XXIX. CHAP. and the Scheldt all round the north and east of France to the Mediterranean, west of which Spain menaced both from the Pyrenees and from the ocean. If Francis the First found it necessary to resist such an ubiquitous and ambitious neighbour, the duty was still more incumbent upon Louis the Thirteenth. Richelieu deemed Italy the vulnerable point of this great empire, forming the link and connection between the two courts and the two Houses of Vienna and of Madrid. The true and obvious policy, consequent upon this conviction, was to have made a close friend and ally of the House of Savoy, enable it by the conquest of the Milanese to interpose its force between the German and the Spaniard, and by such a guerdon secure the duke to French interests. This had been the aim of Richelieu in the first years of his power and his administration: but it failed. He had been overcome both abroad and at home, and being then obliged to deceive and betray the Duke of Savoy, the cardinal was never able to recover that prince's trust and confidence. This it was that rendered Richelieu's efforts in Italy so nugatory, and which drove the queen-mother, always in the interests of Savoy, to make common cause with the Spanish and ultra-Roman party against the cardinal. The chief of these was Berulle, another cardinal, whom Marie of Medicis now pitted against Richelieu. He opposed all concessions to the Huguenots, all subsidies to Holland, all alliance with Sweden or the Protestant powers of the North, his object being to make France tread in the wake of Spain and Philip the Second's policy. Louis the Thirteenth had predilections so strong for all that was bigoted, that such counsellors had great influence with him. But, fortunately, Berulle took the part of Monsieur, the monarch's brother, and recommended the concession of all his demands. This flung the king into the arms of Riche XXIX. lieu, who based his influence on fanning Louis's jealousy CHAP. of all and of everyone, of his brother, of the Huguenots, of Rome, and of Spain. Secure of the king, Richelieu, whilst he directed his chief efforts towards Italy, did not neglect Germany. He had sent Charnacé thither to incite the Duke of Bavaria and the Catholic league to resist the emperor. This they durst not as yet think of. The same agent tried to encourage the King of Denmark to continue the war, but, defeated and exhausted, that monarch succumbed, and signed a treaty at Lubeck on the 12th of May, 1569, yielding a portion even of his Danish dominions to the emperor. There remained no power that could be raised in resistance to Austria save Sweden, no commander that could be opposed to Wallenstein save its monarch, Gustavus Adolphus. He had been engaged in hostilities with Poland, which both belligerents were eager to terminate, the King of Sweden already fearing the imperial ascendency, and having aided to defend Stralsund, the last and sole spot of German soil that resisted the arms of Wallenstein. Gustavus' envoys having been treated with contumely and driven out of Lubeck, the Swedish monarch was desirous of measuring swords with the celebrated imperialists, Wallenstein and Tilly. But The Protestant princes of Germany, oppressed by the arms of Austria, and threatened with the spoliation of all their ecclesiastical property, secretly implored his aid, promising all, and even more, than they could give, the crown of the empire not excepted. Gustavus, aware of the cost and difficulty of the war, hesitated till he obtained from Richelieu the promise of 400,000 crowns annually to enable him to invade Germany with an army of 40,000 men.* The salutary * Mercure Français, t. xvi., contains king's and Richelieu's letters to Gustavus. XXIX. CHAP. intervention of Gustavus Adolphus in Germany could and did only take place in 1631. And in the meantime the two courts of Madrid and Vienna, perceiving the determined hostility of the French minister, resolved to unite their forces, in order to expel him and his partisans from Italy. German troops occupied the Valteline. An Austrian army under Colalto, one of Wallenstein's lieutenants, marched to invest Mantua, whilst the command of Milan and the task of reducing the Montserrat and its capital, Casale, was given to Spain's best general, Spinola. Richelieu was not slow to accept the challenge. In November, 1629, the king caused him by letters patent to be declared Prime Minister. In December he was nominated lieutenantgeneral, and representative of the king in Italy. So universal was his jealousy and mistrust, that the cardinal would not commit the conduct of armies to any officer, whatever his skill and courage, Bassompierre, Crequy, and Schomberg being provided with subordinate commands. Such petulant and independent officers as Thoiras Richelieu quarrelled with immediately; he could no more bear the idea of a political rival or a successful general, than Louis could to see greatness, independence, or renown in his brother. One cause, no doubt, of Louis' continued favour to the cardinal was, that he could scarcely be obfuscated by the military renown of a churchman. In the last days of 1629 Richelieu set out for the Alps. He was met at Lyons by a young diplomatic agent from the Pope, named Giulio Mazarini, who sought to avert Richelieu's warlike intentions and incline him to a truce.* Mazarini, no doubt, succeeded somewhat in cooling Richelieu's ardour, for the cardinal did not pass the Alps or advance to Susa till the first days of March. He had summoned the Duke of Savoy * By no writer are the circumstances of this war more ably and clearly depicted than by M. Cousin in his "Jeunesse de Mazarin." XXIX. to fulfil the terms of the treaty of 1628, to aid in libe- CHAP. rating Casale, and to facilitate the march of French succours. The duke, in reply, mustered a large force at Veillane, between Susa and Turin, and, summoning Spinola to his assistance, prepared to fall upon the army of Richelieu, and overwhelm it in its advance to Turin and the Montserrat. Mazarini warned Richelieu of the trap that was laid for him, and the latter, to escape an unequal combat, and at the same time be avenged of the Duke of Savoy, turned aside, laid siege to Pignerol, one of the chief fortresses of Savoy towards the Alps, and carried it on the 31st of March, ere succours could be brought to save it. If Mazarini's object had been to prevent the French from pushing their advantages in Italy, he was the contrary of successful, since his interference first gave them Pignerol, and, subsequently, the Spaniards, not listening to peace, French troops were poured over the Alps; De la Force took possession of Chiavenna, and the Duc de Montmorenci and D'Effiat attacked the forces of Savoy at Veillane on the 10th of July, and completely defeated them. Had Richelieu done as much at first he might have saved Mantua, which surrendered to the imperialists on the 17th of the same month. The victory of Veillane did not even relieve Casale. The Montserrat, a conglomeration of wooded hills, defended on the north by the Po, is one of the most difficult countries through which an army can be marched. The plague, too, raged at the time through Piedmont, and attacked the French; whilst Richelieu, distracted on one side by the inactivity of the army, and on the other by the hostile cabals which surrounded Louis the Thirteenth, capricious in taste and weak in health, was unable to retain his composure. When Mazarini came to see him, Richelieu assailed the Papal diplomatist with a torrent of abuse, whilst traversing the apartment with long strides and dashing XXIX. CHAP. his cardinal's hat to the ground. He complained that it was owing to the astute representations and promises of Mazarini that he had been first stopped at Lyons; and that, ever since, the advance of his army had been obstructed and delayed, until Mantua had fallen and Casale was about to capitulate. Mazarini excused himself to the utmost of his power against the too just reproaches; and, as he looked probably for future fortune and employ rather at the hands of Richelieu than from the Papal court, he promised to do his best to prevent by an accommodation the surrender of Casale. What ensued is a striking exemplification of how completely military spirit and events, and, by consequence, political fortune itself, was subjected in those days to the intrigues and wills of ecclesiastics. The French, however wasted by disease, were still rallied by Marshal Schomberg, and, under his command, penetrated within view of Casale. The Spanish army, upwards of 30,000, under the Marquis of Santa Croce (Spinola had died during the siege), was encamped before the town, and was superior in numbers to the French. A battle seemed inevitable, nay desirable, to decide the fate of Italy. But the ever active Mazarini was there with powers from the new Duke of Savoy, who had just succeeded to his brother, powers from Richelieu, and the same from the Pope, whilst he succeeded in sowing mistrust and differences between the imperialists and Spaniards. Day after day Mazarini spent in flying from one army to another, but neither side would give in; and the French were actually marching to the attack when Mazarini extorted from the Spanish commander the permission to treat. He no sooner obtained it than, flinging himself on a horse, and snatching the cross of the legate from its bearer, he galloped towards the advancing French, crying, "Peace, peace!" At no little risk, he thus prevented the engagement, and succeeded in concluding a truce, on the condition of the Spanish |