is analyzed, of course, into the root yaj(-i; so roots are technically quoted), and the ending (e-)ta. As always, the ending is the 'principal' part, the meaning of the root being subordinate to it. And the verbal ending expresses what is called the bhāvanā, which is the heart of the injunction.

This bhāvanā is the Prunkstück of the Mimānsā. Until one gets a clear understanding of it, it is impossible to understand the system. Derived as a nomen actionis from the causative of the root bhū, the word bhāvanā means 'efficient-force', 'bringing (something) to be'; or more precisely, 'a particular kind of operation in an efficient-agent which is conducive to the production of the effect', or, yet more literally, 'a kind of activity in someone-who-is-bringing-(something-)about which is conducive to the coming-into-being of that-which-is-to-come-intobeing' (bhavitur bhavanānukulo bhāvakavyāpāraviseṣaḥ).

Every verb has an efficient-force, bhāvanā. It is the active verbalitynotion. But in an optative (injunctive) verb there are two bhāvanās, two efficient-forces, tho both are exprest by the same ending. One is the general-verbality (ākhyātatva) which is exprest by any finite verbform; this the optative shares with all the rest. The other is the specific 'optativeness' (liñtva) which is exprest only by the optative forms, and which is the ultra-central element in the whole injunction and therefore in the whole Veda, because it is that which instigates a person to perform the action suggested by the verb. That is, the word yayeta, 'he shall sacrifice', expresses (1) an instigation (exprest by the 'optativeness' in the ending, the injunctive efficient-force) to (2) effect (exprest by the 'general-verbality' element in the ending, the general-verbal efficient

force) (3) something (viz. the object which the performance is to secure, such as 'heaven'),—by means of (4) a particular course of action (exprest by the verbal base, in this case yaj-, 'sacrifice').

Parenthetically, I may note that in certain injunctions (of accessory elements, guna-vidhi) the base-meaning (as 'sacrifice') is regarded as object or end of the general-verbal efficient-force; and this might seem to us a more natural analysis for all injunctive words (we might express it by the three English words '1. shall, 2. perform, 3. sacrifice'). But for good reasons of its own-specifically, in order to bring the 'fruit' or reward of the sacrifice into relation with the bhāvanā—the Mīmānsā teaches that in primary or originative injunctions of rites (utpatti-vidhi) the 'base-meaning' (sacrifice) is rather the means or instrument of the efficient-force, its end being the 'fruit' (as heaven).

It will be noted that the term bhāvanā, efficient-force, fits both the injunctive idea and the idea of general-verbality. Both mean 'bringing (something) into being'; tho the objects are different. The object of the injunctive efficient-force is the general-verbal efficient-force ('shallwhat?', answer, ‘effect' [the desired end]); the object of the latter is the desired end ('[shall] effect-what?', answer, 'the desired end', as e.g. heaven).

The general-verbal efficient-force is called arthī bhāvanā, 'efficientforce of the end or goal' (artha=phala, 'fruit'), because its object is the end or fruit or reward of the performance; yajeta means yāgena iṣṭam bhavayet, 'by sacrifice he shall effect the desired end'.

An accessory, guna, is a subordinate element in a rite, as e.g. the material offered in sacrifice. An accessory-injunction, guna-vidhi, is one which merely enjoins a particular accessory for a rite which has been enjoined in another injunction; as, dadhnā juhoti, ‘he shall make oblation with sour-milk', referring to the agnihotra oblation already enjoined by the injunction agnihotram juhoti. In these accessory-injunctions, the rite itself (exprest by the verbal-base, as hu-, homa, oblation) is the object of the efficient-force; 'with sour-milk he shall effect the oblation (which has been enjoined previously).' But unless the oblation has been already enjoined, it is clear that this interpretation would leave us without proper motivation for the instigating force. Why perform the oblation at all— with or without sour-milk? Despite the insistence on Vedic authority-nay, rather because of the repeated Vedic appeals to human self-interest-it is felt that a 'fruit' must be found; otherwise man will not perform the rites. This fruit (which is exprest by an 'injunction of qualification', adhikāra-vidhi) is then regarded as the end of the efficient-force in primary or originative injunctions.

Hence the general-verbal efficient-force is dependent on the injunctive one; the latter is the principal of principals.

The injunctive efficient-force is called śābdī bhāvanā, 'efficient-force of the Word', because in Vedic injunctions the force behind the injunction rests only in the Word, the Veda,-not in any agency, human or divine. (In worldly injunctions, on the other hand, it rests in the will of the person who issues the injunction; to these the term 'word-efficientforce' could not apply.) That is, the Word says man is to do certain things; this Word is absolute, and is its own authority. There is no commanding agent-not even God, who, if He exists, is not the power behind the Veda, and does not enforce Vedic commands, nor deal out rewards for their performance. (It has been held that the Mimānsā originally denied the existence of God. It seems that it would be truer to say that it ignored God, simply as having nothing to do with its subject-matter. Many later Mimānsakas, in any case, were theists.)

Every element in the entire Veda is brought into relation to one of these two bhāvanās or efficient-forces-in relations of end, means, or manner. For instance, the explanatory-statements (arthavāda) have no other purpose than to glorify ritual actions, and so provide the manner of operation of the injunctive efficient-force (śābdī bhāvanā); that is, the instigation is helped to be effective by statements which glorify the action to which it instigates. And so finally the entire Veda is made to depend upon the injunction; of which the injunctive verb is the core; and of this in turn the core is found in the ending, expressive of efficientforce of two kinds, the general-verbality force, and the injunctive force, this latter being the ultimate of ultimates, the peg on which the whole system of Vedic duty hangs.

This is not the whole story. Various Mimārsā scholars try to define even more precisely the exact psychological values of each of the two bhāvanās. They argue hotly against one another, and vie with each other in subtlety. But these discussions are of less interest to linguists. If any one cares to follow them, he can do so shortly by looking into the book mentioned in note 2.

Let me close by quoting from a brief but very valuable sketch of the system by Thibaut, in his Introductory Remarks (page xiv f.) to his edition and translation of the Arthasaṁgraha, a Mimānsā treatise (Benares Sanskrit Series, No. 4; 1882). This Introduction deserves to be much better known than it is; it has not its equal as a careful, penetrating, and lucid statement of the practical intent of the Mimānsakas. Thibaut says: "The Mimānsă certainly deserves greater attention than it has hitherto received. It has indeed none of the attractions which

the other darsanas derived from the speculative character of their contents; its scope is limited and the nature of the investigations in which it is engaged leaves no room for high flights of the imagination." But it possesses counterbalancing advantages. Its subject matter is of a positive nature, its method is sound, and its reasoning in most case convincing.'

• This, I think, is needlessly exaggerated in its depreciation of the speculative side of the system. Thibaut was presumably thinking of the work he was dealing with, the Arthasaṁgraha, which like the Mimānsā Nyāya Prakāśa (see note 2) does not deal with that side.

THE IE ROOT *meik-: *meiĝ- AND AVESTAN mīzān



Certain forms of the Greek word for 'mix' which have y instead of K as the final of their root-syllable, e.g., the present μlyvoμ and the 2nd aorist éμlyny, appear to be anomalous when compared not only with the other forms of the same Greek verb but also with its cognates in other Indo-European languages, where all forms point to k as the primitive IE root-final. Boisacq1 derives μlyvvμι from pIE *meik- and states, without further comment, that 'le grec a la gutturale douce'. Walde,2 s. v. misceo, gives the Greek cognate as 'mit Media', but makes no remark on the phenomenon except to reject Wackernagel's theory of an independent origin for ulyvvμt. Apparently, then, Boisacq and Walde explain the disagreement in root-finals by the theory of the socalled variation of the root-determinative.1

Another possible explanation is that some word-contamination affected certain of the Greek forms, but did not reach or, at any rate, did not affect the rest. This solution of a given linguistic riddle is easier to assume than to prove, and none such has yet been found to throw light on the present problem.

A third possibility is that the pIE root was originally not *meik- at all, but *meiĝ-, weak grade *miĝ-, and that the few Greek forms are, with an exception to be mentioned presently, the only ones to show the original root-final unchanged. With this as a working hypothesis, we need not depend on the theory of a varying root-determinative to explain incongruities in Greek and other languages, but we may simply apply the ordinary principles of sound-change. Most verbal suffixes begin with either s or t, both of which would cause the preceding voiced

1 E. Boisacq, Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque 637-8 (Paris, 1916). 2 A. Walde, Lateinisches etymologisches Wörterbuch2 488 (Heidelberg, 1910). 3 J. Wackernagel in Kuhn's Zeitschrift für vergleichende Sprachforschung 33. 39. 4 P. Persson, Studien zur Lehre von der Wurzelerweiterung und Wurzelvariation, Upsala, 1891.

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