any-price school would do well to consider what their theories, if put into practice, amount to. Let us suppose, for argument's sake, that it would be possible to exterminate the Mussulman from Europe. England might then, setting aside all considerations of the maintenance of her communications with the East, and of her supremacy as a naval power, adopt the view so ingeniously suggested by Mr. Gladstone, and ally herself with Russia, re-enacting the old part of the cat and the chestnuts in the fable. Mr. Gladstone does not say what he considers would be the ultimate results of such an alliance; he contents himself with drawing a pleasant picture of the Turk being driven by England and Russia, bag and baggage, from Europe. But, admitting that the Turk can be really expelled from his empire, who is to take his place? Is Turkey to be merely broken up into a chaotic agglomeration of autonomous states, each endowed with enough vitality to live in perpetual discord with its neighbour, but too weak long to maintain a separate and peaceful existence of its own? or rather may we not more rationally conclude that once those States are separated from

the Empire to which they belong, Russia's motto will be divide and govern; and that the Mussulman element having been eliminated, the Turkish Slavs would, by a simple process of absorption, become subjects of the Czar? The Porte may and no doubt now has become aware of the fact (if, indeed, it ever thought otherwise), that the assistance it received from England in the Crimean war, and her interference on its behalf at the present crisis, is not due to any inherent sympathy existing between Christian England and Islamite Turkey. Our policy was then what it must be now, one of interest. We wished, and we still wish to maintain the Ottoman Empire as a barrier to Russian aggrandisement, and it is simply ridiculous to represent England's intervention on behalf of Turkey as an unnatural alliance between Christian civilisation and Mussulman barbarism. Now, however, that Turkey is unquestionably aware of the true motives which justly actuate England's policy towards her, may it not be rationally assumed that if we were to leave her to the tender mercies of the Government of St. Petersburg, she might, and probably would, retaliate both upon us and upon her Christian

Maintenance of the Turkish rule.

subjects by raising the standard of Islam? The Slavs and Greeks would then find themselves exposed to the horrors of a religious war waged with all the intensity of fanaticism; and England's danger would not be less, for we must not forget that forty millions of the subjects of our Indian Empire are Mahometans. Already influential Mahometan meetings have been called at Bombay and other places in India to urge upon Her Majesty's Government that their Turkish brethren should not be allowed to fall a prey to Muscovite rule. Once, however, they are fully convinced that England will do nought to save them, all the fierce animosities of race and religion will be unchained, and we may see a repetition of the terrible events of the Indian mutiny of 1857, with the additional danger that the then peaceable element of our Indian dominions would be turned into our bitterest and most implacable enemy.

Let us now consider the second of the proposals above referred to-that the Turkish rule should be maintained. If Russia had abandoned her traditionally aggressive policy, and were sincerely anxious for those reforms in Turkish administra

tion which should offer material guarantees for the improved condition of the Christian populations, then this country, in common with the other great Powers, would of course cordially acquiesce in her views and assist in so peaceful a consummation. But England, with the rest of the world, can, after the events of the last few months, hardly fail to be convinced that the real object of Russia is to encroach upon the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. The maintenance of that integrity is essential to English interests; and we must, therefore, consider whether, if it should be attacked by Russia, we should not wage a second Crimean war, with the same objects as the first, the " 'Bulgarian Atrocities" notwithstanding. It cannot be too often repeated that if this country is forced to draw the sword, English blood will not be spilt, as our political philanthropists would have us believe, for the defence of a barbarous and effete race, but because the establishment of an aggressive Power on the Balkan Peninsula would be a standing menace to England; and if, in the event of a Russian invasion of Turkey, England should be forced to wage war for the

Police Intervention.

reasons we have stated, it will be time enough when peace is again restored to enforce those internal reforms which are so urgently required.

The third proposal is that of a species of police intervention in Turkey. On this it is to be observed that such a suggestion, taking the form of dictation to the Sovereign of a great Empire in his own capital at a moment when he has just assumed the reins of Government-when his soldiers are flushed with the success of recent victories, and the population is a prey to fanatical excitement-would probably have the effect, if it should be adopted under the pressure of circumstances, of so weakening the power of the Sultan as ultimately to lead to results the very reverse of what are now contemplated. The anarchy and misrule consequent upon such an event might then be used as an argument by Russia for carrying out at a later period, when she might be better prepared, designs which had for the moment been postponed.

The question of internal reform is, indeed, now entirely subordinate to the higher issue of checking Russian ambition. That England should