which he claims to it of the ancient philosophers were | tion than he intended, so he will attribute less to God. little considerable, if ever so truly claimed, we have no For he will, at this rate, attribute no more to him, than ground to think it otherwise claimed than most untruly. hath been generally ascribed to ordinary natural agents; Its authority, as he represents it, depends upon a worse i.e. to produce into actual being, out of matter, that whereto authority. He is so modest as to expect it to be believed, there was in it some seminal disposition before. upon his bare word, that this was the opinion of all the And here, indeed, is the source of his error, his reducing ancient philosophers before Christ's time; while yet he infinite power to the measures of finite; an insolent prethinks not fit to tell us his name. But if their reasonings suming to circumscribe Omnipotency, and making that from it be considered, that generations are out of matter, simply impossible even to Almightiness itself, which is and corruptions are into matter, we have no cause to ap- only so to created agents. And to this purpose, I find prehend they understood it otherwise than that natural some reasonings in Sextus Empiricus, who tells us how agents did neither create nor annihilate any thing. Besides the sceptics attempted to prove (besides their disputing that, there is positive ground enough to conclude, that the against the other three sorts of causation) that dowμarov more instructed and wiser pagans, long before Christ's an incorporeal thing, cannot be airiov oparos-the cause of time, did believe all things to have sprang from one intel-any thing corporeal; arguing (and slightly enough) from ligent, self-subsisting original, matter itself not being ex- the common methods of subordinate agents, to the operacepted. As, with the Egyptians, the inscription of the tions of the Supreme Cause. Nor is it apprehensible, how temple at Sais shows, "I am all that is, or was, or shall one can find a medium; or while they make matter inbe," &c. and with the Grecians, their worshipping God, dependent, how not to make God dependent. under the name of Pan: which could mean no other And when the Monsieur we are concerned with took a thing, than that they thought the Deity to comprehend friendly notice of Hermogenes's consent with him upon eminently or virtually all beings besides, in its creative or this subject, he might as well have been at the pains to productive power. And we have reason to think that consider somewhat of what Tertullian wrote anainst him, pagan philosophers since Christ, such as Hierocles, Jam- that hereby, in some respect, God is made inferior and blichus, Porphyry, Plotinus, &c. who (as others have subject to matter, when without it he could not have made a observed) were manifestly of this sentiment, understood world. Materia superior invenitur, quæ illi copiam opethe minds of the more ancient philosophers as well as randi subministravit, et Deus subjectus materiæ videtur, this Monsieur; nor do they pretend to contradict them cujus substantiæ eguit; nemo non subjicitur ei cujus eget, &c.-Every one is subject to what he stands in need of.

herein.

And for the reason of the thing itself, he hath not the least appearance of any on his part, but that, because the finite power of a creature cannot bring a thing out of nothing, therefore omnipotency cannot; which is so far from concluding for him, that (as hath been intimated) it manifestly contradicts itself, and concludes the contrary. For how is that omnipotency, which cannot do every thing that implies not a contradiction? And how is that a contradiction, that what once was not, should afterwards come to be? there being no objective impossibility or intrinsic repugnancy in the thing itself to exist, but that it were truly ens possible; (and we are out of doubt concerning matter for instance, or whatsoever else we are sure doth exist, chat it could exist;) and supposing also that there be a sufficient, causative power, to make it exist, or produce it into being and what cause can be more sufficient than an omnipotent one, such as our author confesses God to be? Nor doth he deny that there are intelligent spirits, that were not of themselves; only he would have us think them but finer matter, impressed with intellectual power. But what akin is a mind to matter, except his own? And supposing a mind or intellect be stamped upon matter, it is then but added to it, not drawn out of it, as if matter had before contained it. And even thus, since mind or intellect is not nothing, (unless he will say, himself differs by nothing from unthinking clay,) we have something out of nothing. And who can think it more impossible to Omnipotency, to create matter, than a mind?

CHAPTER III.

The reason of what next follows. Directions to readers not wont to inquire into the grounds of their religion. A summary and plainer proposal unto such, of what hath been said in the former Part, concerning God's existence and conversableness with men. The reasonableness (so much being already evinced) of alleging, and relying upon the testimony of the Holy Scriptures. The expressness of that testimony concerning the unity of the Godhead, the trinity therein. The absolute perfection of the Divine Nature. The infiniteness of God's knowledge, power. goodness, and presence. His propensions towards men, and aptness (supposing there were no obstruction) to human converse. Matters of doubt herein resolved.

I. AND having thus far established and vindicated so principal a ground-work in this important cause,―That what is necessarily, or of itself, is an absolutely perfect Being, distinct from all things else; and a proper Object of religion, or whereto a temple, and all the worship thereof, duly belong, I shall now only suffer myself to be a little further diverted from my intended course, apprehending that their case is also to be considered, who have been less accustomed to this course, of reasoning out to themselves the principles of their religion: unto whom therefore what hath been hitherto attempted may seem, if not obscure in its parts, yet so tiresome in the whole, as not to meet with patience enough to trace the design that hath been driven on, to its issue and period; it being very incident to unexercised and less attentive readers, to lose their thread, and forget the scope of a discourse, and so still have the truth to seek even in the midst of it. And if what hath been hitherto said, prove unsatisfying to any, that justice must be done to the cause itself and to them, as to avow it must rather proceed either from this infirmity in the reader, or from the unskilfulness of the writer to propound things happily and to advantage; than either from the inevidence of the things themselves, or from want of capacity, even in an ordinary understanding. Nor Or if he think matter, as such, to have only seminal doth any undertaking seem more feasible, or less to be reason or intellect in it, antecedently to his supposed di- despaired of, than plainly and satisfyingly to evince, to an vine impress upon it, how will that agree with his making unprejudiced understanding that shall attend, these first it essentiellement imparfait, essentially imperfect? Or foundations of a religion and a temple, viz. That God is; what means his added capable neunmoins, its being never-and-That he is conversable with men, or is such as is theless capable of all such perfections by the impression of capable and apt to receive worship from men, and impart God upon it? Is that capacity something, or nothing? blessedness to them. We shall therefore so far interrupt Or what sense is it to make it capable of having those per- the current of this discourse, as to endeavour this, by fections, which it is essential to it not to have? giving a brief and plain sum of the more principal things And surely, as he will attribute to matter more perfec- that have been said to this purpose already. And to pre

But if he reckon thought, or intellect, is contained in matter, or included in the notion of it, then matter, as such, must be intelligent, and consequently all matter; and this will be absurdity enough, to give him as good a title to the privilege of not being reasoned against, as, from his magisterial way of writing, we may count Spinosa thought himself to have. Nor indeed will it leave any man so much as a conjecture at the reason why he should pretend to differ from him. For who can imagine, why his matter, endued with the attributes of extension and thought, might not do as well as Spinosa's substance?

pare for it, must desire you that have not been, as yet, wont to employ your minds this way, to observe the following directions:

easy steps in a way that is in some part sufficiently beaten, however, that is sufficiently plain, and it is to be hoped you will soon see that matter put out of all doubt. Let this then be your first step:

1. That somewhat or other there is, that hath been from all eternity necessarily and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else. If this be not at the first view evident to you, or if it seem too large a step, we will divide it into parts; and consider well what is said for the proof of it, by these degrees.

First, That you would not give place to discouragement, nor think too meanly of the understanding whereby God hath distinguished you from the inferior creatures. There is that mind and spirit in man, which doth compass many things of far greater difficulty than it is here to be employed about; though it can be exercised about nothing of so great consequence. That apprehensive power that can take in the orderly frame of such notions as are requi- (1.) Somewhat or other must ever have been; for othersite to the exact skill of numbering or of measuring things, wise, how could any thing come to be at all? Do you of navigation, of trade, of managing the common affairs of think it was possible, if ever there was nothing at all in human life; that can lay down to itself such prudent being, of one sort or other, that any thing should have maxims and rules whereby the inconveniences may in come into being? No surely, for which way should it be? great part be avoided which are incident to common con- It could not be made by another, there being no other to versation, and the advantages gained which may serve make it; and it could not make itself, itself being as yet one's own private and secular interests; that understand-nothing. But sure you can easily apprehend, that to make ing which can do all this, would far more easily compre- a thing be, is to do something; and as easily, that what is hend as much as is needful to the certain knowledge of nothing, can do nothing. Therefore, when your eyes tell God's existence, and that he is such as we ought to wor-you that something now is, you may be as sure, as of what ship, and may enjoy, if it apply itself hereto. Do not so despair as not to make an attempt; you know not the strength of your own mind till you have tried it.

Secondly, That you indulge not, or do not suffer yourselves to be insensibly seized by, a mean and sordid sloth. Set your thoughts a-work with vigorous diligence. Give not out before you have well begun. Resolve, since you have a thinking power about you, you will use it to this most necessary purpose; and hold your thoughts to it. See that your minds do not presently tire and flag; that you be rationally peremptory, and soberly obstinate, in this pursuit: yield not to be diverted. Disdain, having minds that can reach up to the great Original and Author of all things, that they should be confined to this dirty earth, or only to things low and mean.

you see with your eyes, that somewhat or other hath ever been. Say with yourself, Somewhat now is, therefore somewhat hath ever been. If you discern not the clearness of this consequence, take the opposite to it: Nothing now is, therefore nothing will ever be; it is as broad as long.

(2.) You may next proceed thus, that something or other hath been of itself; that is, without depending upon any thing else, or being beholden to any other thing for its being. Now here pause awhile, and consider what is said to make this plain to you. Either you must acknowledge something hath ever been of itself, or you must say that all things that are, or ever have been, were from ane ther, without any exception. But mark now, if you say that all things that are, or ever have been, without excepting any, were from another, you contradict yourself; for Thirdly, Look on the things that are rationally evident besides all things that are, or ever have been, without exto your understandings, as equally certain with what you cepting any, there is not another from whom they could see with your eyes. Are you not as sure that two and be. Therefore it is impossible that all things without extwo make four (which judgment is the act of your mind) ception should have been from another; whence then it is as that this thing which you look upon is black or white, plain that something must have been of itself, without deor of this or that shape or figure? Do not so debase your pending for its being upon any thing else: for it will come own understandings, as to think nothing certain that comes to the same contradiction, if you say all things depend under their judgment. It is true, they are apt enough to upon some other; since there is nothing beyond all things: be deceived in many things, and so is your sense too; but therefore, to say that all things depend, is to say they deif your sense could make you certain of nothing, what pend on nothing, that is, they do not depend. And to would become of justice and government among men ? say they have all depended on one another for their being, Who could take an oath before a magistrate? What or made one another, is altogether as absurd; for it will would become of the common actions and affairs of life? make the whole compass or circle of all being to depend How could you eat or drink, or buy or sell, if you could upon nothing, or come at length to this, that some one not certainly distinguish one thing from another? Some made itself, or even (which is more gross) made its own things are so plain as that you can be in no doubt about maker; unless you will rest in some one that made all the them, as that this is bread, not a stone; that a horse, not other, and was itself not made by any of them. If you a sheep; otherwise all the world must stand still, and all do not apprehend this yourself, desire any one that hath a commerce and action cease. And if there were not some better understanding to explain it to you, and you will things sure to your minds, that you may certainly say, in soon see the matter intended by it to be as evident as your some plain cases at least, this is true and that false, this heart can wish. And so this will be out of question with right and that wrong, you would be at as great a loss. you-That somewhat was of itself; which added to what Otherwise, you might be apt to think a part of a thing was proved before, comes to this-That somewhat was greater than the whole, or that the same man might be at ever of itself. And both these thus conjoined, plainly apLondon and at Rome at the same time; and you might pear from what hath been said. For we have seen that be as ready to kill your own father as to do him rever-nothing could possibly make itself, (which would absurdly ence, or to commit robbery upon your rich neighbour as relieve the poor, and judge the one as good an action as the other.

Fourthly, As any particular thing is offered to you, for the purpose we are here aiming at, consider it well by itself, before you go further; and think thus, Is this plain and certain, yea or no? If at the first sight you think it not so, observe diligently what is brought for the proof of it, and see whether now it be not manifestly certain; and when you once find it is, fix it in your mind as a certainty; say, Thus far I am sure. Let not your thoughts run back to this as a doubtful thing any more, or unravel their own work; but make use of it as a certainty, to your further purpose.

II. Being thus prepared, take this brief account of what hath before been discoursed more at large. And,

First, As to this first and great principle,-That there is a God. Be but patient of being led by the hand a few

imply, that before, it both was and was not,) and therefore, whatsoever was of itself, must ever have been, or never had beginning of being. So much, then, I suppose you take to be most certain, that something hath ever been of itself. Whereupon you may further add,

(3.) That what was ever of itself, was necessarily. I hope you understand what is meant by being necessarily, that is, being so as that it could not possibly but be. You may perceive that some things are so as that it was possible they might not have been, as a house, a town, a garment, or whatsoever was made by such makers as might have chosen whether they would have made it, or no. Yea, or whatsoever is any way made to be, having before not been; for what once was not, it is manifest it was then possible for it not to be. But to be necessarily, is to be so as that it could never possibly but have been; that is, what is necessarily, is somewhat of so excellent a nature, as that it could never be out of being. Now what was

ever of itself, it was in this sense necessarily; viz. so as that the excellency of its nature was such, as could never permit that it should not be; whence the name I AM agrees peculiarly and always thereunto. Nothing can otherwise be of itself, (not by making itself, which you have seen is impossible,) but by an everlasting possession of that excellency of being, which excludes all possibility of not being. It depends upon no one's choice or power, whether that which is of itself shall be or not be.

(4.) What hath thus ever been necessarily, still is, and will ever be; which is plain upon the same ground. What could never but be, can never but be; for its nature is such, as whereto not to be is impossible. Otherwise, if its nature had not been such, there being nothing else by which it should be made, it could never have been. Wherefore thus far you have firm footing in this first step; no part of the ground which it measures shakes under you. You may say you are sure of this-That somewhat there now is, that hath been from all eternity necessarily and of itself, without dependence upon any thing else, and that can never cease to be.-Set this down therefore for a certainty, and then add to it,

2. That whatsoever is not necessarily and of itself, is from and by that which is necessarily and of itself, as the first Author and Cause thereof. This is so certain, that nothing needs to be said for the proof of it more than hath been said already, so that you do but understand the meaning of it; which you cannot but do, if you consider that all things that are, or ever were, must be of one of these two sorts, viz. what was of itself, and what was not of itself, but from another: therefore, what is not of the first sort, must be of the second; that is, what was not of itself, must be from another; and then, what other must it be from? Surely from what was of itself, as its first and chief cause, whatsoever inferior or secondary causes it may have had besides, that were before it, caused by that first. So that you have now plainly before you, and in view, some or other eternal, necessary Being, not only to be considered as it is in itself, but as the original and root of all besides. Then go forward a little, and further add,

3. Neither this visible world, nor any thing of it, is necessarily, or of itself, without depending upon any thing else; and was therefore created and made by some more excellent Being that was so, and is quite distinct and diverse from it. That this may be evident to you, consider,

(1.) That whatsoever is changeable or imperfect, and capable of becoming more perfect, is not necessarily, and of itself, without dependence on any thing else. For what is of itself necessarily, and without dependence on any other, must have whatsoever belongs to it, all at once; for from whence should any addition or change happen any way to it? Not from any other, for it no more depends on another for addition, than it is liable to diminution by another, being what it is necessarily, or from itself: for nothing can impart or add what it hath not; and what it hath was in it before, and was in it necessarily, and therefore unalterably, and without possibility of any change. Now you know this visible world is continually changing, and in an imperfect state; and we may add, that there is somewhat invisible, of whose present being we are certain, that was not of itself, and that did not make this world. For instance, we are certain of the present being of our own mind and spirit, which we cannot see with our eyes, but by self-reflection we are sure we have somewhat in us that can think. Nor is there any thing that comes under our immediate, certain observation, more excellent than man himself, especially his mind and soul. And do you not yourself know, and find how changeable, indigent, and imperfect that is? Therefore you may be sure it is not of itself, or the maker of this visible world. If all the men in the world should join all their wit and power together, which way would they go to work to make such a world as this? yea, or even to make one single pile of grass, or grain of sand? Which way can you devise, then, they should make the sun or stars, or such an earth as this? It is plain, then, that all this world had a maker, distinct from itself.

(2.) Whatsoever being is of itself, is more excellent than what is not of itself. This you cannot but assent to at the

first sight: for besides that you must needs acknowledge it better to live of oneself, than to be beholden to another, you must also know that whatever being is not of itself, hath no excellency in it, but what was in that being that was of itself before; and therefore it had in it all the excellency that is in such things as proceeded from it, (unabated because in it necessarily,) together with the proper excellency of its own being, whereas the other sort of beings have but their own derived excellency only. Wherefore this also is most evident, that this world had a maker distinct from and more excellent than itself, that changes not, and whereto that name most properly agrees, I AM THAT I AM. Being sure of this, you may proceed, and conclude,

4. That the things which are manifestly not of themselves, but created and made, do plainly show that the Maker of them doth excel in power, wisdom, and goodness. The greatness of his works shows his mighty power; the nature, exactness, and order of them, his admirable wisdom; and his own self-sufficiency, and independency on the things made, show his rich and vast goodness in making them, as you may see more at large in Part I. Now therefore, if you have attended, you cannot but find you are sure and at a plain certainty concerning these four things: (1.) That somewhat was ever, and is necessarily. (2.) That what was not so did arise from that which was. (3.) That this world being not so, did therefore spring from that eternal, necessary, self-subsisting Being. (4.) And that this Being hath those particular excellences, whereof there are the manifest appearances and footsteps in the works that are made by him, (viz. especially power, wisdom, and goodness,) in himself. And thus the invisible things of him from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and godhead; so that they who see them not are without excuse. Rom. i. 20. If you be sure that any thing is, you may be sure somewhat was ever of itself: if you be sure any thing that was not of itself hath appearances of power, wisdom, and goodness in the frame of it, you may be sure that Being which was of itself is the powerful, wise, and good Creator and Maker of it. It is to be hoped, then, you are at a certainty,— That God is.

III. Secondly, And now as to the second principle, that hath been insisted on also in the former Part,-That this God is conversable with men. You cannot surely doubt, but that he that made you, and gave you all that any way belongs to your being, can apply himself to you, or any of his creatures, in a way suitable to the natures which he hath put into you and them; nor that he is ready to converse with you, in a way suitable to the nature he hath given you, if you be such towards him, and so apply yourself to him, as you ought. For it is not a greater thing to do so, nor more exceeding or going beyond the reach of his power, wisdom, and goodness, as you cannot but see, than to have given being to you, and all things.

But now if what is further discoursed in that former Part, concerning the oneness of the Divine Being, and the infiniteness thereof, or concerning any other perfections there particularly asserted unto it, seem not so plain to you as is requisite to guide and facilitate your applications to him; what hath been more plainly said in this, is however sufficient, as more primarily fundamental and pre-requisite to that further knowledge of his nature and will towards you, which in another way is to be had and sought after.

A cloud and darkness are now drawn over the world of mankind; and though it be still very easily discernible that God is, it is yet more difficult to attain to so distinct apprehensions what he is, as are necessary to our conversing with him. Against this difficulty, he hath afforded a gracious relief; that is, he hath provided there should be a more express discovery of him extant among men, than can be collected by their making observations upon this world. The case was such with man, (grown now so great a stranger to God,) as to require a written revelation of his nature and will; and we have it in those scriptures which bear with us the name of the word of God. It were indeed very unseasonable and absurd, to urge their authority in the inquiry, whether there be a God or no? For what

authority have they more than other writings, but as they are God's word? Therefore to expect or give assent to them as such, while yet it remains an undecided controversy, whether there be any such one, or no, for whose sake the assent should be given, were to expose our religion, not to prove it. These holy writings were not intended, by their affirmation of it, to inform us of God's existence, which they suppose, and do not prove, as a thing we may otherwise be certain of; but to teach us our duty towards him, and what our expectations may be from him; and do therefore give us a true representation and discovery of his nature, (so far as it was needful for us preparatively first to know it,) and then next, of the pre-other; and how absurd any such expectation must be, sent state of things between him and us, that we might be directed how to apply ourselves to him suitably to both the one and the other. It is true, that we can never know that there is a God, without knowing somewhat of his nature, or what a one he is. We cannot so much as inquire whether he be or no, but we must have some notion in our minds of the thing we inquire about; and so much as is necessary to this purpose, may be plainly gathered in the way we have gone hitherto. For if we understand the difference between something and nothing, between being and no being, and find that something is, or that there is some being; and again, if we understand the difference between a thing's being of itself, and being of or from another, and find the former must be the original of the latter, we cannot but understand ourselves, when we say there is an Original Being. And having some understanding what is meant by power, wisdom, and goodness; withal finding that not only the effects of these, but these very things themselves, are in the world, we cannot but be sure (because these things come not of nothing) that the Original Being is powerful, wise, and good. And now when we have thus found out an Original Being, that is of wisdom, power, and goodness sufficient to be the Author of such a world as this, we at once know both what God is, (sufficiently to distinguish him from all things else,) and are at a certainty that he is.

When we perceive that he hath given to all breath and being and all things; we have sought, and even felt and found him out, and found that he is not far from any one of us, since in him we live and move and have our being; that he is every where present, in this his creation, as the great Sustainer and the Life of the universe; and forasmuch especially as we are his offspring, (as even the light of a heathen poet could reach to discover, a sort of intelligent, designing, active beings,) that therefore the Godhead is not like silver, or gold, &c., but of a nature more nearly resembling that of our own souls, and the higher excellences of the best of his creatures,although eminently containing in himself also all the real perfections, virtues, and powers of all the rest. When we understand so much of God, (as we may by the light of our own reason,) we understand enough to give a foundation to religion, and to let us see he ought to have a temple, and worship; and another sort of temple than is made by men's hands, other worship than can be performed by the hands of men; as is there clearly argued, and inferred by the apostle, upon those plain grounds. Now when we are arrived thus far, it is seasonable to make use of the further help which we may observe the great, and wise, and good God to have most condescendingly, most aptly, and most mercifully afforded us, for our more distinct understanding of his nature, and our own state; and how we are to behave ourselves towards him thereupon.

IV. Taking notice therefore that there is a written revelation of him extant in the world, that bears his name, and gives itself out to be from him; if now we look into it, observe the import and design of it, compare it with what we before knew of his nature and our own; consider what is most obvious to an easy self-reflection in our own state and case, and how exactly this written revelation agrees and corresponds to those our former notices; taking in withal the many considerations that concur besides, to evidence to us the divine original and authority thereof: we cannot but have much rational inducement and obliga

a If we take notice that in some parts of this volume there are very ancient predictions, of the strongest and most unlikely events, that we see exactly fulfilled in the other parts.

|tion to receive, with all reverence and gratitude, this revelation, as from God; and to rely upon it, as a sure and sacred light sent down from heaven, to direct us in all our concernments God-ward. For finding our own great need of such additional light, and apprehending it sufficiently agreeable to the divine goodness to afford it, and expecting it to be such, in its scope and design, as we find it is: if we further consider it must have had some author, and perceiving it not easy, with any plausible pretence, to affix it to any other than to God himself: if we consider that it was impossible it could be invented by men, without some design of self-advantage, either in this world or in the either from men here, (the contents thereof being so repugnant to the common inclinations of men, as to oblige those that owned them to the severest sufferings on that account,) or from God hereafter, who could not be expected to reward forgery, falsehood, and the usurpation of his name; if, again, we further observe the positive attestations whereby he hath challenged and owned it as his own, and wherein the divine power hath borne witness to the divine truth contained in it: if the matters of fact on which all depends appear not less certain than that there were men and nations in the world, that we have not seen, and before we were born; if we see it not only improbable, but even next to impossible, that the records of those miraculous attestations should have been forged, and nations imposed upon thereby; and amongst them, many of the wisest of men in those very times when the things recorded were alleged to have been done, and in a matter wherein their eternal hope was concerned; we shall upon the whole see cause to judge, That as it were most absurd to suppose such a revelation given by God, and no sufficient rational evidence withal given that it is from him, (without which it cannot serve its end, and so would signify nothing,) so that there is nothing wanting, in divine estimate itself, to make up such a sufficient, rational evidence; nor in our own, unless we would suppose it necessary that every man should have a Bible reached him down by an immediate hand from heaven, or make some other suppo sition as fond and vain as that; or that we count not that sufficient evidence, which ought to satisfy our reason, if it do not gratify our fancy and curiosity too. It is not fit, here, to say more of the divine original of those holy writings, nor needful; so much being written already, with so great clearness, on that subject, by many. That therefore being out of question what you cannot reason out yourselves, or apprehend from the reasonings of others, concerning God's nature, tending to represent him worthy of a temple with you, and capable of receiving and rewarding your sincere and spiritual worship, fetch out from that divine volume; for you may be sure, though you cannot search him out unto perfection, he perfectly understands himself, and is certainly such, as he there tells you he is: and he there reveals himself to be such, as to whom the temple and worship we here intend, cannot be doubted (as he hath ordered things) to be both due and grateful. Whatever might be otherwise matter of doubt, is, by his express discovery of himself, taken away.

V. If it were still a doubt, after all that hath been formerly said for the reasoning out of these things, whether the Deity be one only, or manifold; whether the world had but one, or had not many makers; and so, whether there be no danger of misapplying our religion, or of mistaking the object of our worship. This word plainly tells us, There is but one God, the Father, of whom are all things. 1 Cor. viii. 6. That he is God, and there is none else. Isa. xiv. 21, 22. And that however there be three that bear witness in heaven, and the stamp of whose name is, in our baptism, distinctly and solemnly put upon us; Matt. xxviii. 1 John v, yet (as in many other instances, that may be in some respect three, which in some other respect is but one) without the unnecessary, punctual,declaration, how these are three, and how but one, it expressly tells us, these three are one.

And if it be yet a doubt with us (in which the reasonings of some may be too short to determine and resolve them)

b Dr. Stillingfleet, in his Origines Sacræ, Grotius de Verit. Chr. Relig. Huet. Demonstr. Evangel. &c. Mr. Baxter's Reasons of Christian Religion. With many more.

CHAPTER IV.

That there is an obstruction to this intercourse. The method of the following discourse. Man's apostacy from God, and the vitiated state of his nature; not only represented in the sacred writings, but also acknowledged and lamented by pagans-very mistakenly, in some respects; wherein perhaps some of them not justly understood. This not the primitive state of man therefore not to be imputed to the Author of nature. The temple of God hereby became unfit for the divine presence. Unsuitable. Disaflected. Hereupon forsaken, and most justly.

I. BUT so far it is, that there should want probability of

whether this one God be so absolutely and every way perfect as to be sufficient for us all; whether he can understand all our concernments, relieve us in all our necessities, hear our prayers, satisfy our desires, receive our acknowledgments and thanksgivings, and take notice with what love and sincerity they are tendered unto him; or, if he can do for us according to our necessities, and reasonable desires; whether we have any ground to believe that he will; this word of his plainly assures us, That he is God all-sufficient, Gen. xvii. 1.; that he hath all fulness --in him. It often represents him to us, under the name of the Lord God Almighty; tells us that he can do every a very inward commerce between God and man, that we thing, and that he doth whatsoever it pleaseth him. It have reason to think it rather strange, considering his natells us his understanding is infinite, and particularly as-ture and our own, it should not have been continual; and sures that he searches the hearts of men, and tries their that his unbounded and self-communicative fulness was reins; that they cannot think a thought, or speak a word, not by him always afforded, and always imbibed and drawn but he understands them afar off, and knows them alto- in by so capable and indigent a creature. One would gether that his eyes are upon all the ways of men; that wonder what should have discontinued this intercourse! he knows all things, and therefore knows if they love him. What can be so apt to give and flow out, as fulness? And that we may be the more fully put out of doubt What should be so apt to receive and take in, as want and how easy it is to him to do so, we are assured, That he emptiness? Such a commerce then as can be supposed is every where present, that he fills heaven and earth, that between onea that is rich and full, and them that are poor the heaven, and heaven of heavens, cannot contain him; and necessitous, one would think should have never failed. that there is no going from his Spirit, or flying from his So a fabulous dream may be significant, and not úninpresence; that if one go up to heaven, he is there; lie structive, touching the reason and way of commerce bedown in hell, he is there; go to the uttermost part of the tween God and creature. We are therefore put upon ab sea, yet there his hand shall lead, and his right hand hold new inquiry, and need no longer spend ourselves in anxious thoughts, Can there be any converse between God and men? That we may rather say, How ean it not be? or, How strange is it there is not more! that he hath not a temple in every human breast, replenished with his vital presence! that there are nothing but ruins and desolation to be found, where one would expect a fabric worthy of God, and an in-dwelling Deity! This must therefore be the sad subject of our thoughts awhile, What hath rendered the blessed God so much a stranger on earth, and occasioned him in so great part to forsake his terrestrial dwelling? Whence we shall have the advantage (seeing how just cause there was, on his part, for this deplorable distance) to adore the grace that returns him to us, and inclined him to take that strange course, which we find he did, to repair his forlorn temple, and fill this desolate, forsaken world with the joyful sound of those glad tidings, "The tabernacle of God is with men."

him.

II. We shall find he is no further a stranger in this world, than as we have made and continued him so: no further a home-dweller in it, than as by an admirable contrivance of wisdom and love, that will be the eternal wonder of the other world, he hath made way for himself: whereby his propensions towards men, prevailing against so great an obstruction, do even now appear at once both evident and marvellous, and ought to be not only the matter of our belief, but admiration.

VI. And that all doubt may vanish, concerning his will and gracious inclination, how expressly doth he make himself known by his name? viz. That he is the Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, &c. Éxod. xxxiv. 7. And by the same blessed and inspired penman of a part of these holy writings, (the beloved disciple, who lay in the bosom of his only-begotten Son; who also is in the bosom of the Father, and hath declared him,) we are not only told that God is Light, whereby the knowledge, purity, simplicity, and glory of the Divine Being are represented; but also, once and again, that God is Love, that we might understand him as a Being not of more glorious excellency in himself, than of gracious propensions towards his creatures. And lest it should be thought our meanness should exempt us, and put us beneath his regard, we are told, He taketh care for sparrows, he heareth the ravens when they cry; and generally, that the eyes of all wait upon him, and he gives them their meat in season, Psal. cxlv. (which even the brute creatures are emphatically said to seek of God,) and that he opens his hand, and satisfies the desires of every living thing, Psal. civ. And besides what he hath so expressly testified concerning his own nature, his favourable inclinations towards men might sufficiently be collected from that very nature which he hath given to man, considered in comparison and reference to his own; Wherefore our discourse must here proceed by these that he made him in his own image; and that he being steps, to show-1. That mankind hath universally revolted, the Father of spirits, hath placed a spirit in man, so agree- and been in a state of apostacy from God;-2. That hereby able to his own spiritual nature; and by his own inspira- the temple of God in man hath been generally made waste tion given him that understanding, that the mind begotten | and desolate ;—3. That he hath laid both the new foundacorresponds, by its most natural frame and constitution, to tions and the platform of his present temple in Immanuel, the mind that begot, the vous marpikos, (as it was anciently God with us, his own incarnate Son, who rebuilds, beaucalled,) his own Eternal Mind; and that if its own origi-tifies, furnishes, inhabits it, and orders all the concernnal be remembered, it turns itself towards him, seeks his ments of it. acquaintance by an instinct he hath himself implanted in it, and cannot rest till he have such a temple erected in it, where both he and it may cohabit together. By all this, his aptness to that converse with men, which is imported in the notion of a temple, doth so far appear, that at least it is evident such converse cannot fail to ensue, supposing that there were nothing in the way that might be a present obstruction thereto. And it will more appear, when we have considered (since there is somewhat that obstructs this converse) what he hath done to remove the obstruction, and how he hath provided that the intercourse may be restored, and his temple be resettled with men, upon everlasting foundations.

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III. 1. The first we do little need to labour in-every man's own reflection upon the vitiated powers of his own soul, would soon, as to himself, put the matter out of doubt; whence each one's testimony concerning his own case, would amount to a universal testimony. No man that takes a view of his own dark and blinded mind, his slow and dull apprehension, his uncertain staggering judgment, roving conjectures, feeble and mistaken reasonings about matters that concern him most; ill inclinations, propension to what is unlawful to him and destructive, aversion to his truest interest and best good, irresolution, drowsy sloth, exorbitant and ravenous appetites and desires, impotent and self-vexing passions-can think human nature, in him, is in its primitive integrity, and so pure as when it first issued from its high and most pure original. By such reflection, every man may perceive his own ill

b Plat. Sympos,