And if the means be juft, the conduct true, COMMENTARY. VER. 263, Moft Critics, fond of fome fubfervient art, etc.] II. The fecond way in which a narrow capacity, as it relates to the matter, fhews itfelf, is judging by a favorite Part. The author has placed this [from ver. 262 to 285.] after the other of judging by parts, with great propriety, it being indeed a natural confequence of it. For when men have once left the whole to turn their attention to the feparate parts, that regard and reverence due only to a whole is fondly transferred to one or other of its parts. And thus we fee that Heroes themselves as well as Hero-makers, even Kings as well as Poets and Critics, when they chance never to have had, or long to have lost the idea of that which is the only legitimate object of their office, the care and confervation of the whole, are wont to devote themfelves to the fervice of fome favourite part, whether it be love of money, military glory, defpotic power, etc, And all, as our Author fays on this occafion, ❝to one lov'd Folly facrifice." This general misconduct much recommends that maxim in good Poetry and Politics, to give a principal attention to the whole; a maxim which our author has elfewhere fhewn to be equally true likewife in Morals and Religion; as being founded Once on a time, La Mancha's Knight, they say, COMMENTARY. in the order of things: For if we examine, we shall find the misconduct here complained of, to arife from this imbecility of our nature, that the mind muft always have fomething to rest upon, to which the paffions and affections may be intereftingly directed. Nature prompts us to feek it in the moft worthy object; and common fenfe points out to a Whole or Syftem: But Ignorance, and the falfe lights of the Paffions, confound and dazzle us; we stop short, and before we get to a Whole, take up with fome Part; which from thence becomes our Favourite. NOTES. VER. 267. Once on a time, etc.] This tale is fo very appofite, that one would naturally take it to be of the Poet's own invention; and fo much in the spirit of Cervantes, that we might easily mistake it for one of the chief beauties of that incomparable Satire. Yet, in truth. it is neither; but a story taken by our Author from the fpurious Don Quixote; which fhews how proper an ufe may be made of general reading, when if there be but one good thing in a book (as in that wretched performance there fcarce was more) it may be picked out, and employ'd to an excellent purpofe. Made him obferve the fubject, and the plot, 275 The manners, paffions, unities; what not? All which, exact to rule, were brought about, Were but a Combat in the lifts left out. "What leave the Combat out?" exclaims the Knight; Yes, or we must renounce the Stagirite. 280 "Not fo, by Heav'n" (he anfwers in a rage) Knights, fquires, and fteeds, must enter on "the stage." So vaft a throng the stage can ne'er contain. COMMENTARY. VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice, Form fhort ideas, etc.] 2. He concludes his obfervations on thofe two forts of Judges by parts, with this general reflection-The curious not knowing are the first fort, who judge by parts, and with a microscopic fight (as he fays elsewhere examine bit by bit: The not exact but nice, are the fecond, who judge by a favourite part, and talk of a whole to cover their fondness for a part; as Philofophers do of principles, in order to obtrude notions and opinions in their stead, NOTES, VER. 285. Thus Critics of lefs judgment than caprice, Curious not knowing, not exact but nice.] In these two lines the poet finely defcribes the way in which bad writers are wont to imitate the qualities of good ones. As true Judgment Form fhort Ideas; and offend in arts COMMENTARY. But the fate common to both is, to be governed by caprice and not by Judgment, and confequently to form fhort ideas, or to have ideas fhort of truth: Tho' the latter fort, thro' a fondnefs to their favourite part, imagine that it comprehends the whole in epitome: As the famous Hero of La Mancha, mentioned just before, used to maintain, that Knight Errantry comprised within itself the quinteffence of all Science, civil, military, and religious. VER. 289. Some to conceit alone, etc.] We come now to that fecond fort of bounded capacity, which betrays itself in its judgment on the manner of the work criticifed. And this our Author profecutes from ver. 288 to 384. These are again subdivided into divers claffes. Ibid. Some to conceit alone, etc.] The first, [from ver. 288 to 305.] are thofe who confine their attention solely to Conceit or Wit. And here again the Critic by parts, offends doubly in the manner, just as he did in the matter: For he not only confines NOTES. generally draws men out of popular opinions, so he who can. not get from the croud by the affiftance of this guide, willingly follows Caprice, which will be fure to lead him into fingularities. Again, true Knowledge is the art of treasuring up only that which, from its ufe in life, is worthy of being lodged in the memory. But Curiofity confifts in a vain attention to every thing out of the way, and which, for its inutility, the world leaft regards. Lastly, Exactness is the juft proportion of parts to one another, and their harmony in a whole: But he who has not extent of capacity for the exercife of this quality, contents himself with Nicety, which is a bufying one's self about points and fyllables. Poets, like painters, thus, unskill'd to trace 295 With gold and jewels cover ev'ry part, COMMENTARY. his attention to a part, when it should be extended to the whole; but he likewife judges falfely of that part. And this, as the other, is unavoidable; the parts in the manner bearing the fame close relation to the whole, that the parts in the matter do; to which whole, the ideas of this Critic have never yet extended. Hence it is, that our Author fpeaking here of those who confine their attention folely to Conceit or Wit, defcribes the true fpecies of true and falfe Wit: because they not only miftake a wrong difpofition of true Wit for a right, but likewife falfe Wit for true: He defcribes false Wit first, [from ver. 288 to 297.1 "Some to Conceit alone," etc. Where the reader may obferve our Author's skill in reprefenting, in a defcription of falfe Wit, the falfe difpofition of the true; as the Critic by parts is apt to fall into both these errors. He next defcribes true Wit, [from 296 to 305.] "True Wit is Nature to advantage drefs'd," etc. And here again the reader may obferve the fame beauty; not only an explanation of true Wit, but likewise of the right difpofition of it, which the poet illuftrates, as he did the wrong, by ideas taken from the art of Painting. NOTES. VER. 297. True Wit is Nature to advantage drefs'd, etc.] This definition is very exact. Mr. Locke had defined Wit to confift" in the affemblage of ideas, and putting thofe together, "with quickness and variety, wherein can be found any refemblance or congruity, whereby to make up pleasant pictures and agreeable vifions in the fancy." But that great |