The Ministry of Foreign Affairs presents its compliments to the German Embassy and, with reference to the German Embassy's pro memorias of November 9 and 10, 1938,2 has the honor to inform the Embassy that, having considered in a spirit of the greatest cooperation the wishes of the German Government expressed in the abovementioned documents and with the intention of furnishing new proof of its friendly sentiments for Germany, the Spanish Government has made the following decision: (a) That in accordance with the proposal of the Embassy the percentage of German participation in the capital of the designated mining companies be increased as follows: Aralar S.A.-Tolosa. 75 percent Montes de Galicia S.A.-Orense. 75 percent The German participation in the capital of the "Mina Santa Tecla❞ company in Vigo remains unchanged and will not exceed 40 percent. The capital increases are granted with the understanding that in carrying out the decisions of the Government the companies named will otherwise adhere to the existing Spanish legislation on the formalities of organization and management. The Nationalist Government willingly approves the proposed method of payment of the increased German capital participation hereby granted. (b) Desiring to accommodate the Reich Government, the Spanish Nationalist Government also approves the Embassy's proposal that the company called Sociedad Anónima Mauritania be established in conformity with the charter drawn up by the Spanish Vice Consul in Tetuán, bearing in mind that the above-named company not only is being established in the above-named city of the Spanish protectorate, but also is to have its seat in the Spanish protectorate of Morocco and carry on its activities there. 1The copy used is a German text in the files of the Embassy in Spain. 2 See document No. 693, p. 788. (c) The Spanish Nationalist Government likewise grants the Embassy's request that machinery and materials to the value of 5 million. RM be imported for the five mining companies with German capital participation; furthermore, it agrees that ores from these mines shall be exported to Germany over a period of 5 years, to be used to cover the credit now being provided by the German Government for the above-mentioned deliveries of machinery. With respect to: (d) The general acknowledgement of the amounts entered in the bill covering the expenditures of the Condor Legion from November 7, 1936, to October 31, 1938, and (e) The payment for the new deliveries requested by the Nationalist Government by means of an agreement between Hisma, Ltda. and the appropriate Spanish authorities, particularly on the subject of the supplementary export of raw materials and payments in foreign exchange, the Spanish Nationalist Government has the honor to inform the Embassy that it would like to examine these last two points in somewhat greater detail and make them the subject of separate negotiations. 136/73672-78 SECRET No. 665 g No. 704 Memorandum by the Ambassador in Spain SAN SEBASTIÁN, December 19, 1938. In Berlin the dissatisfaction with Generalissimo Franco appears to be continuing. It is founded less on the fact that during the Czech crisis Franco assured France and England of his neutrality in case of a European war than that he informed us belatedly of his negotiations with the above-mentioned powers and allegedly even promised them that the Condor Legion would be interned as proof of his good will. To begin with, as far as the belated notification of the neutrality discussions with Paris and London is concerned, Franco really is somewhat to blame, even though it is true that he did not inform the press of his intention to maintain neutrality until after notifying us. (Cf. report No. 4757 of October 19, 1938.1) As regards the alleged intention or promise to intern the Condor Legion, the sources for this report circulating in Berlin are unknown I knew nothing about any such intention. On the contrary, to me. 'Not printed (2685/528902–04). in answer to my question of what would happen to the German volunteers in case of neutrality, Foreign Minister Jordana answered immediately without hesitation that they as well as the Italians were part of the Generalissimo's army and that therefore this question had not been discussed during the neutrality negotiations with France and England. It will not be possible to get to the bottom of this question, which is perhaps decisive for the dissatisfaction in Berlin, until the source of the information is known. Is this source known to the Foreign Ministry? It seems necessary to me to eliminate the existing dissatisfaction in order to free German-Spanish postwar relations from a severe handicap. How can this be done? The following has been proposed: 1. The sending of an important Spanish Nationalist political figure for personal consultation with the highest Government and Party officials in Germany. 2. Having the Generalissimo send a personal letter to the Führer or the Field Marshal.2 (Both measures for the purpose of explaining once again the attitude of the Spanish Nationalist Government during the Czech crisis and of giving assurances for the future.) Perhaps we might also consider utilizing the situation described (the bad conscience of the Spaniards) in order to demand promises from Spain in regard to closer relations with us later. I reserve further proposals. December 20, 1938. The Foreign Minister informed me that Franco intended to write a letter to the Führer; the Minister knew about the dissatisfaction in Berlin and deplored it. In answer to my question he declared categorically that an internment of the Condor Legion had never been considered. STOHRER 'i.e. Göring. 8 The final paragraph was added in Stohrer's handwriting. Today the Spanish Ambassador brought me the communication, which had already been announced by Herr von Stohrer,1 that a letter from the Generalissimo to the Führer was in preparation, for the purpose of dispelling any remaining misunderstanding or dissatisfaction with regard to Nationalist Spain stemming from the time of the September crisis. In this connection I mentioned to Magaz the rumor that France had at that time suggested to the Spanish Government that in case of war it should intern the German and Italian volunteers. Magaz stated that this report was an invention, as, for that matter, Herr von Stohrer had already said earlier. The Ambassador then went on to say that he had another important and pleasant message to convey: As was known, in the course of the past year we had come to a standstill in our conversations regarding a possible political treaty going beyond the protocol of March 20, 1937. He was authorized to inform us that, if we so desired, the Spanish Government was prepared to proceed to the conclusion of such a treaty on the basis of the treaty draft discussed by Herr von Stohrer. The draft of a German-Spanish treaty of friendship, sent to the Embassy at San Sebastián on April 8, 1938,1 was favorably received by Franco and Foreign Minister Jordana at first. On May 19, however, Foreign Minister Jordana expressed doubts regarding the conclusion of the treaty,2 for one reason because a solemnly concluded political treaty would become known to a large group of people and consequently could not really be kept secret. Furthermore, he pointed out that the Spanish Nationalist Government had received reports that England wished a rapprochement and that there was a possibility that England would induce France to close the Pyrenees frontier effectively, which would enable Franco to end the war victoriously in a few months. 3 Ambassador von Stohrer then received telegraphic instructions on May 31 that he should not urge matters further, and at the beginning of July he told General Franco that we had no intention whatever of pressing Spain to conclude this treaty. The draft of the German-Spanish treaty of friendship in its content still suits the status of German-Spanish relations. If the Spanish Nationalist Government now declares that it is prepared to conclude the treaty, we ought to do so without trying to extend its scope. Such an extension is conceivable in regard to article 2 (joint defense against Communism), in the form of accession by Nationalist Spain to the Anti-Comintern Pact. The Spanish Government probably does not desire this, however, as long as it has not brought the war to a victorious conclusion. In the light of our experiences during the Czech crisis, article 6 might be amplified in the sense of a stipulation of benevolent neutrality. But that would be precisely what we blamed the Spaniards for during the Czech crisis. Article 7 on military cooperation might also be expanded. This matter, however, has developed so favorably by itself that it does not appear necessary to try to obtain any further agreements on this score for the duration of the war. An amplification of article 7 would not be opportune if only in view of the apprehensions of the French and the British, and for this reason Franco also would probably not desire it. With regard to the economic relations mentioned in article 8 considerable progress has been made in the Montana affair recently. Other special agreements in this field might develop in the course of events, without necessitating any change in the text of article 8. It therefore seems advisable, with reference to the démarche by the Marquis de Magaz, to instruct Ambassador von Stohrer to try to bring about the conclusion of the treaty in Burgos in its present form. The fact that the Spanish Nationalist Government is now offering 2 See document No. 587, p. 664. Document No. 590, p. 668. |