What England wants. We retain our hold on Gibraltar, though part of the territory of a foreign Power, because we consider it our interest to do so; and we should also regard this as a sufficient justification for our occupying Constantinople or Egypt. This is not a question of abstract morality, but of interest: it is the business of England to look at the matter from an English, not from a Russian point of view. The Russians want Constantinople for their own advantage; England wants to keep them out of it for hers; and putting out of the question the moral right given to her by the Treaty of Paris, she is just as much entitled to prevent the Russians, if she can, from taking Constantinople as they are to attempt its conquest. The practical issue is, are we to step out of our way to let Russia do her will, even if-which, as has been shown, is very questionable-a few millions of Slavs will have their condition improved by our doing so? Yes, say our sentimental politicians; we should support the oppressed, however much our own interests may suffer. Such a doctrine may be admirably suited to the hermit's cell, but has nothing to do with the rough code of morals accepted in the practical affairs of life. We must take the world as we find it, and fight our enemies with weapons which can hurt them, not strike in the air while they aim at our hearts. If we are to adopt the principles of Messrs. Freeman and Gladstone, let us at least be consistent; let us give up India and Gibraltar, sell our ironclads, disband our army, and nobly starve in the consciousness of possessing virtues that are not of this world. Recapitulation of re Having thus cleared the ground, it may be useful to recapitulate the results which have been arrived sults. at. These are: 1st. Every great Power in Europe has an interest in keeping Russia out of Turkey. 2nd. It is therefore necessary, from a political point of view, not to allow the Russian power in Eastern Europe to extend beyond its present limits. 3rd. This is also desirable from a philanthropic point of view; for The world in general would suffer by the Russian power being established on the Balkan. (b) The Turkish Slavs themselves would suffer; for it is not probable that Russia, who has shown herself to be cruel, tyrannical, and intolerant in Poland, Khiva, and Circassia, will suddenly become humane, tolerant, and liberal in Turkey. 4th. Political autonomy for the Turkish Christians is only another name for Russian predomi nance. 5th. The conduct of Russia in the present crisis has shown that she is not working for the Turkish Slavs, but for herself. It appears, therefore, that whether from a political or a philanthropic point of view, the first thing to be considered by England in the present crisis is her own interest, and that the future destiny of the Turkish Slavs, though not to be excluded from consideration altogether, is a matter entirely subsidiary to that of putting a stop to Russian Policy of the encroachment. What has been the policy of the present Government. Government in this respect? Is it true, as their accusers assert, that they have "bolstered up" the Turks, that they have disregarded the just claims of the Christians, and that, by taking up an isolated attitude, they have prevented that "European concert," which, we are assured, would have at once solved the Eastern Question? It will be worth while, by means of a careful review of Lord Derby's despatches, to see how far these accusations are well founded. That the Government has made mistakes-that it has done things which it would not have done if it could have looked into the future-is only to say that it is not exempt from the ordinary failings of humanity. The question is not whether it has erred in matters of detail, but whether the objects of its policy have been the right ones, and whether it has consistently and firmly pursued those objects. When the insurrection in the Herzegovina first The insurrecbroke out, it met with but little sympathy in zegovina. England, and assuredly any attempt on the part of the Government to give its countenance to the rising would have been universally condemned by public opinion. If the subjects of any State choose to rise against their government, that is a matter of internal politics which need not in any way concern the governments of other States; but a foreign Power has not the right to assist the insurgents in tion in Her violation of treaties to which it was a party unless it openly declares war, especially when the insurrection, as in the present case, is known to have been the result of the ambitious designs of an aggressive neighbour. It was in accordance with this principle that Lord Derby acted throughout the whole course of the insurrection. He informed the Turkish Government* that it "should rely on its own resources to suppress the insurrection, and should deal with it as a local outbreak of disorder rather than give international importance to it by appealing for support to other Powers; " and when a consular mission to the insurgents was proposed, he accepted it with reluctance, on the ground that "such an intervention is scarcely compatible with the independent authority of the Porte over its own territory, offers an inducement to insurrection as a means of appealing to foreign sympathy against Turkish rule, and may not improbably open the way to further diplomatic interference in the internal affairs of the Empire" an anticipation which, as we all know, was afterwards only too completely realized. † * Despatch to Sir Henry Elliot of the 25th January, 1876. + Ibid. |