England, and of England alone, would pro- | favourably received. Russia, very different bably have a good effect, and be well received at Frankfort. Acting on this hint, Lord Russell, in his own words, "instructed her Majesty's minister at Frankfort to ascertain from the President of the Diet, and from the ministers of Bavaria and Prussia at Frankfort, whether the Diet would be disposed to accept the sole mediation of Great Britain in the international question on which Denmark and Germany are now at issue." It cannot, therefore, be urged that Great Britain wantonly mixed herself up with this controversy. On the contrary, she was dragged into it. She was the chosen mediator between Denmark and Germany-trusted by both. That position, as it seems to us, she could not with honour have declined, even had she certainly foreseen all the troubles in which it would involve her. Soon, however, it appeared that M. Von Bismark had miscalculated-that the mediation of England alone would prove all. insufficient to allay the rising strife. England then appealed to France and Russia, and met with little encouragement from either.

In the debate in the House of Lords, on the 11th April, Lord Russell said :

"On the 5th of January, Lord Cowley, having been asked by M. Drouyn de Lhuys what more we proposed besides a Conference, stated that he was unable to answer that question, and that it was unnecessary then to consider more than the present proposition. But as we heard that the French Government desired to know what

it was that her Majesty's Government proposed to do, I immediately wrote a despatch convey ing the intentions of her Majesty's Government. I also wrote a similar despatch to Russia. What I said in effect was this:-There is a project evidently conceived in Germany for depriving Denmark of the States of Holstein and the Duchy of Schleswig. Supposing that project is persevered in, will you, France, will you, Russia, agree with us in giving material assistance to Denmark? That is my answer to my noble friend's reproach. The very thing which he blamed us for not doing, if he had had the patience to read a few pages further on, he would have found that we actually did."

"EARL GREY.-I expressly mentioned that despatch, and said its terms were too vague."

"EARL RUSSELL.-My despatch referred distinctly to a plan conceived for the dismemberment of Denmark, and went on to say that to prevent the execution of that plan we sought the co-operation of France, of Russia, and of Sweden, in order to give material assistance to Denmark in resisting that dismemberment. My noble friend calls that vague, and says that we did not propose to give material assistance; but it appears that nothing could be more clear and plain than the proposal of her Majesty's Go

vernment."

This proposal, however, was in no quarter

66

from the Russia of 1848, stood coldly aloof. France coquetted with the population of the Duchies, gave forth fine sentiments on universal suffrage, was clear only on one point— that she would not fight. In the debate in the Corps Législatif, on the 12th of May last, M. Rouber put it beyond a doubt that such was her resolution from the first. Sweden and Norway have been vox et preterea nihil. The Times happily compared them to an opera chorus which loudly shouts, "Let us march; let us fly," and never moves a step. Now, in this position of Europe, what course should Lord Russell have adopted? Could he with prudence have pledged the honour of this country to support Denmark singlehanded. Why should we, of all the parties to the Treaty of London, have gone to the rescue? Nay, in spite of all our loud sympathy, are we prepared to do so even now? Things have turned out even worse than any minister could have anticipated. Austria, and especially Prussia, have been overbearing to a degree exceeding even their traditions. And with all this before our eyes, indignant as we are, would a Ministry proposing to declare war against Germany receive the support of the country? We greatly doubt it. "L'Angleterre," says M. Forcade, in the Revue of 1st May, a une grande sympathie pour le Danemark, mais elle a une répugnance non moins grande à se brouiller avec l'Allemagne.' We confess we think this repug especially if the Tory lawyers are right in nance very justifiable and exceedingly natural, their law; in which case a war with Germany might afford us the pleasant spectacle of a fleet of Teutonic Alabamas sailing out of New York, and swarming all over the sea. It is, moreover, a feeling which the Opposition, to do them justice, seems to entertain not less heartily than Ministers. From no responsible Conservative leader have we heard a word indicating that, had they been in office, they would have adopted a warlike policy. Whatever might have been their conduct of the negotiations, of one thing we may be very sure, that they would never have hurried a hesitating country, and a most unwilling Court, into a war of doubtful justice. The proud English people, sensitively alive to their unsatisfactory position, are naturally desirous of shifting the reproach on their servants; but it is not right that the Opposition, knowing the difficulties with which Ministers have to contend, should embarrass them with vague fault-finding, and censure a line of conduct which they must feel assured that they themselves, in the place of the Ministers, would have certainly adopted. It is an evil thing to inflame men's minds with

to Denmark in that defence."

Great Britain. He wished to have an explana- | Wodehouse that no promise of armed intertion. On the occasion referred to I had exvention had ever been made by England. pressly declared that I could not say what the The truth is, that on this Danish question decision of the Government might be, as the the English people have been all along unCabinet had not deliberated, and consequently not submitted any opinion to the Queen; but duly swayed by prejudice and by generous that, judging from the general current of feel sympathy. The Government has performed ing in Parliament and in the nation, I thought an important duty in opposing itself to these an invasion of Schleswig by Germany might influences. It has, indeed, thereby risked its lead to assistance to Denmark on the part of popularity, it has given occasion to the single this country. Her Majesty's Government could and somewhat obtrusive assault of General not wonder that the King of Denmark was Peel; it has afforded constant and muchready to defend Schleswig, and to consider its hostile occupation as a fatal blow to the inte- needed stimulus to the energies of Mr. Seygrity of his dominions. But I could not doubt mour Fitzgerald; it has supplied a text for that he would be assisted by Powers friendly the long and dreary sermon of the Quarterly; but though the results of its action have been so grievous, it has yet done right and justly. When we look to any possible solution of the difficulty, we see how much English opinion has been actuated by feeling in this matter, and how little by knowledge or by reason. Should the Germans propose permanently to occupy Danish territory, or, in other words, to destroy the Danish monarchy, it may be that we shall yet encounter them, and in such a cause we shall have the right on our side. But as regards the Duchies, which constituted the casus belli, can we reasonably expect that the result should be otherwise than in favour of the claims of Germany! Holstein to Germany, Schleswig to Denmark, might have been a solution acceptable to both parties at the date of the Treaty of London. It would not be acceptable now. Denmark cannot hope for such favourable terms. Some division of Schleswig she must be prepared to concede, and the past has certainly taught us that there should be no more "unions for purposes of the monarchy," or any such insufficient devices. All arrangements of this sort can be but temporary,—give rise, while they last, to very bad government and much despatch-writing, and lead most surely to war in the long run. Nor is it less idle to dream of the Treaty of London as affording the basis to any enduring settlement. Without altogether, adopting Mr. Bernal Osborne's piquant description of that Treaty as the "last product of the dalliance between Lord Palmerston and Russia," and bearing always in mind that Lord Malmesbury must bear the credit or discredit of that Treaty equally with the present Premier, we cannot but regard it as a great triumph of Russian diplomacy, and as the culminating point of the influence of the Emperor Nicholas in Europe. Why such a treaty is entitled to more respect than the Treaties of Vienna,-except because of its more recent date, it is not easy to imagine, and it is not worth while to try to imagine. For, whenever a practical solution shall seem near at hand, the Treaty of London will receive but slight consideration. Gradually the

Now surely these and such-like sentiments were perfectly true, and the expression of them perfectly justifiable. It did at that time scem probable that the non-German powers would interfere to prevent the invasion of Danish territory, and was it not right to bring that probability under the notice of Germany? Not one word can be quoted from the whole correspondence conveying a threat that England would interfere alone. Nay more, not one word can be found clearly showing that she would interfere at all. All that can be found in the whole mass of despatches does not go beyond this-that an invasion of Schleswig would be viewed by Great Britain with great disfavour-that in such an event she would not pledge herself | to preserve neutrality-nay, that she might interpose in support of Denmark. Now was not this exactly the position which our Government were at that time prepared to take? Was it not exactly the state of English feeling and was it not honest and candid that Germany should be made aware of this told precisely what England felt, and what the English Government were prepared to do, no more and no less? Nor should it be forgotten that Denmark was no party to these communications. They were made only to the German States, and to those Powers who might have acted with us, and who may act with us still. That we expressed our views openly to Russia and to France; that we warned Germany of the possible results of her conduct; that we told her she was risking a European war, is true. But surely such frankness to the two great powers and such cautions to Germany cannot be supposed as implying promises of material assistance to Denmark. Least of all, when, in our direct communications with that country, such promises were studiously withheld. M. Hall himself gives, on this point, conclusive testimony on behalf of Ministers. So far from having been misled, he made it matter of complaint to Lord

Herein lies the difficulty which has surrounded this unhappy quarrel from the first-which has throughout embarrassed the action of England. These questions of nationality are a new element in European politics. But new as they are they have already a great hold on the English publie. They early acquired a sudden popularity, and that popularity they have for some time maintained. They recommended themselves as the best means of giving peace to a wearied world, and resting that peace on lasting foundations. The will of the nations would prove a principle noble and unerring; how different from the caprices of kings which shaped the politics of bygone years! The idea never occurred that a time might come when even this majestic principle would prove misleading; that the development of nationalities" might bring with it much injustice. As the clergy under the Stuarts thought love of the Church and attachment to the monarchy could never be dissevered, so we have thought this principle identical with rectitude. The Danish quarrel has been to us what the reign of James II. was to them. For once this principle pulls the wrong way. A full development of “nationalities" will seriously impair the monarchy of Denmark. We are not prepared to go this length, and yet we shrink even now from discarding utterly our favourite panacea for the wrongs which Europe has so long endured. It was this conflict of our sympathies with our reason which hampered us at the beginning of the dispute; for what has since taken place, the obstinacy of the Danes, the indifference of France and Russia, and above all the treachery and cruelty of Prussia, must be held responsible.

question will come to be determined, as it | nations-ruling impartially over all: it is the assuredly ought to be determined, by the much harder case of one nationality connected wishes of the inhabitants of the Duchies; with and subjected to the democracy of anoand the only difficulty then will be, how ther. these wishes are to be ascertained. France has given it to be understood that, should she interfere at all, her traditional policy would lead her to urge universal suffrage as the proper means to this end. The English press, generally speaking, has scouted this idea, hastily and inconsiderately. It is true that England does not love universal suffrage. It seems, in our opinion, to lead either to a sort of tyranny in anarchy, as in America, or to pure despotism, as in France. But the question can hardly be settled by our prejudices. In the first place, there is a wide difference between the best mode of governing a country and the best mode of ascertaining the wishes of a people on a question of nationality. The two things are quite distinct; and universal suffrage may be a very bad way of doing the one and yet a very fitting way of accomplishing the other. It is quite consistent to maintain that only the intelligence of a community should take part in the government of that community, and yet to hold that every member of a community is entitled to a voice when the point is with what other race or nation it shall be content to be united. Pure questions of nationality depend on considerations for the appreciation of which education is not perhaps essential; and it may well be, therefore, that with regard to such questions the vote of one man is as good as the vote of another. In the next place, universal suffrage has become a recognised mode of determining the destinies of nations. If England did not actively authorize, she at least welcomed and applauded the votes of March and November 1860, which annexed Central and Southern Italy to Sardinia. After this, it will hardly do to repudiate a similar vote in Holstein. To adapt a homely proverb, what was sauce for the South of Europe must be sauce not less for the North. At all events, it would be impossible for England to oppose a proposal that the States of the Duchies should settle the matter. And there would, we suspect, be little doubt but that the States would come to exactly the same conclusion as would be reached by universal suffrage. And if Holstein, and even Schleswig, really desire to be united with Germany, can we, after what has of late years taken place in Italy, with any consistency, or even with any honesty, endeavour to prevent them? Nor should we forget that the present is a case in which the wishes of the people have a peculiar claim to be respected. This is not an instance of one despotic monarch ruling over many different

Reasonable critics of Lord Russell raise against him in the case of Poland exactly the same point as in the case of Denmark. Perhaps no one save Mr. Ruskin would seriously contend that we should have gone to war either for the purpose of restoring a nationality long since a thing of the past, or with the yet more hopeless object of teaching the Russians to suppress rebellion with rose-water. But many urge that if not prepared to fight, we should have held altogether aloof, silent if not indifferent. But we must distinguish here a little. Moral influence unless backed up by physical force is of little avail. Admonitions, without guns, will never restrain the action of a powerful State. And in any new question in European politics, which may turn up for the first time, this truth should

new political complication having arisen. It was a matter in which we were already involved. By the Treaty of Vienna we had recognised the title of Russia to certain territory; if we saw her governing that territory in defiance of that treaty, were we not justified in remonstrating against such government as dangerous to the peace of Europe? nay, were we not bound to clear ourselves from the complicity which silence might have been held to import? We never put war before her as the penalty of such a line of conduct; but is this country always to keep silent, in matters in which she is already involved, unless she is prepared for that ultima ratio? Such have not been the tra

certainly be borne in mind. But here we are not dealing with a new question. We cannot shake ourselves free of the responsibilities which the diplomacy of the past has bequeathed to us. We are deeply involved in the Polish difficulty; we have in a sense guaranteed the title of Russia to her Polish dominions. In these circumstances we cannot hold ourselves aloof. Indifference is not possible to us; silence would be construed into consent and approval; and if we neither consented nor approved, we were bound to say so. Placed then in this embarrassing position, forbidden by reason to fight, and yet compelled, in justice both to ourselves and others, to prevent our inaction being construed into acquiescence,-what line of conditions of our Foreign Office. In 1831, when duct was open to England? Plainly one only above all, and from the first, to make it clear to the Poles that they need hope for no material assistance from us; and on the other hand, to intimate to Russia that, although we did not desire and would not fight for the restoration of a decayed nationality, we yet protested against her mode of governing that country, and would hold her persistence therein as releasing us from any obligation to respect her titles under the Treaty of Vienna. The latter course we owed to ourselves, the former to Poland.

Russia violently suppressed the Polish Constitution, Lord Palmerston, then Foreign Secretary under Lord Grey, remonstrated, as Lord Russell remonstrated last year. If Lord Palmerston's example is not respected by the Opposition, what do they say to the proceedings of Lord Malmesbury before the Italian War? He wasn't ready to fight, and he knew it; and yet he filled a huge blue book with lectures and remonstrances and protests. What do they say to the conduct of France and England towards the late King of Naples? They remonstrated with that monarch's treatment of his subjects; their remonstrances were disregarded; they withdrew their ambassadors; but they did not go to war. That they refrained from war in a spirit of contemptuous disgust, sparing his weakness rather than respecting his strength, makes no difference to the present argument. Nay, what do they say to our relations with the King of Dahomey? Had that enlightened prince replied by means of a sarcastic foreign minister, when we remonstrated against the practice of murdering prisoners in cold blood, would England have been thereby degraded? And if it be conceded that extreme barbarity may authorize our interference, the proceedings of Field-Marshal von Wrangel more than justify the whole German blue-book.

Now is not this exactly what Lord Russell has done? The Quarterly Review accuses him, most wrongfully, of having excited delusive hopes in the minds of the insurgents. This fault at least he certainly avoided. He refused to send a joint despatch with France, for the very reason that such a proceeding might hold out a prospect of joint action. Nay, at the beginning of the business, he declared in his place in the House of Lords, that under no circumstances would England go to war for Poland,-a declaration which the Quarterly passes over in disingenuous silence. We all remember how that declaration was attacked at the time, as nullifying the efforts of our diplomacy. It may have done so. Some effect of that sort it must have had; but surely it relieves Lord Russell from the charge of having buoyed up the We think, therefore, that even in the af Poles with vain expectations. On the other fairs of Poland, with regard to which there is hand, could we have remained altogether most room for doubt, Lord Russell's policy silent? Leaving out of view the pres- was, on the whole, sound. But we have now sure put upon the Ministry by the public had enough and more than enough of controexcitement, by the urgency of France, by the versy. Foreign affairs are at present too comurgency, at one time, even of Austria, was it plicated and too serious to be approached in not our duty, as parties to the Treaty of Vi-a party spirit. The rest of our space will be enna, to speak out? Believing, rightly or wrongly, that the conduct of Russia was a violation of that treaty, was it necessary to conceal this belief unless we were ready to fight in support of it? It cannot be too often repeated that this is not the case of a

better devoted to a consideration of the future than to a more lengthened defence of the past.

England is at present the most conservative power in Europe. She is so for many reasons; some noble, some, it must be con