Let SATIRE then her proper object know, a Lo, Shaftfb'ry rears her high on Reafon's throne, 2 495 200 Big It were to be wished that lord Shaftsbury had expreffed himself with greater precision on this fubject: however, thus much may be affirmed with truth. ift, By the general tenor of his effays on Enthusiasm, and the freedom of wit and humour, it appears that his principal defign was to recommend the way of ridicule, (as he calls it) for the investigation of truth, and detection of falsehood, not only in moral but religious subjects.. 2dly, It appears no less evident, that in the courfe of his reasonings on this question, he confounds two things which are in their nature and confequences entirely different. Thefe are ridicule and good-humour: the latter acknowledged by all to be the best mediator in every debate; the former no lefs regarded by most, as an embroiler and incendiary. Tho' he fets out with a formal profeffion of proving the efficacy of wit, humour, and ridicule, in the investigation of truth, yet by Jhifting and mixing his terms, he generally flides infenfibly into mere encomiums on good-breeding, chearfulness, urbanity, and free enquiry. This indeed keeps fomething like an argument on foot, and amufes the fuperficial reader; but to a more obfer-vaut eye difcovers a very contemptible defect, either of fincerity or penetration. The question concerning ridicule may be thus not improperly ftated, Whether doubtful propofitions of any kind can be determined by the application of ridicule? Much might be X 3 faid Big-fwoln with folly, as her fmiles provoke, Who therefore fmil'd, because they faw a fool; 205 Sublimer faid on this question; but a few words will make the matter clear to an unprejudiced mind. The disapprobation or contempt which certain objects raise in the mind of man, is a particular mode of paffion. The objects of this paffion are apparent falsehood, incongruity, or impropriety of fome particular kinds. Thus, the object of fear is apparent danger: the object of anger is apparent injury. But who hath ever dreamt of exalting the paffions of fear and anger into a standard or test of real danger and injury? The defign must have been rejected as abfurd, becaufe it is the work of reafon only, to correct and fix the passions on their proper objects. The cafe is parallel: apparent or feeming falsehoods, &c. are the objects of contempt; but it is the work of reafon only, to determine whether the fuppofed falfehood be real or fictitious. But it is faid, "The fenfe of ridicule can never be mistaken.". Why, no more can the fenfe of danger, or the fenfe of injury.. "What, do men never fear or resent without reafon ?". Yes, very commonly: but they as often defpife and laugh without reafon. Thus before any thing can be determined in either cafe, reafon, aud reafon only, must examine circumfances, feparate ideas, decide upon, reftrain, and correct the paffion. Hence it follows, that the way of ridicule, of late fo much celebrated, is in fact no more than a species of eloquence; and that too the lowest of all others: Jo Tully justly calls it, tenuiffimus ingenii fructus. It applies to a paffion, and therefore can go no farther in the investigation of truth, than Sublimer logick now adorns our ifle, And courts the fpruce free-thinker and the beau. 210 than any of thofe arts which tend to raise love, pity, terror, rage or hatred in the heart of man. Confequently, his lordfhip might have transplanted the whole fyftem of rhetorick into his new Scheme, with the fame propriety as he hath introduced the way of ridicule itself. A hopeful project this, for the propagation of truth! As this feems to be the reas nature of ridicule, it hath been generally difcouraged by philofophers and divines, together with every other mode of eloquence, when applied to controverted opinions. This difcouragement, from what is Said above, appears to have been rational and juft: therefore the charge laid against divines with regard to this affair by a zealous admirer of Lord Shaftsbury (fee a note on the Pleasures of Imagination, Book III.) feems entirely groundlefs. The diftinction which the fame author bath attempted with respect to the influence of ridicule, between fpeculative and moral truths, feems no better founded. It is certain that opinions are no less liable to ridicule than actions. And it is no less certain, that the way of ridicule cannot determine the propriety or impropriety of the one, more than the truth or falsehood of the other; because the fame paffion of contempt is equally engaged in both cafes, and therefore, as above, reafon only can examine the circumftances of the action or opinion, and thus fix the paffion on its proper objects. Upon the whole, this new defign of discovering truth by the vague and unfteady light of ridicule, puts one in mind of the bone Irishman, who apply'd his candle to the fun-dial in order to fee how the night went X 4 Dadalian Dadalian arguments but few can trace, 215 220 But you, more fage, reject th' inverted rule, 225 As the gay prifm but mocks the flatter'd eye, And gives to ev'ry object ev'ry dye. 239 Beware the mad advent'rer: bold and blind She hoists her fail, and drives with ev'ry wind; 235 Then mirth may urge, when reafon can explore, Yet chief 'tis her's to draw the present age: 240 1 With Wifdom's luftre, Folly's fhade contrast, 245 250 Ere lewdness the stain'd garb of honour wore, Or chastity was carted for the whore ; Vice flutter'd, in the plumes of freedom dress'd; Or publick spirit was the publick jeft. Be ever in a juft expreffion bold, Yet ne'er degrade fair SATIRE to a scold: 255 Let no unworthy mien her form debase, But let her fmile, and let her frown with grace: In mirth be temp'rate, temp'rate in her spleen; 260 her grace a : The Muse's charms refiftless then affail, When wrapt in irony's tranfparent veil : Her beauties half-conceal'd the more furprize, 265 And keener luftre sparkles in her eyes. Then be your line with fharp encomiums grac❜d: Dart |