Order Ethics or Moral Surplus: What Holds a Society Together?Bloomsbury Publishing PLC, 18.03.2015 - 262 Seiten Christoph Luetge takes on a fundamental problem of contemporary political philosophy and ethics. He questions the often implicit assumption of many contemporary political philosophers according to which a society needs its citizens to adopt some shared basic qualities, views or capabilities (here termed a moral surplus). Luetge examines the respective theories of, among others, Habermas, Rawls, Gauthier, Buchanan, and Binmore with a focus on their respective moral surpluses. He finds that each moral surplus is either not necessary for the stability of societies or cannot remain stable when faced with opposing incentives. Binmore’s idea of empathy is the only one that is, at least partly, not confronted with this dilemma. Luetge provides an alternative view termed order ethics, which weakens the necessary assumptions for modern societies and basically only relies on mutual advantages as the fundamental basis of society. |
Inhalt
| 1 | |
2 Normativity under Conditions of Globalization | 21 |
3 Society Requires Capacities of the Individual | 69 |
4 Society Requires a Sense of Justice | 143 |
5 Society Requires Incentives and Rules | 165 |
6 Conclusion | 209 |
Outlook | 225 |
| 227 | |
| 241 | |
About the Author | 251 |
Andere Ausgaben - Alle anzeigen
Order Ethics or Moral Surplus: What Holds a Society Together? Christoph Luetge Eingeschränkte Leseprobe - 2015 |
Order Ethics Or Moral Surplus: What Holds a Society Together? Christoph Lütge Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2015 |
Order Ethics Or Moral Surplus: What Holds a Society Together? Christoph Luetge Keine Leseprobe verfügbar - 2016 |
Häufige Begriffe und Wortgruppen
able actions actors already approach argument basis behavior benefits and incentives Binmore Binmore’s Buchanan chapter citizens communication conception of justice constitutional consensus contract theory cooperation criticism David Gauthier discourse ethics discussion dispositions economic empathetic preferences example fact Foot functioning Game of Morals Gauthier Habermas Habermas’s heuristic Höffe homo economicus Hösle human Hume ibid ideal role taking implementation individual instance institutions interaction interests interpretation Jürgen Habermas justice as fairness Ken Binmore least liberal Luetge means modern societies modus vivendi moral intuitions moral norms moral surplus value naturalistic Nonetheless order ethics original position overlapping consensus performative contradiction Philippa Foot philosophy political possible preconditions principles of justice prisoner’s dilemma problem question rational motivation Rawls’s reason recognize Rorty rules sanctions section Moral section Society requires self-interest semantics of benefits sense of justice situation social contract stability systematically theoretical theory of justice tion value-ethics virtue ethics virtues
