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The question as to whether the majority of voters may or ought to give instructions to their representatives, has often been raised, but has never been legally decided in the affirmative; because a strict restraint and obligation laid on delegates destroys the idea of representation, and because the voters are in general sufficiently well acquainted with the views and principles of the persons they elect.

That the senators and representatives, considering the great diversity of situation and interests among the several states, should be chosen out of these states, appears very natural; yet they are by no means instructed or obliged, as in some European confederacies, to represent their own state exclusively, and to set its local interests above the general welfare.

As the number of the members of Congress is always regulated according to the number of souls, it should not be permitted to increase excessively with the increasing population. Accordingly there were chosen,

In 1789, one representative to every 30,000 inhabitants.

1793, 66

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Democratic as the American institutions are in comparison with the English, the British House of Commons is two and a ha times as numerous as the American House of Representatives.

The number of senators for twenty-six states now amounts to fifty-two. The political weight of each state in this upper house always remains unchanged; whereas it is unequally increased in the lower house, in proportion to the greater or less increase of population.†

*If there remain an overplus of population of more than one half this sum, a representative is chosen for it.

The following are the number of representatives sent by each state:

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Although both the House of Representatives and the Senate were necessarily founded on the principle of election, yet (as we have seen) the form and substance of these elections were not only very different, but every possible means was employed to make of the Senate a more limited, exclusive, aristocratic body. Hence its fewer members and the unvarying number for each state, their greater age, longer residence, and less frequent changes.

More recently doubts have arisen, as to whether the delegates to Congress should be appointed by the whole body of voters in a state, or according to certain districts; and whether Congress had the right to make regulations on this head. In the Constitution (Art. I. Sect. 4) it is said: "The times, places, and manner of holding elections for senators and representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time, by law, make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing senators." In virtue of the right thus given, Congress decided that the election in each state should take place by as many districts as it sends representatives. Only four states-New Hampshire, Georgia, Missouri, and Mississippi-have still adhered to the old method.

The gross violations of decorum and order that occasionally take place in Congress, admit of no justification; but this fault of the passions of individuals directed against individuals, is to be charged to them alone.* The great contending parties never suffer themselves to be betrayed into such general improprieties as occur but too frequently in Paris. In Washington by far the greater number have always been distinguished for propriety of demeanor, moderation, and patience. This last virtue in particular has been much in requisition; and the complaints that are made of the lengthy and multitudinous speeches in Congress

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Total, 65 to about 30,000 in 1789; and 223 to 70,680 persons at the present time. Florida, Wisconsin, and Iowa each send a delegate, making 3.

• Ira procul absit; cum qua nihil recte fieri, nihil considerate potest. Rectum est autem, etiam in illis contentionibus quæ cum inimicissimis fiunt, etiam si nobis indigna audiamus, tamen gravitatem retinere, iracundiam repellere.-Cicero de Officiis, I. 38.

appear but too well founded, when we compare the shorter time occupied on an average by the English and French speakers, and the smaller number of individuals who in London or Paris undertake to speak at all. But here again it must not be forgotten, that in Congress not only are two great parties under able leaders opposed to one another; but the very different and complicated interests of twenty-six states are to be represented and adjusted. In the House of Representatives interminable speakers are now limited to an hour's duration. Before the aid of law was invoked, a happy thought was now and then employed with good effect: as for instance, when a tedious orator said to one who impatiently interrupted him, that he was speaking not to him, but to posterity; the other replied, "The gentleman seems in a fair way, before he ends, to have his audience before him."*

Tediousness and loss of time ought certainly to be avoided; but too strict a limitation of the speaker is obnoxious to the still greater disadvantage, that the majority may force a decisive vote before a topic has been thoroughly discussed.†

In any case a speaking, active congress, whose proceedings are fairly before the public, is to be preferred to a silent and inactive one; moreover, the praise or censure of hearers and readers is a far better restraint upon the speakers, than any attempt to enforce moderation by not naming them (as among the Prussian deputies); a mode of proceeding which in fact places the able man and the bungler upon a level, and deprives the voters of all grounds of judgment as to whether they should re-elect or discard them.

As regards the relations of the single states to the general government, there is not yet an entire unanimity of views and wishes; but the difference is not as great as formerly, when some would have no federal government at all, and others no states. Jefferson, with great sagacity, foresaw that the political institutions of the country would receive their full development only in case the latter were granted as much independence and power of self-government as possible. How many improvements, what great public works have been achieved by these latter; while the undertakings planned by the general government have made comparatively little or no progress. A just complacency in this spirit of local and provincial enterprise, and this astonishing advancement, has sometimes caused the necessity and utility of the federal government to be too much overlooked; or else an excessive and groundless fear has been

*North American Review, li. 111.

† Much time is lost by frequent voting; it was calculated that the last Congress consumed 146 hours in this manner.

Long's Expedition to St. Peter's River, i. 26.)

entertained that the chosen presidents, senators, and representatives might easily become the absolute masters of all.

Although a strict interpretation of the Constitution has for a long time controlled the extent of congressional powers, and the danger of a one-sided preponderancy lies more on the side of the states than of Congress; still the latter has far more authority and power (e. g. over the army, the navy, taxation, and legislation), has produced, without over-governing, far more wholesome uniform measures for the good of all, and has preserved more unanimity both internally and externally, than all the assemblies and diets of European confederacies. Thus it guarantees to each state its free constitution; and any arbitrary attempt to undermine or subvert it, would be frustrated by the joint efforts of all. It is equally true that the twenty-six states are really twenty-six states, as that all the Americans form one great people. Even at, the adoption of the Constitution, there came forward neither a formless democracy of all the inhabitants, nor a mere aristocracy of the thirteen states. The people decided in thirteen assemblies, through representatives for thirteen states. These must render obedience as long as Congress keeps within the limits of its rights. At the time of nullification, its course was imprudent, and that of South Carolina dangerous; and moderation and compromise were found to be the best remedies by far. As Congress has no right to deliberate on the concerns of the individual states, so these are debarred from interfering in the sphere of the general government. A reconciliation of the duties and positions of both, was and continues to be possible. Thus John Quincy Adams obsérves: "Even the most perfect constitution is no security against different interpretations and doubts as to what is the right. But the indissoluble link of union between the people of the several states of this confederated nation is, after all, not in the right, but in the heart."*

That the power of the several states must change, and that that of the Western states in particular must increase, cannot admit of doubt. But in this there lies no new or more imminent danger, than when in former times Virginia and Pennsylvania had a preponderating weight. On the contrary, the creation of new states, through the judicious and generous cessions of land already mentioned, is substantial gain. This is evident from their extraordinary advancement, and from the fact that their laws and civil institutions exhibit by no means, as many suppose, mere crude beginnings; but in judgment, perspicuity, purity of design, and zeal for liberty, surpass or at least equal any others. But (and this question has been answered in the affirmative

* Speech on the Jubilee of the Constitution, p. 69.

by many, with mournful sympathy or malicious joy) will not this increase of the population and of independence, this opposition of interests in the several states, together with a thousand other reasons, lead ere long to a complete dissolution of the Union? Quos Deus vult perdere, dementat! Madness knows no rule, and is blind to the light of truth. There is however no trace of this madness in the United States; but, with all the diversity of views on subordinate points, one and the same conviction is entertained by all respecting the naturalness, necessity, and usefulness of the federal Union. How enthusiastically Washington expressed himself on this subject, in his admirable Farewell Address, I have already shown.* John Adams repeated: "The Union is the rock of our safety and the pledge of our greatness." John Quincy Adams says in his Inaugural Address: "That the policy of our country is peace, and the ark of our salvation, union, are articles of faith upon which we are all agreed." Webster exclaims: "The Union has been hitherto the source of our greatness and our renown; it is the foundation of our highest hopes!" In such great prophets and in such a long and happy experience, every one willingly puts confidence. It is also very evident, that with the dissolution of the Union, innumerable and grievous evils would rush in and destroy the brightly blooming and still increasing prosperity of the country. Who in such a case could avert all the infirmities and woes that sap as it were the life-springs of Europe:-envy, jealousy, discord, standing armies, custom-house restrictions, augmenting taxes, excises, military debts, foreign interference, civil wars, and constitutions which are despotisms in all but the name.

Let us lay aside the obviously foolish supposition that mere madness can demolish the noble structure of the Union; and let us rather consider the dangers that threaten it in a natural way, or which are designated as most probable, in order that they may be guarded against and avoided.

In the first place, the decided preponderance of too large a capital (as Rome and Paris) or an excessive number of poor, has often proved detrimental to the establishment and preservation of true freedom. Such a danger does not exist in America. The larger cities, in which a rabble might gradually be produced, are not even the seats of government in the several states; and still less likely is it that Washington will ever play a formidable

*P. 82 et seqq.

† Presidents' Messages, p. 397.

Speech on the Bunker Hill Monument, p. 12. "No man deprecates more than I do, the idea of consolidation; yet between separation and consolidation, painful as would be the alternative, I would greatly prefer the latter."-Clay, Speeches, i. 61.

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