XXXIII. CHAP. the occupation of Dauphiny, and the French were not only threatened with the loss of Italy but with that of their own south-eastern provinces. If France was unable to make use of the Piedmontese alliance, England profited almost as little by the Dutch. Their generals hampered Marlborough in every design. He had begun the campaign of 1703 by the capture of Bonn. But their fears had recalled him to Flanders, where he formed with them a plan for reducing Antwerp and Ostend. But one Dutch general, Opdam, allowed himself to be surprised and routed, whilst Cohorn, their engineer, showed none of the singleminded zeal of Vauban. It was even said at Amsterdam that, if Marlborough had no better success in the following year, the Dutch would abandon the active alliance.* The war was, however, about to change its character altogether. The nature of the Low Countries, and their many fortified towns, had reduced a campaign to a succession of sieges, with attempts more or less successful for the relief of the beleaguered places. Lombardy had come to partake of the nature of Flanders in this respect. In Germany the French commanders seldom ventured far from the vicinity of their strongholds on the Rhine. Political circumstances, however, and especially the alliance between France and Bavaria, led to larger strategic movements, and to the march of numerous armies over a wide expanse of territory, naturally producing those great and decisive battles in the field which change the features of politics and war.† The Tories and some of his own colleagues were against prosecuting the war in landers. The duke remonstrated that in that case they would alienate and lose the Dutch. The report of the latter abandoning it is from correspondence amongst the State Papers. 1708. † Leibnitz writes to Schulemberg in 1702 that nothing would humble the House of Bourbon but a change in the ordinary course of military operations by new inventions in the field. The transference of war to the Danube first led to this. Bavaria's detachment from the empire produced the change. One of the last political efforts of King William was to engage the emperor to secure the Bavarian elector by the promise of Naples.* The advice was slighted, and, as we have seen, the French and Bavarians threatened Vienna. This attempt, which had failed in 1703, might be renewed in the ensuing year, and embarrassed as the emperor was with the Hungarians, it became necessary that he should be succoured. This Marlborough resolved to do, in despite of the manifest obstructions to be overcome. The chief one was the reluctance of the Dutch to allow their army to be diverted from their own defence by a march so remote as that to the Danube. Marlborough by his personal solicitation prevailed, and in the month of May he had crossed the Rhine at Coblentz. Towards the close of June he was upon the Danube, contingents from almost every German power, save Bavaria, joining his standard. The duke's first object was to secure a permanent passage over the Danube into Bavaria, or from it in case of need. The foe held a strong fort on the height of Schellenberg near Donauwerth for this same purpose. And on the 2nd of July Marlborough attacked them there with 7,000 or 8,000 men. The FrancoBavarians made a gallant resistance of an hour and a half, but were driven from Schellenberg at last, the Dutch and the Austrians each losing their commanders, and the English having suffered considerably. The victory was a good earnest of success. After it the duke marched into Bavaria, crossed the Lech, and posed reducing Munich unless the Bavarians submitted. They were inclined to do so until the news arrived that Marshal Tallard was marching to join them with 35,000 fresh troops. The elector in consequence determined *Hedges to Stepney. Kemble, State Papers, p. 315. pro CHAP. XXXIII. CHAP. XXXIII. to prolong resistance, whilst Marlborough proceeded to a general devastation of the electorate, and prepared for a permanent occupation of it by investing Ingolstadt. To prevent this, and transfer the war to the north of the Danube, the elector, as soon as he was joined by Tallard, crossed that river, for the purpose of placing their united armies between Marlborough and his chief depôt, which was at Nördlingen.* They thus threatened Prince Eugene, who was encamped at Schellenberg. Marlborough lost no time in crossing to Eugene's support, and on the 11th of August both armies were concentrated on the Danube bank. The French and Bavarians numbered about 60,000 men, the Anglo-Dutch and German nearly equal numbers, except that the French were much superior in infantry, and their foes in cavalry. Of the sixty-six battalions under Marlborough, but fourteen were English, fourteen Dutch, the rest Danes and Germans. The French under Tallard posted and barricaded themselves at Blenheim on the river, the Bavarians and French mingled held Lutzingen amidst woods and ditches. Between their positions ran a stream or streams twelve feet wide, with marshy bushes on either side, which the French commanders deemed to be scarcely passable. Lest, however, it should be so, the French cavalry were placed at a certain distance behind with orders to charge and defeat any attempt of the enemy to cross or at least form after crossing. Marlborough and Eugene advanced to the attack early on the morning of the 13th of August. Eugene was to carry Lutzingen. Marlborough awaited till the prince was in a condition to begin, which on account of the ground was not till one o'clock. Then the cannonade gave way for assault. The first was not successful. The English were repulsed from Blenheim, *Marsin to Chamillard. XXXIII. the Imperialists from Lutzingen. Hearing that the CHAP. elector was pressed in the latter post, Tallard rode thither. In his absence Marlborough directed the English troops to pass the marsh and the stream; the operation was long, destructive, and hard-fought, the first comers being more than once cruelly repulsed. But by degrees they gained footing, drew up, and leisurely formed four lines, one behind the other, without advancing, though under a heavy fire. The French say that, had their horse charged altogether, and not by fits and brigades, they would have routed the AngloDutch. That was not done. And about five o'clock in the afternoon Marlborough ordered the advance of the five lines, which "in a slow and close march," says the most graphic French account, drove back French cavalry and infantry and routed all before it. Eugene did not carry the fortress of Lutzingen till seven in the evening, after the centre had been broken. The French infantry retreated into Blenheim, which, after the defeat of the cavalry, became surrounded. Their horse was borne along and forced into the Danube, where many squadrons utterly perished. After a long defence, the French infantry in Blenheim, to the number of 10,000, seeing no hope of resistance and no chance of escape, surrendered, and made the victory complete. The result of Blenheim, besides its 14,000 captives and 40,000 enemies destroyed, and the number of guns and abandoned cities, was the liberation of Austria, the subjugation of Bavaria, and its occupation by Imperial troops, the unfortunate elector betaking himself to a French command in the Netherlands. But the greatest gain of all was the colossal reputation which it created for the British commander, displaying him as a leader before whose genius and fortune the star and the hitherto military pre-eminence of France paled and shrunk. The illustration of Marlborough came most timely, not only for Austria and for England, but for himself. Without XXXIII. CHAP. victory his political influence would have been lost,* and the cause which he continued to uphold, that of stubborn resistance to the French king, would have been trodden down by factions both in England and in Holland. After Blenheim, Marlborough withdrew his Dutch and English troops westward of the Rhine. The German princes, especially their general, Prince Louis of Baden, were not a little jealous of Marlborough's achievements, so that no zealous co-operation was to be had from them either that year or the next. The efforts and hopes of the English were directed to another quarter. Some of the most successful naval exploits in British history had been against the Spaniards. An attempt to repeat them was always popular. A naval expedition against Cadiz in 1702 had indeed been attended with signal failure; but this was redeemed by the capture of the Spanish treasure fleet in the harbour of Vigo, much to the impoverishment and disgrace of both the Bourbon monarchies. Later, the King of Portugal had joined the alliance against France, and in 1704, whilst Marlborough was marching to the Danube, the Austrian Archduke Charles, assuming the title of King of Spain, landed in Lisbon, 12,000 English and Dutch troops under Schomberg soon joining him. A war soon commenced upon the Tagus, similar in some respects to that which Wellington opened in the same region a century later. Schomberg, however, was as incapable as his opponent, the Duke of Berwick, was skilful and active. On the side of Portugal, therefore, nothing * "Lord Marlborough," wrote Prince Eugene to the emperor a fortnight before the battle, "is a man of great talent, courage, and good intentions, most desirous of achieving something, and necessarily so, for he is lost if he return to England after having achieved nothing. He at the same time knows and mistrusts himself, being well aware that a soldier does not become a general in a day.” Eugene's Correspondenz. It would be impossible to enumerate the many accounts of the battle of Blenheim. |