for no more than the recovery of the small strip of Bessarabia, extending to the mouth of the Danube, which was taken from her by the Treaty of Paris, a compliance with such a demand would be highly dangerous to Austria, both from a strategical and commercial point of view. It will be remembered that at the beginning of the Servian War great fears were expressed by the Servians lest Belgrade should be attacked by the Turkish gun-boats; and this step would doubtless at once have put an end to the war if the Powers had not prevented Turkey from taking it, on the ground that the Danube is a neutral stream. Such a plea, which was sufficient to deter a weak Power like Turkey, would be certainly disregarded by Russia if she were engaged in a war with Austria. The only obstacle (which, however, only exists in dry seasons, when there is not sufficient water at this point for purposes of navigation) to a Russian flotilla of gun-boats proceeding up the Danube is the rocky defile known as the Iron Gate, between TurnoSeverin and Orsova. Several attempts have already been made to remove this obstacle by Interests of Germany, mining operations, and there can be no doubt that so serious an impediment to commercial traffic on the Danube will soon be overcome (as in the recent case of Hell-Gate at the entrance of the harbour at New York) by engineering skill. Once this is done, both Pesth and Vienna would be exposed to the danger of a Russian naval attack. Even if we look at the matter only from a commercial point of view, the damage which would accrue to Austrian trade from a Russian possession of the mouths of the Danube is sufficiently obvious. Austria, moreover, as a country largely interested in the commerce of Europe with the East, would share with England in the loss which would be caused by the destruction or closing of the Suez Canal--a loss which would also be more or less severely felt by Germany, France, and Italy. These Powers, though not so directly interested France, and in the Eastern Question as England and Austria, Italy. would each be likewise affected in other respects by the establishment of Russian power in Turkey. It is universally admitted by the German press that the extensive trade now carried on between South Germany and the East, would be almost paralysed if the protective duties and vexatious customs regulations which now hamper the importation of foreign goods into Russia were introduced into the Danubian territories. Moreover, the political interests of Germany would be gravely endangered by Russian aggression in Turkey. Her frontier on the side of Russia is about 500 miles long, in a country well provided with railways and other means of communication, and not presenting any natural obstacles to an invader. Strategically speaking, Germany is more open to an attack from Russia than from any other Power; and now that the Czar has proclaimed himself the champion of Panslavism, it is impossible for Russia to attain the aims of her policy without coming into direct collision with German interests, for a considerable portion of Germany,* comprising one-third of her sea-board, is Slavonic territory, and is still to a great extent inhabited by a Slavonic population; while the Austrian provinces of * Posen, West Prussia, East Prussia, aud Prussian Silesia, all of which provinces formerly belonged to the kingdom of Poland. Bohemia and Moravia, which would certainly be claimed by Russia as part of the Slavonic Empire of the future, contain more than half as many Germans as Slavs. As to France and Italy, their position as Mediterranean Powers necessarily renders it of vital importance to them that Russia, with the fleet of ironclads which she is now building on the Black Sea, should not be mistress of the Dardanelles. If this were the case, their maritime power in the Mediterranean would at any moment be exposed to the danger of a hostile combination between Russia and England; for these Powers --England being in possession of the key of the Mediterranean at Gibraltar, and thereby enabled to isolate the French fleet in that sea,-might easily sweep from it the ships of both France and Italy. Further, if Russia obtained free ingress and egress in the Black Sea, her ports there would become great naval arsenals, and she herself a first-class naval power, with the safest of retreats in case of attack. Even if operating alone, therefore, against France or Italy, she would be a very formidable opponent. France would see her great commercial ports of Toulon Question keeping from a phi lanthropic certain point of view. 66 our It is evident, therefore, that each of the great The Eastern Powers of Europe has an interest in Russia out of Turkey. "But," say politicians of the humanitarian school, conduct should not be determined by our interests, but by our duty; we should do what is right, no matter what harm to ourselves may come come of it." Mr. Freeman, whose great literary gifts only bring into stronger prominence his want of political judgment, has devoted many columns of effusive declamation in his favourite newspaper to the development of this self-evident proposition, which is about as much to the point as the maxim: "Cease to do evil, learn to do well," or any other copy-book text that nobody has ever dreamt of contesting. We are all agreed that we should do right; but What is right? |