Tuscany and Parma. Alberoni scorned these proposals, CHAP. and proceeded to carry on the war of conspiracy and XXXIV. intrigue, since success did not attend his more open efforts.

The Count of Cellamare, that ambassador whom Philip of Spain had sent to oppose and prevent, if possible, the accession of the Duke of Orleans to the regency, had remained ever since in the capital, and naturally fell into relationship with the opposition and enemies of the regent and his government. These were not a few, and comprised many of the grandees, who were disappointed at not retaining the influence and position they expected, and who took advantage of the financial and other embarrassments of the time to vilipend the regent and his government. The promotion of Dubois, who became minister at the time, especially galled them, and they exclaimed loudly against the new policy, so contrary to that of Louis the Fourteenth, of an alliance with England and the emperor, and antagonism only towards Spain. The restless Maréchal Villars was one of the foremost of these malcontents. St. Simon himself considered that there was some great national policy in aiding Spain to reconquer its hold of Italy, and some modern historians agree with him. Really, however, the interest of France, or any other nation, was but little concerned. It was the personal interests of the Queen of Spain, of the Duke of Orleans, and of the Elector of Hanover, which were in play, and not those of any one of the countries engaged, or sought to be engaged, in the idle strife and struggle of the great families.

Whilst the more prudent of the malcontents limited their opposition to protests against any hostility to Spain, the more foolish pushed their intrigues to the height of conspiracy. The court of Spain was fatuous enough to entertain any hope and follow any suggestion. The Prince of Cellamare, its ambassador, conceived

CHAP. XXXIV.

the scheme of carrying off the Duke of Orleans, arrest-
ing the States General, and claiming the regency for
Philip. The Duke and Duchess of Maine were the puissant
auxiliaries on whom Cellamare depended. The former,
whose character procured him more enemies than
friends, had engaged in antagonism to the legitimate
princes of the blood, as well as to the higher ranks of
the peerage.
He pretended to succeed to the throne
over the heads of the former. This had been overruled
and cancelled. But he still had his rank as prince of
the blood, and guardian of the young monarch. The
Duc de Bourbon deprived him of both. It was at the
time when the Parliament strenuously resisted the
financial measures of Law. A Bed of Justice, at which
the young king was made to preside, put down at once
the Duc du Maine and the Parliament. The former was
deprived of his guardianship, and the edicts of Law were
registered in despite of the latter.

The Duke and Duchess of Maine were still smarting
with this degradation, when Cellamare's conspiracy
was ripening. How far they joined in it is uncer-
tain. An agent of Cellamare's was seized on his
way to Madrid with letters which mentioned and com-
promised a number of persons. In consequence of
this discovery Cellamare himself was arrested, his
papers seized, and the conspiracy soon divulged to the
public. The Duke and Duchess of Maine were arrested,
the prince deprived of his position and residence in the
Tuileries, and sent to Dourlens; the duchess was im-
mured in the donjon of Dijon. Alberoni's letters re-
vealing the plot were made public, and France joined
England in formally declaring war against Spain.
(January, 1719).

Marshal Villars refused the command of the army destined to cross the Pyrenees. The world was more surprised to learn that the Duke of Berwick had ac

*It was accompanied by a manifesto of which Fontenelle was the author.

XXXIV.

cepted it. The Prince of Conti commanded under him. CHAP. The army entered Spain in the spring, and was soon master of Passages, then a naval arsenal of importance and wealth. Six ships of war were in the harbour, and abundant stores, all of which became a prey to the flames. Berwick then laid siege to Fontarabia. Philip the Fifth, with his court and a few troops, marched, not so much to oppose the French army as to seduce it. He was led to suppose that his presence would induce the invaders to lay down their arms and join him.* He came but to see the fall of this hope, and the Spanish court withdrew to Madrid. St. Sebastian surrendered to the French in August, as did Santona, which contained also an arsenal and many ships of war. The English are accused of having insisted on the destruction of the naval force of Spain. Berwick then marched his army to the Mediterranean coast, but did not penetrate into the country. Indeed his desire was but to conquer peace, and preserve it by compelling Philip to dismiss Alberoni. The failure of that bold minister's scheme, with the threatening aspect of Europe combined against him, necessarily overcame the royal predilections. The Jesuit confessor of the monarch recommended that he should be abandoned, and in December 1719 Alberoni was dismissed. Soon after the court of Spain submitted, and consented to accept the terms and views of the Quadruple Alliance. These views were to complete the peace of Utrecht by compelling the emperor and the King of Spain to become reconciled. This was effected by a compromise, Austria receiving Sicily, and the Queen of Spain's son, Don Carlos, being secured the succession of Tuscany and Parma. One is quite at a loss to comprehend the abuse and lamenta

* There was a good deal of desertion from the French army. That the English government feared that the French troops would not fight is

evident in a letter from Craggs to
Worsly, congratulating him that they
had captured Passages. Add. MSS.
B. M. 15, 936.

СНАР. XXXIV.

tions which French historians lavish on this treaty, and on the policy which produced it. Though somewhat unjust to the House of Savoy, it was the only fair and feasible path towards terminating the wars between the Imperial and Spanish houses. Nor can we glean from the rabid effusions of French ultra patriotism, what real advantage England gained, or France lost, by this pacific policy.

The unheroic, if not unsuccessful, part which the regent played in foreign affairs, was forced upon him by the embarrassments of domestic administration. Louis the Fourteenth had left immediate debts amounting to 2,400,000 livres. Though he had reduced by one-half his chief funded debt, that on the Hôtel de Ville, in 1713, the interest had not been more regularly paid. The rentes on the Hôtel de Ville amounted to 32 millions annually, and other rentes or funds to 104 millions. The entire revenue, if received without deduction, would not have done much more than pay this interest of the debt. But the net revenue was but 70 millions, and the necessary annual expenses more than double. There were Treasury bills for 600 millions in circulation, negotiated in the market at from 80 to 90 per cent. loss.

The regent was advised to wipe away this mountain of debt with a sponge. The kingdom was shipwrecked, argued these councillors, and one portion of it must be sacrificed to save the other. The smaller mountain should be sacrificed to the greater, the creditors to the mass of the population.* Disguised, divided, and partial bankruptcy was much safer than the wholesale measure, and was therefore adopted.

The first step in that direction was to order that all

taxes should be paid directly into the treasury without CHAP. passing through the hands of the receivers-general, XXXIV. who had made large advances, and refused to continue them. This threat to supersede them brought the wealthy class of functionaries to reason, and they consented to continue monthly advances. The holders of treasury bills were next dealt with. These were subjected to a visa or examination by a commission, which reduced the 600 millions to 250, for which merely fresh bills were given bearing 4 per cent. interest. Fifteen per cent. was the common rate of interest at the time. The funds were also dealt with. The rentes on the Hôtel de Ville had been reduced by two-fifths so late as 1713; they were now passed over, and the reduction applied but to the rest.

ment.

One wonders how the public tolerated all this, or how a government, which never kept its word, and cheated in all its dealings, could still obtain credit. But the truth was that no investment existed for money, save what was in the power, if not in the hands, of government. The frugal individual who saved money must either buy rentes, or a salaried place, or join a trading company, also in the power of the state, or lend on mortgage, which, as we shall find, was equally subject to the interference of the governLand produced nothing, partly owing to Colbert's depression of agriculture, but still more to the impediments and duties in the way of circulation. The noble landlords eked out their revenues by military or other functions; and when the state could not pay them, it gave them in return exemption from being pursued by their creditors. If to lend money was thus fruitless, it was still more dangerous to hoard it, government lowering or raising the standard according as it had to pay or recoin. At the beginning of Louis the Fourteenth's reign, the marc of silver was coined into twenty-eight or thirty livres. He afterwards coined