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ized by Voltaire, is still at variance with most of the princi ples which reason and humanity would employ as guides in judicial procedure.

A comparison of the course of conduct pursued by the French court on this occasion, with that which, under similar circumstances, would have taken place in this country, will enable us, with comparative ease, to explain to an English reader the grounds of our unfavourable opinion. From thus putting, side by side, the different steps in two very dissimilar modes of procedure, we may probably be able to discover the errors of both systems, and obtain a conception of that which an enlightened people ought to adopt. Let it not be supposed that we are about to set up our own procedure as a model, or that we intend to assume, that what is English, is right. The comparison we propose is intended only as a means of illustration: nothing can well be more dissimilar than the two systems of procedure; the opposition will therefore, at every step, be singular and interesting, and may, by its very singularity, suggest the true principle which ought to guide us in every step of the process.

Before we proceed to our present attempt, in this species of comparative anatomy, we would premise a few observations, upon the end sought to be obtained by Judicature as a means.

It is usually deemed sufficient to say, that the object which should be in view in all judicial enquiries is the attainment of truth. But this general statement is far from being sufficient; and the very insufficient conception of the ends of judicature which such an assertion evinces, has led to the greater number of the cruel and pernicious mistakes exemplified in the proceedings now under our consideration. The great purpose of that class of judicial proceedings here contemplated, is to maintain a feeling of security from wrong, in the society to which the tribunal belongs. If a member of the community be wronged in his person, property, or reputation, and there be impunity for the wrongdoer, then do the rest of the community tremble lest they should also suffer the same wrong: and, if this impunity be frequent, society can hardly be said to exist, as each man endeavours to defend

himself, since he can no longer depend upon society for security. On the other hand, the more certain and rapid the punishment which the tribunals inflict upon wrongdoers, the more complete is the security of the community-the more completely have the ends of judicature been attained.

But before we punish, must we not learn, first, whether a wrong has been done?-next, by whom it has been done? And when the tribunal makes this enquiry, should not the attainment of truth be the sole object of its solicitude and consideration? Our answer is, No. If the attainment of truth be the sole object of consideration, we must seek it, no matter at what cost of terror and insecurity to society at large: and thus the tribunal, by its enquiry, may do a greater injury to the community than did the crime it seeks to punish. Human imperfection renders the administration of justice of necessity a system of averages. We cannot hope for perfect certainty, and certainty in every case. All that we can expect is, to discover the necessary facts in so large a number of cases as to render society generally secure, by rendering the perpetration of crime exceedingly dangerous to those who would commit it. This can be done, and done more efficiently, if we pursue certain predetermined and specific rules of enquiry, than if we were to give the tribunal, on every occasion, perfect and uncontrolled liberty of action. The philosopher sitting quietly in his closet, may imagine that every fact that has the slightest relation to the matter in band ought to be known and weighed and that the more completely the facts are known, the greater is the chance of attaining a knowledge of the truth respecting the particular enquiry instituted. But it should be remembered, that in order to get at all these facts, it may be necessary to invade the peace and security of others; that the knowledge of a multitude of comparatively insignificant facts serves often rather to confuse than enlighten; and that the wider is the field of enquiry, the greater is the danger of mistake, from emotions created by irrelevant evidence, from passion, from prejudice.

In every judicial enquiry, then, we may say, indeed, that the object sought to be obtained is the truth; but that truth

itself must be sought according to certain fixed and preestablished modes of enquiry modes which experience has shown to be necessary as safeguards for the security of society generally; and that the very form of the enquiry is of vital importance as respects this security.

Let us now endeavour, by examination, to discover whether this salutary precaution was duly considered in the remarkable instance before us.

In the following narrative, we shall, as far as we can, present the facts to the reader, in the order, form, and manner, in which they were presented to the tribunal. This mode is adopted for the purpose of being better able to show what of the multitude of facts, relevant and irrelevant, submitted to the French jury, could, by the English mode of procedure, have been brought forward in evidence we may thus perhaps discover to what extent, and in what manner, the forms of either nation err--the one by admitting much that is unnecessary, the other by excluding something that is needed for the proper administration of justice.

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On the 14th of January 1840, Charles Pouch Lafarge died at Glandier, in the department of la Corrèze in France. Α few days after, the widow of Lafarge was arrested upon suspicion of having poisoned him.

When the house of the deceased was searched by the officers of justice, certain diamonds were found, which were supposed to have been stolen by the widow before her marriage, from Madame la Vicomtesse de Léautaud. Hereupon the prisoner was charged with larceny, or stealing-(le délit de vol.)

By the law of France, murder is classed as a crime, larceny as a délit. The crime is tried by the assize court of the department-the délit by the Tribunal de police correctionnelle.

The charge of larceny was the first brought to trial. The trial commenced on the 9th of July 1840. We may here, in passing, remark upon the delay that had taken place. The prisoner was arrested towards the latter end of January upon a charge of murder. The second charge was soon after preferred, and neither the one nor the other was tried till the

9th of July. In the proceedings before us, no application for delay on the part of the prosecution seems to have been made. The delay which occurred; appears to have been according to the ordinary course of proceeding.

This delay in the case of a common larceny could not well have occurred in England. But a person charged with a murder committed out of London in the autumn, cannot be tried before the end of February in the following spring. Such delay is a gross violation of justice, and ought not to be permitted to continue..

Before the charge of stealing was gone into, the counsel for the defence moved to defer the trial; first, upon the ground that there being two charges, one of having committed a crime, the other of having committed a délit, the charge of the crime should be tried first. The second reason given for delay was, that Madame Lafarge had not had time sufficient for her defence.

The court, however, refused the delay asked whereupon an appeal was entered against this judgment, and delay again demanded because of the appeal. The court again refused to delay the trial, and proceeded to investigate the charge. Madame Lafarge thereupon retired, the proceedings went on in her absence, and she was found guilty of the theft ;-the trial being by a judge unassisted by a jury.

The Court of Appeal gave judgment afterwards-1. That the demand for delay was properly refused. 2. But that an appeal from that judgment having been entered, the court below was not justified in proceeding further until that appeal was decided-and therefore all the subsequent proceedings of the court below were quashed as irregular. (')

On the 3d of September, and before a rehearing of the trial for stealing, the court of Assize of La Corrèze proceeded

(") One of the most faulty portions of English criminal jurisprudence is that which relates to the right of appeal from decisions on criminal charges. In fact, no appeal lies from the judgment of the court or the verdict of the jury, except on the ground of error patent on the face of the indictment-and as, under the present system, the greater portion of all the criminals in the country are tried by unlearned justices at the quarter sessions, constant and flagrant violations of law and justice are the necessary result.

to the trial of the prisoner on the charge of murder. A preliminary enquiry had already, according to due process of law, been instituted in July, before la chambre des mises en accusation, and by the arrêt of this court the prisoner was sent for trial before the court of Assize.

The arrêt gave a long enumeration of facts as reasons for its decision, which decision was in these words :

"Attendu que de ces faits résultent des charges suffisantes pour prononcer la mise en accusation: Déclare qu'il y a lieu à accusation. contre Marie Fortunée Capelle, veuve Lafarge, pour avoir, dans les mois de décembre 1839 et de janvier 1840, attenté à la vie de Charles Joseph Pouch Lafarge, son mari, par l'effet de substances susceptibles de donner la mort, et qui l'ont effectivement occasionnée, erime prévu et puni par les articles 301, 302 du Code pénal.

'La renvoie, en conséquence, devant la cour d'assises du département de la Corrèze, séant à Tulle, pour y être jugée selon la loi. Maintient l'ordonnance de prise de corps décernée par la chambre de conseil.' (')

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Upon this charge, on the 3d of September, the prisoner was brought to trial. The jury being chosen by lot, and declared legally constituted by the presiding judge, the prisoner was addressed by the judge :—(2)

'Accusée, levez-vous.

'D. Votre nom? R. Marie Capelle, femme Lafarge. 'D. Quel est votre âge? R. Vingt-quatre ans.

The regular steps in this procedure appear to be

1. An ordonnance de prise de corps décernée par la chambre de conseil. This

is similar to our warrant of commitment by the committing magistrate.

2. An arrêt by the chambre des mises en accusation. This is similar in some things to the finding of a true bill by our grand jury · enquiry seems the same, though the mode be different.

that is, the purpose of the

3. After the srrêt of the chambre des mises en accasation, the prisoner was examined, (on this examination we shall hereafter remark;) and upon this examination and those of the several witnesses, the procureur-général frames his acle d'accusation, which is apparently intended to serve the purposes of our indictment. There appears in both systems much unnecessary complication.

(*) The jury consists of twelve jurymen, and two supplementary jurymen, the prosecution and the prisoner had an equal number of challenges, viz, eight each. The number of challenges seems to be determined by the number of jurymen present-in present case thirty were present; and, as fourteen was the number required for the full jury, the number of challenges permitted became necessarily sixteen, eight to each party. This would appear an objectionable mode, as open to fraud and influence.

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