TRANSLATIONS. An Estimate of the probable Degrees of Temperature in Europe during the Tertiary Periods, founded upon the Study of Fossil Shells. By M. G. P. Deshayes. (From the Annales des Sciences Observations upon the Tarántula (Lycòsa Taréntula). By M. Léon Dufour. (From the Annales des Sciences Naturelles) Passage from Raspail's Work on Vegetable Physiology, relating to On the Structure of the Fossil Saurians. (From the "Palæolo- gica zur Geschichte der Erde und ihrer Geschöpfe;" von Hermann Report of a Notice, by M. Rang, respecting the Inhabitant of the Objections to the Multiplication of Generic Synonymes (L'Hermès) 435 Observations on the Fossil Remains of Apes (L'Hermès) Historical Notice of Antoine Laurent De Jussieu (From the Annales A Synopsis of the Birds of Australia. By John Gould, F.L.S., &c. author of "The Birds of Europe," "The Birds of the Himalaya Report of the Expedition for exploring Central Africa from the Cape The Botanist; containing accurately coloured Figures of tender and hardy ornamented Plants; with Descriptions, scientific and popu lar; intended to convey both Moral and intellectual Gratification. No. I. Conducted by B. Maund, F.L.S.; assisted by the Rev. J. S. Conchological Illustrations; or coloured figures of all the hitherto · 163 Woodland Gleanings. By the Editor of the "Sentiment of Naturalist's Library. Ornithology. Vol. VII. Birds of Western Africa. Beauties of the Country; or, Descriptions of Rural Customs, Objects, and Scenery. By Thomas Miller, Author of "A Day in the Zur Naturgeschichte, &c. On the Natural History of the Genus Calandra, with the Description of a new Species, Calandra Som- meri. By Dr. Hermann Burmeister Histoire Naturelle des Insectes Hymenoptères. Par M. Le Compte A. to affect to be dissatisfied with any non-misleading expression, which is currently understood to denote it. Place a juvenile chimpanzee in presence of one of its natural enemies; a python, or one of the larger Fèles; and it "instinctively" recoils with dread. But does a human infant evince the like recognition? Here, then, is a fundamental distinction at the outset. Not only, too, do brute animals (as remarked by White of Selborne) attempt, in their own defence, to use their natural weapons before these are developed, but they intuitively understand the mode of warfare resorted to by their brute opponents. They know, also, where the latter are most vulnerable, and likewise where their concealed weapons lie. Observe the deportment of a rat that is turned into a room with a ferret: see how artfully he guards his neck against the wall, instinctively knowing that there only will his enemy fix. Notice, on the other hand, the wondrous accuracy with which the Mustéladæ constantly wound the jugular vein of any bird or quadruped they attack. Witness a thrush that has captured a wasp, first squeezing out the venom from its abdomen, before it will swallow it. Or see a spider trying to shake off a wasp from its web, and, failing to do so, proceeding to cut it clean away. Can aught analogous be traced in the actions of inexperienced man? Whence, then, the acquired knowledge on which these animals could reason to act thus? The distinction is, that, whereas the human race is compelled to derive the whole of its information through the medium of the senses, the brute is, on the contrary, supplied with an innate knowledge of whatever properties belong to all the natural objects around, which can in anywise affect its own interests or welfaret; a sort of intimation, by the way, that all the inferior races pertain to some general comprehensive system, all the components of which have a mutual reciprocal bearing, and to which man only does not intuitively conform nor constitute a part of, except in so far as his bodily frame is of necessity subject to the common laws of matter and of organisation. In every other species, each individual comes into the world replete with "instincts," which require no education *Even more: he will contrive so to place himself, if practicable, that the ferret's eyes shall be dazzled by the light, The indirect effects of human agency on this intuitive knowledge of brutes will be considered presently. In no way is the deterioration more evident, than in domesticated animals poisoning themselves by feeding on that which, in a wild state, they would instinctively reject. for their developement. A kitten reared by hand, or a bird raised from the nest, have the same language, the same leading habits, as the rest of their species, but little, if at all, modified by change of circumstances. A kitten watches at a mouse-hole, though it has never seen a mouse; the squirrel proceeds by the easiest possible method to get at the kernel of its first nut, by invariably scraping, with its lower incisors, at the softer end, which it instinctively turns in its fore paws to the proper position; and the wasp, crawling forth from its pupa envelope, immediately commences feeding the neighbouring larvæ. The human infant, too, applies instinctively to the breast, like the young of all other mammalians; but, unlike those, it has to attain all its after-knowledge through the medium of its external senses. It looks to its nurses, and those about it, for information; and these are capable of so communicating their attainments, as very materially to assist the infant learner in its acquisition of knowledge. It is preposterous to assert the contrary, as has been done; or to pretend that it rests on the choice of the infant whether or not it will learn.+ Practically, it cannot help doing so; and it is equally monstrous to deny that human beings can so communicate the results of their experience, that, with what in addition is ever accumulating, each generation must necessarily rise in knowledge above the last. Unless the faculties were to be much deteriorated, it could not be otherwise. Who can pretend to deny the excessive influence of every generation upon that which immediately succeeds it; the influence both of precept and example? Imagine it possible for those of the present day to refuse to instruct; and what would then be the consequent condition of their offspring? Apply the same test to any other species of animal; and in what measure would the progeny be affected? I wish not to defend the untenable doctrine, that the higher groups of animals do not individually profit by ex The reader may probably be disposed to refer this to the structure of the vocal organs. But, admitting to the full extent the reasonableness of this view, it must be borne in mind that the smaller birds have great power of modulation; and it is a certain fact, that, although in most species the song is purely innate, there are many (as the song thrush and nightingale) in which it is, for the most part, acquired; as is proved by the fact of these never warbling their wild notes when reared in confinement, except they have had opportunities of listening to the proper song of their species; which latter, it may be remarked, they imitate much more readily than any other. I do not consider, however, the music of a bird to be so much the language of its species, as those various notes and calls by which different individuals commune together; and these I have never known to vary under any circumstances. + See Mag. Nat. Hist. (old scries), vol. ix. p. 612. l. 3., et seq. perience; nor to deny to them the capability of observation and reflection, whereby to modify, to a considerable extent, their instinctive conduct: neither do I assert that the human race is totally devoid of intuition, when I see the infant take naturally to the breast; when I perceive the force of the maternal attachment, and the ardour of the several passions: which latter, however, are, of course, but incentives to conduct common to both man and animals. In only the human species are the actions resulting from them unguided by intuitive knowledge. All I contend for is, that the ruling principle of human actions is essentially distinct from that which mainly actuates the brute creation, whence the general influence of the two is diverse in kind; and I mistake if I cannot establish the position. The brief period that elapses before most animals are compelled to perform the part allotted to their species, precludes the possibility of their attaining sufficient information from external sources, and renders, therefore, the possession of a substitute for knowledge so obtained absolutely requisite. We have already seen that such a substitute is not wanting; but that all the knowledge necessary to insure their general welfare is intuitively conferred on the brute creation. Their various actions, in wild nature, are consequently based on this innate knowledge; which, being the same in every individual of the same species, in a natural state (that is, as completely uncontrolled by those peculiar changes of condition which man only, the exception of all other animals, can bring about), superinduces a normal uniformity of habit throughout the members of a species, which is rarely modified to any considerable extent by individual experience. Now, this uniformity is at variance with what reasoning from observation could possibly lead to; and, as it extends even to the resource of creatures of the same species, when driven to emergency, we have herein sufficient intimation that their wiles and stratagems, however consonant with what reasoning from observation might suggest, may nevertheless be purely instinctive, perfectly unalloyed with any wisdom resulting from experience. To ascend from illustrations the least equivocal, let me here cite the nidification of the feathered tribes. Who, that considers the wonderful fact, that not only genera, but even species, of birds are for the most part distinctly indicated by their nests, can fail to recognise in this the operation of a principle essentially distinct from that which we understand by the word reason? which latter, in human beings, can, of course, be only the result of observation and reflection.* We observe a similar marked uniformity in the fabrics and operations of all animals of identical species (man only exempted), endless examples of which will instantly recur to the reader in the insect tribes; and, if we consider the beaver, and others of the higher grades of animals which join their labours for mutual advantage, or are otherwise remarkable for what has thoughtlessly been deemed their ingenuity, the same truth will be found still to hold just as obviously apparent, and forbids us to attribute their proceedings to aught else than the dictates of intuition. It is most commonly, however, in the resource of brute creatures, the wisdom they display in their expedients, that unreflecting persons fancy they discern the proofs of intellect identical with human; but, even here, this does not necessarily follow; for it is sufficient to refer to the cases which I commenced by detailing, to be assured that Providence has conferred instinctive wiles on animals as a resource against contingencies; the legitimate actions resulting from which according, perhaps, with what reason might dictate in like circumstances, we are therefore apt to conclude must necessarily have been induced by reasoning. To illustrate what I mean, let me adduce the simulation of death practised by so many species, with intent to weaken the instinctive vigilance of their foes or prey. (That another animal, it may be remarked, should suffer itself to be thus duped, is most probably a result of acquired experience.) A cat has been seen to feign death, stretched on a grass-plot, over which swallows were noticed sailing to and fro; and by this ruse to succeed in capturing one which heedlessly approached too near it. The fox has been known to personate a defunct carcass, when surprised in a hen-house; and it has even suffered itself to be carried out by the brush, and thrown on a dung-heap, whereupon it instantly rose and took to its heels, to the astounding dismay of its human dupe In like manner, animal has submitted to be carried for more than a mile, swung over the shoulder, with its head hanging; till at length, probably getting a little weary of so uncomfortable a position, or perhaps reasoning that its instinctive stratagem had failed in its object, it has very speedily effected its release, by suddenly biting. The same animal has been this * Brutes appear to reason from innate knowledge, and this in proportion to the developement of the cerebrum; but the extreme promptitude of their expedients (as will be shown), in cases of emergency, often prohibits us from inferring that these can be the result of aught else than intuitive impulse. |