their intolerance of the noblesse, of authority of all kinds, and as necessitating by their presence the continued exactions and devastations which civil war occasioned. The French of the north especially, and of Paris, came to look upon the Huguenots, as they had in years previous looked upon the English, as the archfoe, without whose expulsion no peace or prosperity could be hoped for.* The first answers of Henry the Third and of the King of Navarre to the manifesto of the League, were not so sincere, and consequently not so forcible, as they might have been. The King of Navarre said he was open to conviction on matters of religion. The King of France asserted he yet might have peace, and if he had tolerated the Protestants it had been with the assent of the estates, and with a view to avoid civil war and prevent the concourse of foreign soldiers into the kingdom. At the call of both parties the whole kingdom rose, by far the most of its provinces for the League. The entire north, from the sea to the Vosges, with the exception of Metz and Boulogne, in both of which towns the Duke of Epernon held garrisons, hoisted the standard of Lorraine. Berry and Britanny followed the example; as did Lyons. Marseilles and Bordeaux, as well as Orleans, were preserved to the king by the vigilance of their governors. Chalons and Toulouse remained equally firm. The Duke of Montpensier preserved Poitou. The project of the Duke of Mayenne for creating an insurrection in Paris failed also for the present.† But notwithstanding the loyalty of a few provinces and towns, the League was evidently the stronger party, *The pamphlets of DuplessisMornay against the ambition and intrigues of the Guises were very able and crushing, but they did not meet the objections of the disin- † Mémoires de Nevers, Mémoires СНАР. XXV. СНАР. XXV. and the court could not but yield. Catherine undertook to negotiate with this view, and proceeded to Epernay* to confer with the Guises. Their demands were exorbitant. They required the king to proscribe Protestantism altogether, and exile those who professed it. Even this Catherine was under the necessity of granting. It implied no less than that war should be levied upon the King of Navarre and his party, the League demanding the conduct of it. Catherine claimed this for the king. The League then insisted on places of surety,-on Guise getting Metz, Bourbon Rouen, in fact taking military possession of the kingdom. Catherine objected, insinuated, pleaded, the leaguers retarding the negotiations till they could get their foreign troops in order to impose better terms, and made the best bargain for Henry, which was arranged in the Treaty of Nemours. By it the king proscribed the Reformed worship and its ministers, and exiled all who professed it, allowing them merely to sell their movable property. Catherine ceded far less than was demanded in places of surety. Bourbon had Soissons in lieu of Rouen, Guise instead of Metz got Thoul, St. Dizier, and Chalons without the permission to garrison it. Mercœur, who wanted Nantes, got Dinant and Conquet. The magnates of the League were confirmed in their provinces. But where Catherine's ability chiefly triumphed, was in the conduct of the war, which she succeeded in retaining for the king. A circumstance which had rendered the leaguers less peremptory and exigent towards the close of the negotiations with Catherine, was the death of their constant friend Pope Gregory. He was succeeded by Sixtus Quintus, whose competitors Henry's agents had been influential in opposing, and whom the king * April 16th, 1585; for what follow's see her letters, and those of her secretary, in MSS. Bethune, 8873-4 and 8906. No. 8839 contains the leaguers' account of the negotiations. XXV. laboured from the very first to conciliate by all the CHAP. address and all the means in his power. * The new Pope accordingly hesitated to sanction or renew all that his predecessor had promised to the League. He urged them to observe their allegiance to the king, and this change staggered the Duke of Nevers and other least warm fanatics. As Henry continued zealously to conduct the war against the Huguenots, the Pope granted him bulls for the sale of church property, which brought in 360,000 crowns. The king fulfilled the conditions of the treaty, revoking previous tolerance, and issuing the decree which summoned the Protestants, princes and people, to recant or quit the kingdom. This edict of Reunion, as it was called, he solemnly went to register in full parliament. The King of Navarre replied with dignity and force to these edicts, so apparently outrageous and so contradictory with Henry's recent offers and letters. Condé and Montmorency joined with the Huguenot prince in this manifesto, the chiefs of the party of the politiques thus taking a decided stand against the leaguers. The king still sought to negotiate with Navarre, but a bull of excommunication and deposition against him and against Condé, wrung from Pope Sixtus by Spain and the leaguers, rendered negotiation impossible. The bull was answered with humorous audacity by the Huguenot prince. Meantime Henry had the adroitness to keep Guise in Lorraine† with the mission of preventing the German Protestants from invading France, and Joyeuse was given the command of the army to be employed in Poitou against the Huguenots. The King of Navarre saw from the first his inability to cope with the enemies which the League could bring • His letter to Pisani in Rome. Collections of Lucas Montigny. † Letter of Henry, July, 1585, to Catherine and to the king. Let- XXV. CHAP. into the field, with the subsidies of the Pope and of Spain. He declined the struggle, garrisoned his towns, and remained altogether on the defensive, until such time as Elizabeth could afford him succour, and the German Protestants march to his assistance. The Prince of Condé did not approve of such tactics. He was for taking the field at once, like his father, and engaging in offensive operations. In pursuance of this opinion he took the field, routed the Duke of Mercœur, who opposed him, and then laid siege to Brouage with the force that the Protestants of Poitou and the people of La Rochelle could furnish him. Could he have remained constant to this enterprise, he might have succeeded, which would have been important to his cause and to himself, as the Rochellois would have repaid him, if conqueror, by implicit confidence; but whilst engaged in this siege, Condé learned that the castle of Angers had fallen into the hands of a chief who declared that he held it for the Huguenots. The prince inconsiderately resolved at once to quit the siege of Brouage, and march to the occupation of Angers. In vain did some prudent officers dissuade him from so distant an expedition, not only to, but across the Loire, the enemy being in force upon that river, and certain not merely to attack, but intercept him. Condé seems to have been actuated chiefly by a wish to rival the King of Navarre, and especially his hazardous capture of Cahors. By the time he arrived at Angers, the castle was already in the possession of the Catholics, yet he vainly attacked the suburbs. Even then he refused to retreat, and marched apparently without purpose, and certainly without discretion, in the direction of Vendome. Condé's troops, disheartened by his rashness and incapacity, forsook him by degrees, each providing for his own safety. His army altogether dispersed; and, fortunately, both he himself and his chief followers escaped without capture. It was, however, a great triumph for the XXV. leaguers and the royalists united, who hoped, in the CHAP. following campaign of 1586, to get as completely the better of Navarre as they had done of Condé.* The hopes of the reformers were, indeed, brought so low by this defeat of the prince, that even those of the royalist generals who did not press them before, now came forward to give them a final blow. The Maréchal de Matignon determined to carry the war into Guyenne, whilst the Duke of Mayenne undertook to reduce the fortresses north of the Garonne. The King of Navarre, to defeat this project, resolved to proceed to La Rochelle, so as to stir up serious war in that quarter, and thus divert Matignon and Mayenne from their purpose. To execute this it was necessary for him to pass the Garonne, which the troops of the duke and marshal beset. The king succeeded, with his usual audacity and good fortune, as Sully has recounted†, in reaching La Rochelle. There, in concert with Condé, who had returned with some supplies from England, he entrenched himself, in the mean time, near the sea coast, and thus contrived to hold his ground in Poitou. But plague and famine did more for the Huguenots in these campaigns than even the gallantry and manœuvres of their chief. Some towns of importance Mayenne feared to attack, lest his army should find the plague in the conquered place. St. Jean d'Angely was one of these. Mayenne took Chatillon. But, wanting that purpose and spirited lead which captivates a soldier, and at the same time without supplies, which the court was unable to send, "his army disbanded and broke up"‡ for the season. In other parts of France, at Auxonne and in Provence, the Huguenot generals, especially Lesdiguières, gained signal advantages. The bad success of the campaign of 1586 gave Cathe * Mémoires de la Ligue, D'Aubigné, De Sully, et Hist. de De Thou. † Sully. Mémoires, chap. xx. Letter to Epernon, copied in |