The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical PerspectivesEyal Benvenisti, Moshe Hirsch Cambridge University Press, 02.09.2004 - 316 Seiten This 2004 book aims at advancing our understanding of the influences international norms and international institutions have over the incentives of states to cooperate on issues such as environment and trade. Contributors adopt two different approaches in examining this question. One approach focuses on the constitutive elements of the international legal order, including customary international law, soft law and framework conventions, and on the types of incentives states have, such as domestic incentives and reputation. The other approach examines specific issues in the areas of international environment protection and international trade. The combined outcome of these two approaches is an understanding of the forces that pull states toward closer cooperation or prevent them from doing so, and the impact of different types of international norms and diverse institutions on the motivation of states. The insights gained suggest ways for enhancing states' incentives to cooperate through the design of norms and institutions. |
Inhalt
Pathways to international cooperation | 50 |
Customary international law as a judicial tool | 85 |
Reputation compliance and development | 117 |
Rethinking compliance with international law | 134 |
Compliance with international norms in the age | 166 |
Compliance and noncompliance with international | 194 |
Indias challenge | 261 |
299 | |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical ... Eyal Benvenisti,Moshe Hirsch Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2011 |
The Impact of International Law on International Cooperation: Theoretical ... Eyal Benvenisti,Moshe Hirsch Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2004 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
actors analysis Anne-Marie Slaughter Appellate Body Argentina argue Article XX Barsoom Beagle Channel behavior capacity to comply commitments compliance with international conditionality conflict costs customary international law decision developing countries dispute settlement domestic political Duncan Snidal economic effective efficient Enabling Clause environment equity escape clause Framework Convention Game Theory GATT globalization governments GSP schemes human rights Ibid implementation important incentives Int'l interests international agreements international cooperation international environmental international institutions international lawyers international legal international norms International Organization international system issue Keohane labor rights Latin American leaders legally binding Liberal measures ment Moshe Hirsch multilateral negotiations non-compliance obligations outcomes paradigms participation particular parties Pathway Peter Rosendorff plurilateral practice preferences preferential principle problems prospects of compliance protection Protocol rational choice regime reputation role rules sanctions Snidal social soft law substantive territorial tion tional treaties uncertainty violations WTO members