Now, having persuaded the English to quit Missolonghi, and to come hither, having secretly raised and excited against Mavrocordato his own organs, and having cast him down into that abyss into which he wished to precipitate our country and its defenders, we communicate the circumstance to you. Finally, this is what Ulysses and Goorha write against Mavrocordato's friends at Cranidi; this is what Ulysses writes against Mavrocordato himself, with his habitual sarcasm: at some future time, I shall communicate to you all that the English have said, and are going to write, against Mavrocordato.

According to the testimony of Colonel Stanhope, Envoy of the Greek Committee of London, the English took the part of the Cranidi people, in the first instance, only because they were deceived by Mavrocordato; but, having been since persuaded that Mavrocordato and those of Cranidi, instead of seeking the independence of Greece, are endeavouring, without the consent of the people, to invite kings, and to demand the protection of foreign powers, they have quitted the party of Mavrocordato and those of Cranidi, and now panegyrize the conduct of the Tripolitza people, with whom they are desirous of entering into correspondence, seeing that they desire only a national assembly, union, and a cessation of faction. Mavrocordato had so prejudiced the English against Ulysses, Niketas, and Colocotroni, that they could not listen to their names with patience; but the conferences of Colonel Stanhope with Ulysses,

although very brief, and his acquaintance with Goorha, and other persons of good sentiments, have compelled him to declare that the fall of Mavrocordato, the introduction of D. Ipsilanti into the national government, and the reinforcement of the government with Colliopulo and Goorha, are the only means of securing the independence of Greece and the consolidation of her laws, by putting a stop to civil war and intestine disturbances.

At present, it has been considered necessary to cause proclamations to be issued by the legislative body, to invite Lord Byron to Tripolitza, to excommunicate the Cranidi people, to call Goorha and Colliopulo to seats in the government, to compose its executive force, and to dispatch a thousand men from the Peloponnesus, with ammunition and provisions, to occupy the position of Amphorite; all these dispositions will replace affairs on their proper footing. It is useless to dilate upon this subject; while continental Greece is occupied in defending itself against the enemy, and while the Peloponnesians think only of sharing the revenues among themselves, we hope to succeed in our designs.

I am, etc. etc.

PANAGOTI SOPHIANOPULO.

Athens, 25th Feb. N. S. 1824.

To His Highness Prince D. Ipsilanti, at Napoli di Romania.

No. XVII.

From General Odysseus to Colonel Stanhope.

SIR,

Salona, 22d April, 1824.

You have asked my opinion relative to the manner in which the Greeks should make war with the Sultan. Always ready to satisfy your just curiosity, I hasten to give you my ideas on that subject. Our present frontier is so feeble that it is necessary to act offensively; but this cannot be effected till the winter, when the Turkish armies are disbanded. This summer we must limit our operations to the defensive.

As Greece comprehends many islands, peninsulas,and gulfs, and is surrounded by the sea, a maritime force is absolutely necessary. I am of opinion that the whole fleet should be stationed in the vicinity of Ipsara, and should watch this passage, by which the Turkish fleet must pass.

There are two great roads by which the enemy may invade Greece-that of Arta and that of Zeitouni. To prevent the Turks from advancing into Livadia, Salona, etc. 2,000 troops should be dispatched to Stetheda (near St. Marino), and supplies should be sent them.

by sea. Of these troops, 500 should be placed between Zeitouni and Larissa to cut the enemy's line of communication. Two thousand soldiers should also be stationed in the neighbourhood of Thermopyla. The plain between the sea and the mountain should be fortified with redoubts, field-works, etc.; and a third corps of 3,000 should be stationed in the province of Neopatra; of these, 2,000 should be encamped at Altos, and the rest near this place, hid in the woods. After the Turks have engaged their enemy all day at Altos, those in ambush should start up at night and attack their rear, and throw them into confusion.

A corps of 5,000 should be sent to the district of Marrenorso; 3,000 of these should be sent to a defile of the same name, and the other 2,000 spread about in the neighbourhood.

By these means, Sir, the enemy, consisting of about 60,000 men, would be prevented from penetrating into Greece by either of the two roads before mentioned, and 12,000 Greeks, having all the necessaries of war, and being properly defended by field-works, would be able to repulse the enemy. It is, however, to be understood, that the Greeks must be masters of the seas, or my plan would not be effective. This plan includes the measures to be adopted during the summer's campaign.

It is for the government to decide what number of soldiers are required for the attack and defence of the fortresses, and for the police of the country.

It is not necessary to remind you that the interest of my august country and of your dear Greece require that this plan should be kept a secret from the enemy. I am, with profound respect,

Your most obedient servant,

ODYSSEUS ANDRITZO.

Noble Sir,

No. XVIII.

From Coletti to Col. Stanhope.

Millus, 18th April, 1824.

I RECEIVED, with great pleasure, your esteemed letter of————, and regret to see the dangerous state of Lord Byron's health. I sincerely desire his recovery. He is dear to Greece; and it were most lamentable to lose so much philanthropy and so much genius.

I have sent to the government your communication respecting the Greek loan. I trust that the money will arrive here very soon. The enemy has commenced operations; and we, on the contrary, cannot stir, on account of our poverty. Every nation finds money, in time of war, the most necessary of all things.