Sufficient Reason: Volitional Pragmatism and the Meaning of Economic Institutions

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Princeton University Press, 2006 - 244 Seiten
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In the standard analysis of economic institutions--which include social conventions, the working rules of an economy, and entitlement regimes (property relations)--economists invoke the same theories they use when analyzing individual behavior. In this profoundly innovative book, Daniel Bromley challenges these theories, arguing instead for "volitional pragmatism" as a plausible way of thinking about the evolution of economic institutions. Economies are always in the process of becoming. Here is a theory of how they become.


Bromley argues that standard economic accounts see institutions as mere constraints on otherwise autonomous individual action. Some approaches to institutional economics--particularly the "new" institutional economics--suggest that economic institutions emerge spontaneously from the voluntary interaction of economic agents as they go about pursuing their best advantage. He suggests that this approach misses the central fact that economic institutions are the explicit and intended result of authoritative agents--legislators, judges, administrative officers, heads of states, village leaders--who volitionally decide upon working rules and entitlement regimes whose very purpose is to induce behaviors (and hence plausible outcomes) that constitute the sufficient reasons for the institutional arrangements they create.


Bromley's approach avoids the prescriptive consequentialism of contemporary economics and asks, instead, that we see these emergent and evolving institutions as the reasons for the individual and aggregate behavior their very adoption anticipates. These hoped-for outcomes comprise sufficient reasons for new laws, judicial decrees, and administrative rulings, which then become instrumental to the realization of desired individual behaviors and thus aggregate outcomes.

 

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Inhalt

Volitional Pragmatism
129
Volitional Pragmatism at Work
153
Thinking as a Pragmatist
155
Volitional Pragmatism and Explanation
166
Volitional Pragmatism and the Evolution of Institutions
180
Volitional Pragmatism and the Economic Regulations
199
Sufficient Reason
212
Bibliography
225

Explaining
103
Prescribing and Predicting
115
Index
235
Urheberrecht

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Beliebte Passagen

Seite 45 - Consider what effects, that might conceivably have practical bearings, we conceive the object of our conception to have. Then, our conception of these effects is the whole of our conception of the object.
Seite 146 - The opinion which is fated to be ultimately agreed to by all who investigate, is what we mean by the truth, and the object represented in this opinion is the real.
Seite 43 - The law, in its majestic equality, forbids the rich as well as the poor to sleep under bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal bread'.
Seite 115 - Contrariwise," continued Tweedledee, " if it was so, it might be ; and if it were so, it would be : but as it isn't, it ain't. That's logic.
Seite 23 - The surprising fact, C, is observed; But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, Hence, there is reason to suspect that A is true.
Seite 32 - North (1990, p. 3), [institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction.
Seite 129 - The economic life history of the individual is a cumulative process of adaptation of means to ends that cumulatively change as the process goes on, both the agent and his environment being at any point the outcome of the last process.
Seite 20 - I mean the basic conviction that there is or must be some permanent, ahistorical matrix or framework to which we can ultimately appeal in determining the nature of rationality, knowledge, truth, reality, goodness, or rightness.
Seite 212 - Belief does not make us act at once, but puts us into such a condition that we shall behave in a certain way, when the occasion arises.
Seite 24 - ... distinctness" of the logicians. We have there found that the action of thought is excited by the irritation of doubt, and ceases when belief is attained ; so that the production of belief is the sole function of thought. All these words, however, are too strong for my purpose. It is as if I had described the phenomena as they appear under a mental microscope.

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Über den Autor (2006)

Daniel W. Bromley is Anderson-Bascom Professor of Applied Economics at the University of Wisconsin, Madison.

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