CHAPTER II

DOCTRINE OF THE TERM

I

OF THE NATURE OF THE TERM

$28. "TERM," " NAME," AND "WORD" DISTINGUISHed and DefINED.—These words are often used as synonymous, but the distinction between them is material and important. A word is a vocal sign, or vocable, expressing a thought, or a thought expressed by such a sign. Under the name "word" is included the substantive or noun, and also other parts of speech, as, e. g., the article, the conjunction, etc. A name (noun or substantive, which may be either simple or complex) is a word or set of words used to signify an object of thought regarded as a thing, i. e., as an existing substance or entity. The knowledge or cognition of a thing by the mind is called a notion or concept; hence a name may be otherwise defined as a word, or set of words, expressing a notion, or

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as a notion thus expressed. A notion or concept is itself a thought, but it differs from other thoughts as being the thought of a thing, i. e., of something as existing. A term is a name used as a subject or predicate of a proposition. It is therefore to be regarded merely as an element of the proposition; and the proposition as the principal subject in Logic.

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$29. THING" Defined. The term thing is used in two different senses that must be carefully distinguished. In its proper sense the term denotes an actual thing or substance, whether material or spiritual, as, e. g., mineral, vegetable, animal, gas, man, soul, God, etc. In this sense things constitute the actual universe, and all notions or concepts whatever, unless false or unreal, are ultimately derived from them. But, in another sense, the term is used to denote, not only actual existences, or, as we may call them, real things, but mere objects of thought, or things existing only in contemplation of mind, and to which there are, in fact, no real things directly corresponding.' These may be appropriately

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as in

'All true or real notions must correspond to real or actual things, but the correspondence may be either direct between the notion and the real things signified by the term the case of concrete terms, e. g., "man," "horse," etc.; or indirect—as in the case of abstract terms between the notion and the things whose attributes are signified. Thus, taking for example the term "redness," there is apparently a

called quasi-things; and of this kind are the concepts or notions denoted by all abstract terms; which denote, not real things or individuals, but mere abstractions, as, e. g., such terms as "justice," "the state," the names of the several colors, disease, death, etc.; where the things denoted are not actually existing things, but mere concepts of qualities or attributes of things objectified by the mind.

8 30. CONCEPT," "NOTION," AND

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"THOUGHT" DEFINED.-The term concept," or "notion," or thought (in this connection we may use either indifferently) is a relative term implying or connoting, in its strict or proper sense, an individual thinking mind of which it is the product; and hence the term will have a different meaning according to the correlative to which it refers. It must therefore have many different senses; of which two must be especially distinguished. In its proper sense it denotes simply a certain affection of the mind of the individual; and in this sense, obviously, it is momentary and evanescent,—like the snow falling on the river, described by the poet, as "ae moment white,

direct correspondence between the notion expressed and the quasi-thing signified, though in reality they are the same; but there is an indirect real correspondence between the notion of redness and the red things of which it is a quality.

then gone forever." For though, it is said, the thought recurs to us, it is not, nor can it be, the same thought, but is merely a copy or image of it. So, when a thought—as it is said -recurs to us, it is always, or at least almost always, suggested to us by the word in which it is embodied; and, as to us, so also to others. But Logic does not have to deal with the momentary, fleeting thought of the individual, but with the thought only that is continuously, or we may say permanently reproduced, and communicated by one to another; that has become incarnate in words, and is thus, even when lost from the mind, at once preserved, and continuously suggested, or brought back to the consciousness of each and all. Hence, in Logic, the terms, notion, concept, and thought, are to be regarded as used in a secondary or derived sense, as denoting the common notions, concepts, and thoughts of mankind embodied in words. Hence the things or significates denoted by abstract and other universal terms have in fact a kind of existence outside of any and all individual minds; which, as opposed to substantial, may be called logical existence; i. e., they exist in the word (logos), and their existence is as real and of precisely the same nature as that of the word of which they are an essential part. Hence, though we speak of abstractions as fictitious

(i. e., feigned) or imaginary things, yet they are real, and in some cases, as, e. g., in the case of death, disease, misery, poverty, etc., terribly real facts. What is meant by the term "fictitious thing" is, not that the notion signified is false or unreal, but that, for logical purposes, it is fictitiously regarded as a thing.

31. THE NORMAL LOGICAL TERM.Every term legitimate for logical purposes, or we may say every logical term, is therefore to be regarded as involving or implying three essential notions or elements, namely: (1) the vocal sign, or vocable, (2) the notion denoted, and (3) the actual things, or objective realities, to which the notion and the vocal sign are supposed to correspond. These are all to be regarded as, in one sense, essential elements of the logical term. For though, where the last is lacking, a term may exist, and it is, therefore, possible to have an absurd or nonsensical term, yet such a term is not such as is contemplated when we regard the end of Logic; which is not to deal with absurdities or ingenious puzzles, but to discover truth and avoid error. Hence, an absurd or nonsensical term, or, in other words, a term whose signification does not correspond to reality, is not the normal or true term, essential to legitimate ratiocination; nor is Logic-unless in illustrating some of its formal operations—in any way concerned with