right and wrong and of the just and unjust is the good of the majority. An execrable doctrine; for it cannot be asserted that the life or faculties or property of an innocent man can be converted to the use of another or of others, except in the case of a clearly defined right in the one and an obligation to submit to it in the other.

$153. MAINE'S DEFINITION OF THE LAW OF NATURE.-Another example is presented by the peculiar and curious view taken by Sir Henry Maine of the term Jus Naturale as used by the Roman lawyers, and its equivalent, the Law of Nature, or Natural Law, as used by modern jurists and philosophers. This notion, he erroneously assumes, had its origin in the supposed state of nature; which doctrine, he says, the Roman jurisconsults borrowed from the Greek philosophers. But the term Jus Naturale, or Law of Nature, is one of the comparatively small class of terms whose meaning is perfectly definite and settled. As used by jurists, it is but another name for Natural Justice,' or Right Reason applied to the jural 1 Hobbes's Lev., chap. xxvi. "It is not used among them that be learned in the laws of England to reason what thing is commanded or prohibited by the law of nature." But, "when anything is grounded on the law of nature, they say that reason will that such a thing be done; and if it be prohibited by the law of nature, they say it is against reason (Doctor and Student, chap. v.). "True law is right reason

relations of men; which, as universally held by them," is part of the law of every commonwealth in the world."

conformable to nature" (Cicero, De Rep.). "Right reason is what we call law" (id., De Leg.). Natural law is the rule and dictate of right reason (Taylor, Elements of Civil Law). "The law is intellect free from passion" (Arist., supra, § 135 n.).

CHAPTER XI

ILLICIT ASSUMPTION OF PREMISES (PETITIO

PRINCIPII)

1. Of the Nature and Several Forms of this Fallacy

§ 154. This fallacy may occur in various ways, and it would therefore be an endless task to enumerate or classify all its different forms; nor would there be any advantage in doing so. There are, however, several forms of the fallacy that, on account of their frequent occurrence and their powerful influence over the minds of men, demand a particular consideration, and to these our attention will be directed.

8155 (1). ILLICIT GENERALIZATION.-The most important of these, which may be called the Fallacy of Illicit Generalization, consists in the use of a universal proposition in cases where the corresponding particular proposition is alone admissible. This fallacy is one of the most common and formidable, not only in popular discourses, but in more pretentious

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works on Politics and Morality; for almost all the wisdom of common sense is embodied in this sort of propositions, i. e., particular propositions assumed to be universal. Such propositions may, indeed, be used with profit by men of sense in practical affairs; as, in general, when a question presents itself it is easy to perceive whether the principle should be applied or not; or, if a mistake be made, it is corrected by experience; but the masses of men are easily misled by them. Hence they serve well for rhetorical purposes; for the hearer, unless of a critical mind, will in general accept them without hesitation.

Examples

156. COMMONPLACES.-The most important cases of this fallacy occur in the use of Commonplaces; by which is meant, opinions current among men generally, or particular classes of men, and used as premises for reasoning.' These are commonly founded upon some truth which they purport to express, and to which they more or less nearly approximate;

1 Hence Bacon, as a useful rhetorical device, recommends the preparation of tables of Commonplaces, of which he gives an example in his De Augmentis; wherein should be arranged, for the use of speakers and writers, in parallel columns, arguments pro and con, or theses and anti-theses, on all questions of general interest.

so that there is here, as" in all things evil, a soul of truth." But they are hardly ever universally true; and therefore to assume them as universals is illicit.

§ 157. POPULAr Proverbs.—Of these commonplaces, the most striking examples are furnished by popular proverbs; and of these, as illustrating precisely the nature of such maxims, two may be cited that, in their literal expression, are contradictory, but, as maxims go, may both be said to be true, i. e., they are each true in certain cases, but neither universally. They are the old adages, "Never put off till to-morrow what you can as well do today" and "Never do to-day what you can as well put off till to-morrow "; the first of which points out the danger of procrastination, the latter, the danger of committing ourselves before necessity requires. It may be readily seen that, according to circumstances, either of these may serve as a useful hint for conduct; but, in using it, the caution of the nautical philosopher is to be observed, that "the bearing of the observation lies in the application of it."

8158. LEGAL MAXIMS.- Another striking illustration of the same class of propositions is furnished by what are called the maxims of the law; which, in general, are true only as particular propositions, i. e., only in particular cases,