to be a vassal

quietly look on while Russia is establishing herself in a position from which she may at any moment swoop down upon our communications with India, must be simply inconceivable to those who still believe in English pluck and the traditions of English greatness. Such conduct Is England would simply reduce our country to the position of Russia? of a vassal of Russia, depending for its prosperity and comfort on the good pleasure of the Czar; and it may fearlessly be asserted, notwithstanding the truckling arguments of Mr. Bright and his friends, that rather than sink so low, England would fight to the last.

be done to

What is to be done to prevent such a result? What should So long as Russia does not push matters to a prevent this? war with Turkey, all that England has to do is to maintain an attitude of vigilant observation, ready to fight if need be, but unwilling to draw the sword while there still remains a chance of a pacific settlement. But what if Russia marches her armies into Turkish territory? In that case, we are told, England will occupy Constantinople. But is this enough? Are we to remain with some 15,000 or 20,000 men in that city, in

of Constan

tinople in

sufficient.

Occupation the anomalous position of the occupiers of the capital of a State which is not our ally, while Russia overruns the whole of Roumelia and Asia Minor with her troops? Say that we shall even then, thanks to Mr. Baker's fortifications, be able to maintain ourselves in Constantinople, although surrounded by enemies, and hundreds of miles from our nearest military station. Such a position could not in any case be tenable as a permanency. We should have to occupy Egypt and Crete at the cost of a vast expenditure of money, and an increase of our military forces; besides which it would be necessary for us to maintain a permanent fleet in the Eastern waters to counterbalance the fleet of Russia-which, as Lord Palmerston once justly observed, would be 'simply a mauvaise plaisanterie." But even in that case our position at Constantinople would be far from secure. We might hold it against Russian bayonets; but could we defend it against the all-powerful principle of nationality? If a great South Slavonic State were once established on the Balkan Peninsula, the cry for Constantinople as the national capital would be at least

as urgent as was that for Rome as the capital of Italy; some future Gladstone would rise to stir up English enthusiasm in favour of the Slavonic claims, and England would turn out " bag and baggage" from Constantinople as the French

had to do from Rome.

A mere occupation of Constantinople, therefore, would not secure the results at which we should aim. It would entail heavy and permanent sacrifices of men, money, and ships, and it would not prevent Russia from extending her power to the Mediterranean, and sending her men-of-war from Salonica and Smyrna, to harass our communications with Egypt and Constantinople itself. To revert to Mr. Lowe's familiar illustration, we should, instead of locking the gate which keeps a fierce dog out of our house, allow him to go where he pleases, and pay an armed watchman to protect us in case of attack.

No one who has the interests of this country at heart, and is aware of the heavy sacrifices which would be entailed upon it by a war with Russia, would advocate such a war unless the conduct of that Power proved beyond a doubt that

G

to secure peace.

it contemplates an attack on the integrity of Turkey. The policy of England should be prudent, but firm and decided. If the promises and assurances conveyed by the Emperor Alexander to Lord Loftus are really sincere, and are not to be classed in the same category with those addressed by Count Schouvaloff to our Government A last effort in regard to Khiva, the demands of Russia at the Conference will be such as may readily be accepted by the Porte and supported by all the Powers, England included. Our Government has from the first shown that it also desires a real amelioration of the condition of the Turkish Christians; and if this is all that Russia wants, there need be no difficulty as to the question of guarantees. An Austrian or Italian military occupation of Bulgaria might be suggested, on the condition that the occupying Power should be bound by a protocol, signed by herself and the other guaranteeing Powers, to evacuate the territory in a specified period. But the object would be equally well attained by a joint occupation; a distinct arrangement being at the same time made by the Powers as to the period of such occupa

tion, the forces to be employed, and the reforms to be carried out. That England, in making such a proposal, could be actuated by no other motive than an honest desire to maintain peace, no one would doubt; and if Russia refused it, all Europe would see that, while professing peace, Russia means war, and that the only way of arresting her aggressive policy is to resist her by force of arms.

The course which would in that case be most con- Our possiblo allies.

sistent with our national dignity, and at the same time be best calculated to secure our national interests, is that England should make war against Russia directly the Russian troops cross the Danube. But to do this effectually we must have allies. Our fleet did but little harm to Russia during the Crimean war, and we should not have been able, with the small military forces at our disposal, to wage that war if we had not previously secured the alliance of France. There is not much hope of obtaining such an alliance now; but there are other Powers which, being close to the scene of operations, and being vitally interested in the result of the struggle, would prove more useful