 In the past, the need for probabilities expressing prior belief has often been thought of, not as a necessity for all scientific inference, but rather as a feature peculiar to Bayesian inference. This seems to come from the curious idea that an outright...  The Likelihood Principle - Seite 63von James O. Berger, Robert L. Wolpert - 1988 - 208 SeitenVollansicht - Über dieses Buch
 | James O. Berger - 1985 - 648 Seiten
...on the answer than the choice of a prior on 6, and is often just as subjective. Thus Box (1980) says "In the past, the need for probabilities expressing...assumptions and the prior distribution of the parameters." More bluntly, Good (1973) says "The subjectivist states his judgements, whereas the objectivist sweeps... | |
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