not merely a knowledge of his subject, but an acquaintance with human nature, a discreet adaptation of his style and tone of address to the particular character of the parties with whom he may be dealing, as well as a calm and kindly spirit. The advocate of truth will then only fulfil his vocation when he has taken pains to examine how his subject may be presented in the most convincing point of view, and in the most attractive aspect. As his professed object is not the mere statement of truth in that abstract form in which it would approve itself to the calm and unperturbed intellect, but the persuasion of impassioned beings, whose judgments are liable to be warped by manifold influences, he is bound to consider how, without losing anything of its essence, it may be thrown into the form most likely to find its way into the minds of others without encountering resistance.

Setting aside the wisdom of such a course of procedure, it is one to which we are naturally led by that desire to conciliate, which is one of the principles of our constitution. We naturally seek to stand well with our neighbours, and shrink from doing anything whereby we may forfeit their good-will. It follows that this is a principle which is not to be lightly set aside or transgressed, except when it is clearly inconsistent with higher duty.* Men are, no doubt, but too prone, in certain circumstances, to consult their own repose, by refraining, in their social intercourse, from any assertion, however needful for the defence of truth, which may offend others; and it may therefore be inferred, with justice, that they are often more likely to err on the side of excess, than defect of conciliation. Admitting that this is the case, it is no less obvious, that the abuse to which a principle is liable will not justify the neglect of its legitimate application; and least of all can it be imagined that a disposition, thus benevolent in its character, may, without detriment to the interests of truth, be deprived of its full and reasonable scope. The use of this principle, too, it should be remarked, is not only permitted, but enjoined, by that precept of the apostle, in which it is exactly defined and restricted" Let every one of us please his neighbour for his good to edification." (Romans xv. 2.)

The necessity for cultivating a spirit of conciliation is yet more apparent if we consider that there are certain antagonist principles, equally general in their action, which often overpower it altogether. Such are vanity, selfishness, animosity, and others

"No original or essentially inherent principle of our nature is, in itself, either mischievous or useless." (Archbishop Whately's Bampton Lecture, on the Use and Abuse of Party Feeling in Religion; Lecture i., at the beginning a work in which the duty of conciliation is strongly urged).

of the same class. If, in certain circumstances, the desire to please is too powerful, there can be no question that in different circumstances, and perhaps still more frequently, the selfish and angry passions are allowed to exercise an immoderate sway. So long as we feel kindly disposed towards our neighbour, we may, no doubt, be too backward in warning him against anything erroneous in his opinions, or vicious in his practice; but it is no less true, on the other hand, that when, from any of the thousand causes which tend to excite dislike or jealousies between persons of different parties or sentiments, the kindly disposition is lost-the desire to please is then apt to be succeeded by a culpable indifference to his feelings, if not by a real, though lurking desire to make him smart under the lash of sarcasm or rebuke.

There is yet another principle, of a higher and more honourable character, by which the desire to please, if not watchfully cherished, is apt to be overpowered. This principle is zeal, the natural tendency of which (as above adverted to) is to impel men to the attainment of their ends without much reflection on the means by which they are to be sought. It thus often happens that truth is urged with an ardour and eagerness which defeat their own object. Teachers of earnest zeal are often found to regard almost solely the importance of their subject, without properly considering the effects which its direct and immediate announcement may have on the minds of others. They do not sufficiently enter into the feelings, or advert to the various stages of the intellectual or moral progress of their hearers, or reflect that the latter do not regard the subject in the same light as themselves, and that their minds may need to be prepared by gradual steps for the admission of those matured conclusions at which the teacher himself may only have arrived by slow degrees. Their advocacy is, therefore, marked by an impetuosity which must seem extravagant to many who might have been won by moderation and calmness. However much this result of undisciplined zeal is to be lamented, it is not to be wondered at that it should act in the manner described. With an honest and strong conviction of the importance of the truths which they seek to inculcate, and with an earnest desire to see them received by others, it is natural that good men should be impatient of any delay in expounding and enforcing them in the most straightforward manner. What we see clearly and feel strongly ourselves, we are apt to imagine must be seen and felt at once by others in the same manner. And this is most of all the case in religion, the doctrines of which are so momentous, and its motives so constraining, that those who themselves are sensible of their force, find it difficult to conceive that their own

emotions should not be fully responded to by others. To this it must be added, that the minister of religion, conscious that he is armed with an authority not his own, feels himself bound to assume a commanding and decisive tone. It should not, therefore, be considered surprising that religious teachers, particularly such as are naturally of an ardent temperament, should fall into the habit of using the same strong language, on all occasions, to all classes of persons, as if nothing short of this could be adequate to the tremendous necessities of the subject, or correspond to the strength of the expressions in which evil and error are denounced in the Bible. Teachers of this class, though they would doubtless allow, on consideration, that the Scriptures frequently enjoin and exemplify a different course, yet seem to act upon a latent persuasion that any considerable regard to the prejudices, or tenderness for the perverseness of mankind, is, as it were, an abdication of the prerogative of the delegates of God; and that all caution in exploring the least obstructed approaches to the human heart is but a resort to that "wisdom of this world" which St. Paul denounces as an instrument of persuasion rejected by the Gospel.

As it thus appears that the principle of conciliation is not only neglected by many to the detriment of truth, but objected to by others as an unworthy system of concession, at variance with the spirit of holy writ, it may be necessary, before describing its reasonableness, its limits, and its instruments, to show that it is quite consonant to the precepts of the Bible, and more exemplified in the tenor of Scripture teaching than many persons may have been accustomed to imagine.

The strength of language with which this principle is enforced by St. Paul, in 1 Corinth. ix. 19-22, is, perhaps, seldom duly weighed. His words may be cited at length with advantage :

"For though I be free from all men, yet have I made myself servant unto all, that I might gain the more. And unto the Jews I became as a Jew, that I might gain the Jews; to them that are under the law, as under the law, that I might gain them that are under the law; to them that are without law, as without law (being not without law to God, but under the law to Christ), that I might gain them that are without law. To the weak became I as weak, that I might gain the weak: I am made all things to all men, that I might by all means save some. And this I do for the Gospel's sake, that I might be partaker thereof with you."

In the passage preceding these remarkable expressions St. Paul had been explaining to the converts at Corinth that, from a desire to avoid the suspicion of mercenary motives, he had

foregone that just claim which he might have urged to remuneration for his services as a minister of the Gospel; and he here adds to this, that, with the same view of removing all obstructions to the reception of Christianity, he had submitted to study and conciliate the prejudices, and sought to sympathize, as far as he allowably could, with the various feelings, tastes, and principles of the different classes of persons with whom the pursuit of his apostolical vocation had brought him into contact. When dealing with Jews (" under the law" and "weak") he embraced every opportunity, as his words import, to express his sense of the privilege and dignity of those to whom had been "committed the oracles of God" (Rom. iii. 2); "to whom pertained the adoption, and the glory, and the covenants, and the giving of the law, and the service of God, and the promises;" and, as instances of the practical result of these principles, his politic conduct (if it be allowable so to designate it), as related in Acts xxi. 20-26, in observing certain ceremonies of a law which he believed to be obsolete, as well as his precepts in Romans xiv., deserve to be prominently noticed. When dealing with heathens, on the other hand, he could make himself "without law," avoiding, for a time, all such references to his nation's ancestral glories as might have awakened the jealousy and offended the pride of the Greeks; announcing the freedom of the Gentiles from all restraints but those of the gentle "law of liberty;" and gratifying their feelings by occasional allusions to their national literature. He was thus fain to introduce all those favourite topics and old associations which could interest and influence those with whom he was immediately concerned, and to omit all needless allusions to such matters as could only irritate and offend. Such principles and such procedure have no doubt been recorded for the imitation of Christians in all future periods; for the essential characters of mankind, being the same now as ever, though showing themselves under different forms, must obviously require a similar treatment. It will scarcely be urged in reply to this, that such condescension to the weakness of men could only be properly practised in the early ages of Chris tianity, when men had to be reclaimed from the Jewish or Pagan prepossessions arising from their early education, but that no such indulgence is to be conceded now-a-days to persons who have been trained up in the principles of the Gospel from their childhood. For, if prejudices against the truth do exist, it can matter little from whose cause they have sprung, or what shape they assume; the duty of seeking to recover mankind from their errors must still be the same; and the necessity of employing

the most likely methods of persuasion remains unaltered. It might, perhaps, be said, with justice, that the use of conciliation is even more needful to modern teachers than it could have been to the apostle; for he, it could have been supposed, might have stood on the footing of that authority with which. divine inspiration, enforced by the power of miracles, so visibly invested him, and might, on that ground alone, have required the submission and obedience of those whom he addressed. Yet we see that he did not act thus; but, as must be evident to every one who studies his epistles with attention, was in the continual practice of adding to those exhortations, which were founded solely on apostolical authority, the use of argument and of conciliation, of appeals both to the reason and to the feelings. If he thought it no derogation from the dignity of his office, and of his message, to act thus, we may fairly conclude that those who cannot claim the same authority should be even more assiduous in employing those natural and reasonable means of persuasion with which the Author of nature and reason has furnished them.

It is impossible to desire any testimony of Scripture more conclusive or satisfactory, with regard to the end in view, than that which has just been dwelt upon. The following texts, however, may be alluded to as equally convincing, viz., 1 Cor. x. 32, 33, and Rom. xv. 2. Other passages may be cited, which, though not precepts, are examples of conciliation, as Rom. i. 11, 12; x. 2; xv. 8, 14, 15; 1 Cor. x. 15; Heb. vi. 9, 10. The speeches of St. Paul at Athens (Acts xvii.) ; to the Jews (Acts xxii.); before Felix (Acts xxiv. 10-21); before Agrippa (Acts xxvi.); are all distinguished by some particular traits of conciliation or specific adaptation to the circumstances of the several parties. The address to the Athenians breathes kindness, and is based upon principles of natural reason. The Jews are readily and charitably admitted to be "zealous towards God;" while the governor Felix, and King Agrippa, are assured that the apostle "cheerfully answers for himself" in their presence.

It thus appears that the use of conciliation is not only sanctioned, but enforced, both by apostolical precept and example. It may conduce, however, still further to the practical adoption of this principle, if it be shown, from a survey of human nature, more fully than has yet been done, how indispensable it is to success in argument; and if it be evinced, from an illustration of the instruments which it employs, that it involves no unworthy compliances, or compromise of truth.

See the remarks of Bishop Blomfield in his "Lectures on the Acts," and Mr. Townsend's note in loco.