exactly reflected the image of his strong capacious mind, and as we can have but a very imperfect idea of it from the disjecta membra poetæ that now remain, it may not be amiss to be a little more particular concerning each of these projected books. The first, as it treats of man in the abstract, and considers him in general under every of his relations, becomes the foundation, and furnishes out the subjects, of the three following; so that The second book was to take up again the first and second epistles of the first book, and treat of man in his intellectual capacity at large, as has been explained above. Of this only a small part of the conclusion (which, as we said, was to have contained a satire against the misapplication of wit and learning) may be found in the fourth book of the Dunciad, and up and down, occasionally, in the other three. The third book, in like manner, was to re-assume the subject of the third epistle of the first, which treats of man in his social, political, and religious capacity. But this part the poet afterward conceived might be best executed in an epic poem; as the action would make it more animated, and the fable less invidious; in which all the great principles of true and false governments and religions should be chiefly delivered in feigned examples. The fourth and last book was to pursue the subject of the fourth epistle of the first, and to treat of ethics, or practical morality; and would have consisted of many members; of which the four following epistles were detached portions; the first two, on the characters of men and women, being the introductory part of this concluding book. MORAL ESSAYS. EPISTLE I. TO SIR RICHARD TEMPLE, LORD COBHAM. ARGUMENT. Of the Knowledge and Characters of Men. I. That it is not sufficient for this knowledge to consider man in the abstract books will not serve the purpose, nor yet our own experience singly, ver. 1. General maxims, unless they be formed upon both, will be but notional, ver. 10. Some peculiarity in every man, characteristic to himself, yet varying from himself, ver. 15. Difficulties arising from our own passions, fancies, faculties, &c. ver. 31. The shortness of life to observe in, and the uncertainty of the principles of action in men to observe by, ver. 37, &c. Our own principle of action often hid from ourselves, ver. 41. Some few characters plain, but in general confounded, dissembled, or inconsistent, ver. 51. The same man utterly different in different places and seasons, ver. 62. Unimaginable weaknesses in the greatest, ver. 70. &c. Nothing constant and certain but God and nature, ver. 95. No judging of the motives from the actions; the same actions proceeding from contrary motives, and the same motives influencing contrary actions, ver. 100. II. Yet, to form characters we can only take the strongest actions of a man's life, and try to make them agree; The utter uncertainty of this, from nature itself, and from policy, ver. 120. Characters given according to the rank of meu of the world, ver. 135. And some reason for it, ver. 140. Education alters the nature, or at least character, of many, ver. 149. Actions, passions, opinions, manners, humours, or principles, all subject to change. No judging by nature, from ver. 158 to ver. 168. III. It only remalus to find (if we can) his ruling passion: That will certainly influence all the rest, and can reconcile the seeming or real inconsistency of all his actions, ver. 175. Instanced in the extraordinary character of Clodio, ver. 179. A caution against mistaking second qualities for first, which will destroy all possibility of the knowledge of mankind, ver. 210. Examples of the strength of the ruling passion, and its continuation to the last breath, ver. 222, &c. I. Yes, you despise the man to books confined, Though what he learns he speaks, and may advance. You hold him no philosopher at all. And yet the fate of all extremes is such, Men may be read, as well as books, too much. 10 To observations which ourselves we make, grow more partial for th' observer's sake; To written wisdom, as another's, less; Maxims are drawn from notions, these from guess. Our depths who fathoms, or our shallows finds, His principle of action once explore, Like following life through creatures you dissect, Yet more; the difference is as great between The optics seeing, as the objects seen. All manners take a tincture from our own; Or some discolour'd through our passions shewn. Contracts, inverts, and gives ten thousand dyes. Nor will life's stream for observation stay; It hurries all too fast to mark their way: 20 30 41 When half our knowledge we must snatch, not take. 50 (So darkness strikes the sense no less than light); 60 All see 'tis vice, an itch of vulgar praise. See the same man, in vigour, in the gout; Who would not praise Patricio's high desert, 70 80 What made (say, Montagne, or more sage Charron!) A godless regent tremble at a star? Faithless through piety, and duped through wit? 90 Know, God and nature only are the same: In man, the judgment shoots at flying game; A bird of passage! gone as soon as found, Now in the moon, perhaps now under ground. II. In vain the sage, with retrospective eye, Would from th' apparent what conclude the why, Infer the motive from the deed, and shew, That what we chanced, was what we meant to do. Behold, if fortune or a mistress frowns, 101 Some plunge in business, others shave their crowns: This quits an empire, that embroils a state : 110 Not always actions shew the man: we find Take the most strong, and sort them as you can: 120 'Tis from high life high characters are drawn, A saint in crape is twice a saint in lawn; 130 |