of attraction and repulsion, greatly relieves the difficulty which attends the supposition of the creation of it out of nothing, and also the continual moving of it, by a being who has hitherto been supposed to have no common property with it. For, according to this hypothesis, both the creating mind and the created substance, are equally destitude of solidity or impenetrability; so that there can be no difficulty whatever in supposing, that the latter may have been the offspring of the former.". Disquisitions on Matter and Spirit, Vol. I. p. 23. (Birmingham, 1782.) Note (I.) page 106. Notwithstanding the apology which I have offered for the word instinct, as it has been sometimes employed by writers on the Human Mind, I am perfectly sensible that it has been used, on various occasions, even by our most profound reasoners, with too great a degree of latitude. Examples of this might be produced, both from Mr. Hume and Mr. Smith; but I shall confine myself, in this note, to a passage from Dr. Reid (by whose phraseology I was led to introduce the subject at present) in which he gives the name of instinct to the sudden effort we make to recover our balance, when in danger of falling; and to certain other instantaneous exertions which we make for our own preservation, in circumstances of unexpected danger.— (See his Essays on the Active Powers of Man, p. 174. 4to edit.) In this particular instance, I agree perfectly (excepting in one single point) with the following very judicious remarks long ago made by Gravesande : Il y a quelque chose d'admirable dans le moyen ordinaire dont les hommes se servent, pour s'empêcher de tomber: car dans le tems que, par quelque mouvement, le poids du corps s'augmente d'un côté, un autre mouvement rétablit l'équilibre dans l'instant. On attribue communément la chose à un instinct naturel, quoiqu'il faille nécessairement l'attribuer à un art perfectionné par l'exercice. "Les enfans ignorent absolument cet art dans les premières années de leur vie ; ils l'apprennent peu à peu, et s'y perfectionnent, parce qu'ils ont continuellement occasion de s'y exercer; exercice qui, dans la suite, n'exige presque plus aucune attention de leur part; tout comme un musicien remue les doigts, suivant les règles de l'art, pendant qu'il apperçoit à peine qu'il y fasse la moindre attention.-(Euvres Philosophiques de M. 's Gravesande, p. 121. Seconde Partie. Amsterdam, 1774.) The only thing I am disposed to object to in this extract, is that clause where the author ascribes the effort in question to an art. Is it not manifestly as wide of the truth to refer it to this source as to pure instinct? The word art implies intelligence; the perception of an end, and the choice of means. But where is there any appearance of either, in an operation common to the whole species (not excluding the idiot and the insane);—and which is practised as successfully by the brutes, as by those who are possessed of reason? I intend to propose some modifications of the usual modes of speaking concerning this class of phenomena, when I come to contrast the faculties of Man with those of the lower animals. Note (K.) page 109. Want of room obliges me to omit, at present, the illustrations destined for this note; and to refer to some remarks on secondary qualities, in the Philosophy of the Human Mind. See note (P.) at the end of vol. i.; where I have attempted to explain the reference we make of the sensation of color, to the external object; the only difficulty which the subject seems to me to present, and of which neither Dr. Reid nor Mr. Smith have been sufficiently aware. (See Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind, and the Essay on the External Senses, in Mr. Smith's Posthumous Work.) Both of these writers have, in my opinion, been led to underyalue this part of the Cartesian Philosophy, by the equivocal use made in the common statements of it, of the names of secondary qualities; a circumstance which had long before been ably commented on by Malebranche.-D'Alembert saw the difficulty in all its extent, when he observed (speaking of the sensation of color): "Rien n'est peut-être plus extraordinaire dans les operations de notre âme, que de la voir transporter hors d'ellemême et étendre, pour ainsi dire, ses sensations sur une substance à laquelle elles ne peuvent appartenir." Berkeley has made a dexterous and amusing use of this very curious mental phenomenon, to prove that his scheme of idealism was perfectly consonant to the common apprehensions of mankind. "Perhaps, upon a strict inquiry, we shall not find, that even those who from their birth have grown up in a continued habit of seeing, are irrecoverably prejudiced on the other side, to wit, in thinking what they see to be at a distance from them. For at this time it seems agreed on all hands, by those who have had any thoughts of that matter, that colors, which are the proper and immediate objects of sight, are not without the mind. But then it will be said, by sight we have also the ideas of extension, and figure, and motion; all which may well be thought without, and at some distances from the mind, though color should not. In answer to this, I appeal to any man's experience, whether the visible extension of any object doth not appear as near to him as the color of that object; nay, whether they do not both seem to be in the very same place. Is not the extension we see colored, and is it possible for us, so much as in thought, to separate and abstract color from extension? Now, where the extension is, there surely is the figure, and there the motion too. I speak of those which are perceived by sight.”—(Essay towards a New Theory of Vision, p. 255.) Note (L.) page 112. I intended to have introduced here, some doubts and queries with respect to the origin, or rather to the history of the notion of Extension; not with any view to an explanation of a fact which I consider, with the eminent philosophers referred to in the text, as altogether unaccountable; but to direct the attention of my readers to a more accurate examination than has been hitherto attempted, of the occasions on which this notion or idea is at first formed by the mind. Whatever light can be thrown on this very obscure subject may be regarded as a valuable accession to the natural history of the human understanding. It was long ago remarked by Dr. Reid, (and indeed by other writers of a still earlier date) that to account for the idea of Extension by the motion of the hand, is a paralogism, as this supposes a previous knowledge of the existence of our own bodies. Condillac does not appear to have been sufficiently aware of this; nor even that most acute and profound philosopher, the late Mr. Smith. In his Essay on the External Senses (published in his posthumous volume), he all along supposes the mind in possession of the idea for the origin of which he is attempting to account. How do we get the notion of what Mr. Smith calls externality, and Berkeley outness? Is not this only a particular modification of the idea of extension? The same remark may be applied to some late speculations on this subject, by M. Destutt-Tracy. They are evidently the result of great depth and refinement of thought; but, like those of Mr. Smith, they will be found, on an accurate examination, to involve what logicians call a petitio principii. I am strongly inclined, at the same time, to think, that the idea of extension involves the idea of motion; or to express myself more explicitly, that our first notions of extension are acquired by the effort of moving the hands over the surfaces of bodies, and by the effort of moving our own bodies from place to place. The reference which Smith and Destutt-Tracy, as well as many earlier inquirers have made to the motion of the hand, in their attempts to clear up this mystery, furnishes a strong presumption, that motion is somehow or other concerned in the business. I differ from them only in this: that whereas they seem to have considered their theory as affording some explanation of the origin of the idea, to me it appears, if well-founded, to exhibit this problem in-a form still more manifestly insolvable than that in which it is commonly viewed. From the following query of Berkeley's, it may be inferred what his opinion was on the point in question. "Whether it be possible, that we should have had an idea or notion of Extension prior to Motion? Or whether, if a man had never perceived Motion, he would ever have known or conceived one thing to be distant from another?" To this query I have already said, that I am disposed to reply in the negative; although, in doing so, I would be understood to express myself with the greatest possible diffidence. One observation, however, I may add, without the slightest hesitation, that if the idea of Extension presupposes that of motion, it must, of necessity, presuppose also that of Time. The prosecution of this last remark has led me into some speculations, which ap pear to myself to be interesting; but to which I find it impossible to give a place in this volume. Note (M.) page 121. "Tous les systêmes possibles sur la génération des idées, peuvent être rappelés quant à leur principe fondamentale, à cette simple alternative; ou toutes nos idées ont leur origine dans les impressions des sens; ou il y a des idées qui n'ont point leur origine dans ces impressions, et par conséquent qui sont placées dans l'âme immédiatement, et qui lui appartiennent en vertu de sa seule nature. "Ainsi les opinions des philosophes anciens ou modernes sur la génération des idées, se plaçeront d'elles-mêmes sur deux lignes opposées; celles des philosophes qui ont adopté le principe, nihil est in intellectu quin prius fuerit in sensu; celles des philosophes qui ont cru aux idées innées, ou inhérentes à l'intelligence.”—De la Génération des Connoissances Humaines, pp. 8 et 9. (A Berlin, 1802.) Note (N.) page 124. I have substituted the words consciousness and perception, instead of the sensation and reflection of Locke, for two reasons: 1. Because sensation does not, in strict philosophical propriety, or, at least, not in a manner quite unequivocal, express the meaning which Locke intended to convey; the knowledge, to wit, which we obtain by means of our senses, of the qualities of matter: 2. Because reflection cannot, according to Locke's own use of the term, be contrasted either with sensation or perception; inasmuch as it denotes an operation of the intellect, directing its attention to the subjects of consciousness; and bearing to that power the same relation in which observation stands to perception. I must own, at the same time, that I could never assent entirely to the justness of the following criticism on Locke's classification, which occurs in the conclusion of Dr. Reid's Inquiry into the Human Mind. "The division of our notions into ideas of sensation, and ideas of reflection, is contrary to all rules of Logic; because the second member of the division includes the first. For, can we form clear and just notions of our sensations any other way than by reflection? Surely we cannot. Sensation is an operation of the mind of which we are conscious; and we get the notion of sensation by reflecting upon that which we are conscious of." That this criticism would have been perfectly just, if Locke had used the words sensation and reflection, in the definite and precise acceptations invariably annexed to them in Reid's writings, must undoubtedly be granted. Nay, I am inclined to think, that it applies nearly to Locke's own opinion, when interpreted according to some subsequent applications which he himself has made of it; and which, by resolving every thing into the evidence of consciousness, have an obvious tendency to confound our sensations and our perceptions together. But, in proposing this classification, in the beginning of his Essay, there can be no doubt, that Locke meant by sensation what Reid calls perception; and therefore, to those who have not studied, with more than ordinary care, the whole of Locke's system, it is not surprising that Reid should have the appearance of availing himself of a verbal ambiguity to gain an undue and uncandid advantage over his illustrious predecessor.-(See Priestley's Remarks on this subject in his Examination of Reid.) Dr. Reid's criticism, too, on Locke's trespass against the rules of logical division is, I think, too severe; and derives its plausibility from the ambiguity of the word reflection, which Locke, in this instance, as well as in many others, employs as synonymous with consciousness.* It is for this reason, that I have substituted the latter word instead of the former, as expressing Locke's meaning with greater precision and clearness. When Locke's statement is thus interpreted, it does not seem to merit, in all its extent, the censure which Reid has bestowed on it. The account which it gives, indeed, of the origin of our ideas, is extremely incomplete; but it cannot be said that one member of his division includes the other; the first relating exclusively to the properties of matter, and the second exclusively to the internal phenomena of mind. I grant, upon the other hand, that if, with Locke's statement, we combine all the subsequent reasonings in his essay, Dr. Reid's criticism is not so wide of the mark; for I have already endeavoured to show, that some of his favorite doctrines involve, as a necessary consequence, that consciousness is the sole and exclusive source of all *This ambiguity in the term reflection is particularly taken notice of in Dr. Reid's Essays on the intellectual powers. "Reflection ought to be distinguished from consciousness, with which it is too often confounded, even by Locke. All men are conscious of the operations of their own minds, at all times, while they are awake; but there are few who reflect upon them, or make them objects of thought."-P. 60. 4to edit. our knowledge. But this is merely an argumentum ad hominem; not a proof, that the division would have been faulty, if detached from the speculations which afterwards occur. Nor would it have been a correct enunciation of the error on which this argument turns, to say, that the second member of the division included the first; -the first and second members, according to that interpretation, being completely identified. Note (0.) page 150. Mr. Locke himself prepared the way for Mr. Tooke's researches, by the following observations, of which, however, I do not recollect that any notice is taken in the Diversions of Purley. "It may also lead us a little towards the original of all our notions and knowledge, if we remark how great a dependence our words have on common sensible ideas; and how those which are made use of to stand for actions and notions quite removed from sense, have their rise from thence, and from obvious sensible ideas are transferred to more abstruse significations, and made to stand for ideas that come not under the cognizance of our senses, viz. to imagine, apprehend, comprehend, adhere, conceive, instil, disgust, disturbance, tranquillity, &c. are all words taken from the operations of sensible things, and applied to certain modes of thinking. Spirit, in its primary signification, is breath: Angel, a messenger, and I doubt not, but if we could trace them to their sources, we should find, in all languages, the names which stand for things that fall not under our senses, to have had their first rise from sensible ideas." From the sentence which follows, it also appears, that Locke, as well as his ingenious disciple, was disposed to connect this philological speculation with his own account of the origin of our ideas.-" By which we may give some kind of guess what kind of notions they were, and whence derived, which filled their minds, who were the first beginners of languages; and how nature, even in the naming of things, unawares suggested to men the originals and principles of all their knowledge." Condillac, in his Essai sur l'origine des Connoisances Humaines, has given his sanction to this conclusion of Locke (Seconde Partie, Sect. 1, chap. x.) And another writer, far superior, in my opinion, to Condillac, as a metaphysician, has brought forward the philological fact stated in the foregoing paragraph, as a new argument in favor of the theory which refers to sensation the elements of all our knowledge. 66 L'imperfection des langues en ce qu'elles rendent presque toutes les idées intellectuelles par des expressions figurées, c'est-à-dire par des expressions destinées, dans leur signification propre, à exprimer les idées des objets sensibles; et remarquons en passant, que cet inconvénient, commun à toutes les langues, suffiroit peutêtre pour montrer que c'est en effet à nos sensations que nous devons toutes nos idées, si cette vérité n'etoit pas d'ailleurs appuyée de mille autres preuves incontestables." * Hobbes seems to have been the first, or, at least, one of the first who started the idea of this sort of etymological metaphysics. "If it be a false affirmation," he observes in one passage, "to say a quadrangle is round, the word round quadrangle signifies nothing, but is a mere sound. So likewise, if it be false to say, that virtue can be poured, or blown up and down, the words in-poured (infused) virtue,-inblown (inspired) virtue, are as absurd and insignificant as a round quadrangle. And therefore you shall hardly meet with a senseless and insignificant word, that is not made up of some Latin or Greek names."—See page 111, of the folio edition of Hobbes, printed at London in 1750; and compare it with page 103 of the same vol ume, Note (P.) page 161. I do not quote the following lines as a favorable specimen of the Abbé de Lille's poetry, but merely as an illustration of the heterogeneous metaphors which obtrude themselves on the fancy, whenever we attempt to describe the phenomena of Memory. It is but justice to him to remark, at the same time, that some of them (particu larly those printed in Italics) do no small honor to his philosophical penetration. La mémoire. A ce 1.5m se troublent tous nos sages; Note (Q.) p. 170. De Lille. L'Imagination, Chant I. "It is never from an attention to etymology, which would frequently mislead us, but from custom, the only infallible guide in this matter, that the meanings of words in present use must be learnt. And indeed, if the want in question were material, it would equally affect all those words, no inconsiderable part of our language, whose descent is doubtful or unknown. Besides, in no case can the line of derivation be traced backwards to infinity. We must always terminate in some words of whose genealogy no account can be given."-Campbell's Philosophy of Rhetoric, Book ii. chap. 2. In this remark I perfectly agree with the very acute and judicious writer; but I do not well see its connexion with the following note which is subjoined to it. "Dr. Johnson, who, notwithstanding his acknowledged learning, penetration, and ingenuity, appears sometimes, if I may adopt his own expression, lost in lexicography,' hath declared the name punch, which signifies a certain mixt liquor very well known, a cant word, because, being to appearance without etymology, it hath probably arisen from some silly conceit among the people. The name sherbet, which signifies another known mixture, he allows to be good, because it is Arabic; though, for aught we know, its origin among the Arabs hath been equally ignoble or uncertain. By this way of reckoning, if the word punch, in the sense wherein we use it, should, by any accident, be imported into Arabia, and come into use there, it would make good Arabic, though it be but cant English; as their sherbet, though, in all likelihood, but cant Arabic, makes good English. This, I own, appears to me very capricious."—Ibid. I cannot help being of opinion, that, in Dr. Johnson's decision concerning the comparative rank of these two words in the English language, he has greatly the advantage over his critic; although nothing, undoubtedly, can be more absurd than the principle on which it proceeds; that "those words, which being to appearance without etymology, have probably arisen from some silly conceit among the people," ought, on that account, to be banished from good writing. The real ground of the difference, in point of effect, which the words punch and sherbet produce on the ear of an Englishman is, that the former recalls images of low life and of disgusting intemperance; whereas the latter, if it at all awakens the fancy, transports it, at once, to the romantic regions of the East. If the Arabians were to feel with respect to England, as every well-educated Englishman feels with respect to Arabia, the word punch could not fail to affect their ear, as the word sherbet does ours. Nor should this be ascribed to caprice, but to the general and unalterable laws of the human frame. To a Frenchman who never visited this island, and who knows English manners by description alone, the word punch has, by no means, the same air of vulgarity with which it appears to our eyes. In fact, I am inclined to believe, that ponche and sorbet would be considered by him as words of the same class, and standing very nearly on the same level. |