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embracing most of the mercantile countries of Europe, from which the greatest benefits may be anticipated. The present state of our knowledge of the ocean, in all its aspects, is fully given in the volume before us, and the various particulars which are still desiderata are severally indicated.

The Philosophy of the Infinite; with special Reference to the Theories of Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. By Henry Calderwood. Edinburgh: T. Constable and Co. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co. 1854.

THIS work "is intended as an illustration and defence of the proposition, that man has a positive conception of the Infinite," in contradiction, mainly, to the doctrine of Sir William Hamilton, that the "Unconditioned" (which our author holds to be identical with the Infinite) "is unrecognisable and inconceivable, its notion being only the negative of the Conditioned, (that is, the Finite,) which can alone be positively known or conceived. Unfortunately for the discussion, Sir William differs from his critic, as he does from Cousin and others generally, in admitting two species of the Unconditioned; namely, the Infinite, or the unlimited, and the Absolute, or unlimited but perfect, the two constituting, according to his theory, "two extremes, two unconditionates exclusive of each other, neither of which can be conceived as possible, but of which, on the (logical) principles of contradiction and excluded middle, one must be admitted as necessary;" (Discussions on Philosophy and Literature, p. 14;) whereas other philosophers have regarded the Infinite and the Absolute as being strictly identical with the Unconditioned. This difference in the acceptation or application of the latter term introduces a confusion not entirely obviated by the author's postulate, (or showing,) that "the Infinite is also absolute, and that the Absolute postulated by Sir William is not really absolute."

In opposition to the teaching of M. Cousin, and the views of our author, that our notion of the finite implies a notion of the infinite, Sir William says, "Correlatives certainly suggest each other, but correlatives may or may not be equally real and positive. In thought, contradictories necessarily imply each other; for the knowledge of contradictories is one. But the reality of one contradictory, so far from guaranteeing the reality of the other, is nothing else than its negation. Thus every positive notion (the concept of a thing by what it is) suggests a negative notion (the concept of a thing by what it is not); and the highest positive notion, the notion of the Conceivable, is not without its corresponding negative in the notion of the Unconceivable. But though these mutually suggest each other, the positive alone is real; the negative is only an abstraction of the other, and, in the highest generality, even an abstraction of thought itself. The mind is not represented as conceiving two propositions subversive of each other, as equally possible; but only as unable to understand, as possible, either of two extremes; one of which, however, on the ground of their mutual repugnance, it is compelled to recognise as true. We are thus taught the salutary lesson, that the capacity of thought is not to be constituted into the

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measure of existence; and are warned from recognising the domain of our knowledge, as necessarily co-extensive with the horizon of our faith." (Discussions, p. 15.)

The theory (or terminology) of negative, as well as positive, notions is the gist of the controversy; which Mr. Calderwood has managed with considerable ingenuity, and with considerable effect too, so far as to show that a negative notion, though it may hold good in the sense in which it is employed by Sir William, is not a very happy designation of its significate. We are inclined to think that the two disputants would have approximated somewhat to each other, if it had been more carefully remembered, that the discrimination of thought into positive and negative, according as it is conversant about the conditional or unconditional, constitutes “ a logical, not a psychological, distinction; as positive and negative in thought are known at once, and by the same intellectual act." Mr. Calderwood has, perhaps, brought too much of the psychological into his argument; and Sir William has not sufficiently remembered the logical, or it might have occurred to him that negative notions may be made to appear at least quasi positive, on a principle analogous to that by which, in logic, the process of conversion by contraposition turns Negative Propositions into Affirmatives.

"We

At all events, Mr. Calderwood would appear to anticipate something like a re-union between Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin. are persuaded," he says, "that, if the more extreme points (entertained by each of them respectively) were abandoned, they do not differ so much as they seem. We consider that it would not be difficult to show that, apart from these extreme points, these two philosophers are at one. For example, we find Sir William saying, The Divinity, in a certain sense, is revealed; in a certain sense, concealed. He is at once known and unknown.' Having stated this opinion, he has felt that M. Cousin would readily accept the statement; and he asks, 'Am I wrong in thinking that M. Cousin would not repudiate this doctrine ?' So far from repudiating it, we believe M. Cousin would at once adopt it as his own. This may appear when we consider that M. Cousin has stated, that he holds 'at once the comprehensibility and incomprehensibility of God.' He says, 'God reveals Himself to us; but it is not true that we are able absolutely to comprehend God.' 'It is equally an error to call God absolutely comprehensible, and absolutely incomprehensible.' These passages from Sir William Hamilton and M. Cousin we consider as direct admissions of the validity of the doctrine we have maintained, and, at the same time, as directly contradictory of (to) the extreme positions involved in their own theories. Let, then, these two philosophers abide by the passages we have quoted. Let Sir William lay aside the definition of the Infinite as that which cannot exist in relation, as that which involves the negation of plurality. Let him lay aside his doctrine of the impossibility of a knowledge of the Infinite, as dealing with an abstraction which does not exist. On the other hand, let M. Cousin lay aside his doctrine of the impersonality of reason; let him lay aside the doctrine that reason is absolute and divine; let him cease every attempt to raise us to a unity of consciousness with the Absolute Being. Let Sir William and M.

Cousin agree to do this, and there is an end to the controversy, and this doctrine stands out as a common conclusion,-that the Infinite Being is recognised as an object of thought, that he is positively known, though not absolutely known,-that our knowledge of the Infinite is real and positive, though only partial and indefinite." Remains of the Honourable and Reverend Somerville Hav, A.M., sometime Vicar of Netherbury and Beaminster in Dorsetshire. Comprising Sermons, Tracts, and Letters. With an Introductory Memoir, by Thomas J. Graham, M.D. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1854.

THE Memoir prefixed to these Remains is an account of an amiable and pious Clergyman of the Church of England; written by one who had ample means of appreciating his character, and of estimating the effects of his labours. Had Providence vouchsafed to Mr. Hay a long life, his career would, doubtless, have been one of great usefulness. The character of his discourses from the Pulpit, so far as we can judge from these Remains, was simple, earnest, and scriptural.

The People's Day. An Appeal to the Right Honourable Lord Stanley, M.P., against his Advocacy of a French Sunday. By William Arthur, A.M. London: Hamilton, Adams, and Co.

1855.

It is sometimes said, with a view to its disparagement, that the fourth commandment of the Decalogue is purely arbitrary,-is not founded in necessary morality, nor planted in the natural conscience of mankind; and that, therefore, it is not of universal and perpetual obligation. Now, while the fact is granted, the inference is justly to be condemned. The religious observance of every seventh day is arbitrarily enjoined, and is not even suggested by the unenlightened conscience; and therefore the Creator emphatically says, "Remember the Sabbath-day to keep it holy." So also in the first commandment we have an assertion of the unity of God, and of His claims to exclusive worship. The religion which makes no such announcements or demands, which merely echoes the feeble suggestions of our beclouded and impaired religiousness, can have no pretensions to be a revelation from the true God, and is not worth a moment's controversy. One striking advantage arises from the necessity of such pretensions. It is by their original dogmas, and by their positive enactments, that the false religions of the world evince their weakness and bring themselves to confusion; and it is by these also that the true religion asserts its divine authority and power. All morality derives immediately from the will of God, and every injunction springing from that sourcee—however arbitrary, mechanical, or arithmetical it may be in form-will prove strictly consistent with every law of truth, and justice, will be fruitful in works of peace and mercy among men, will redound to the glory and honour of Almighty God. A commandment really given by inspiration will have all the force and sanctions of a natural law; its infringement will be guarded by the same inexorable penalties, its observance followed by appropriate and beneficent results. Here then we have a test to which we may bring the

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fourth commandment of the Decalogue. Is the religious observance of a seventh day a foolish superstition, a barren, irksome, mischievous anachronism? Or is it rather an ordinance as necessary for the temporal and spiritual prosperity of man, as the alternation of day and night, of winter and summer, are for the refreshment and advantage of his nature ? If this last question must be answered in the affirmative, we have not only a demonstration of the authority of the Christian Sabbath, but another proof of the divinity of that law in which it is clearly and emphatically enjoined.

This argument is not insisted upon in Mr. Arthur's letter, but was nevertheless suggested to us by its perusal; for all his pleas-presented with unusual force, and illustrated by a great variety of facts-tend to affirm this truth, namely, that the Sabbath is a positive addition to our natural blessings, conferred by immediate charter, and that no man in Christendom is in possession of all his rights while deprived of the Sabbath rest and privilege. Considering the personage to whom he writes, and the principles by which his Lordship was probably swayed in his unfortunate concurrence in Sir Joshua Walmsley's proposition, the author has wisely limited himself to the secular aspects of the Sabbath-question. Far higher ground there is, and none can appreciate or occupy it better than Mr. Arthur; but this would have been much less appropriate and quite ineffective. The author has succeeded in disarming the flatterers of the people, and turned their arguments against themselves. He has proved, in the calmest, closest, and completest manner, that the Sabbath is only the People's Day while they acknowledge it to be the Lord's,-that their Maker is the most gracious Master they can serve, who commands their service only that in the very act of obedience He may pay it tenfold back into their bosoms. The value of this letter can hardly be overrated; it admits of neither evasion nor reply. The young nobleman to whom it is addressed is, we are sure, too candid to resist its force, Already he has given some sign of wishing to retrace his steps by voting in favour of the Bill for restricting Sunday Trading. His Lordship will never have occasion to repent his manly re-consideration of this important subject, nor his noble acting on his better thoughts. Treatise on Practical Mathematics. London and Edinburgh : W. and R. Chambers. 1855.

THE contents and the value of this compendious, but very comprehensive, work,—which now appears in one volume, instead of two, as formerly, are already well known. A compression in bulk has been accomplished by a diminution of size in the typography and the diagrams; whilst, at the same time, an augmentation of matter has been made by the addition of an article on Analytical Trigonometry, which was deemed necessary to make sufficiently plain the many demonstrations in the work involving trigonometrical reductions which were formerly obscure, and which has also afforded the means of proving simply some of the problems in Astronomy, which were formerly given without demonstration. We know not where the student can find an equal amount of varied and well-digested information on Practical, with a due mixture of Theoretical, Mathematics, within so small a compass, or at so moderate a price,

Manna in the Heart: or, Daily Comments on the Book of Psalms, adapted for the Use of Families. By the Rev. Barton Bouchier, A.M., Curate of Cheam, Surrey. Psalm I.-LXXVIII. London: J. F. Shaw. 1855.

THIS Volume contains a series of short comments on the Psalms, suitable, according to the author's original purpose and practice, for daily use in the family circle. They breathe a devotional and simply earnest spirit, and contain much appropriate and useful exposition, with a commendable avoidance of all critical, verbal, and philosophical investigation, beyond an occasional remark, as to the author of a particular Psalm, or the doubtful interpretation of a difficult verse. The style is attractive, and the sentiment throughout in harmony with the sacred minstrelsy of which it is designed to be an accompaniment.

Urgent Questions, Personal, Practical, and Pointed. By the Rev. John Cumming, D.D. London: Shaw. 1855.

TWELVE Scripture Questions, proposed and answered, for the purpose of awakening religious concern, and directing men to the Saviour. They do credit to Dr. Cumming by their practical aim; yet their style is not pungent, nor armed with the most effectual weapon against the conscience and heart, the free use of the authoritative and powerful language of Scripture. This is a striking defect. Our sentiments may be scriptural; but they will not be more but less forcible, if they be not given in the right words which the Holy Ghost teacheth.

The Science of Arithmetic: a Systematic Course of Numerical Reasoning and Computation, with very numerous Exercises. By James Cornwell, Ph.D., and Joshua G. Fitch, M.A. London: Simpkin, Marshall, and Co. 1855.

THIS book differs from others bearing a similar title, in the following particulars :-1. The investigation of the principle on whieh a rule in Arithmetic depends always precedes the statement of the rule itself. 2. Every process employed in the solution of questions is referred to some general law, or truth, in the theory of numbers. 3. Such general truths are all distinctly stated, and printed in italics. If self-evident, they are illustrated by simple numerical examples ; if otherwise, short demonstrations are added; and, in every case, the truth itself is enunciated in a concise symbolical form. 4. The theory of decimals, and rules for the solution of money questions by the decimal method, are placed earlier in the course than usual. 5. The logical relations of the several parts of Arithmetic are clearly marked by their arrangement. 6. The tables of Foreign Currency, and of English Weights and Measures, are accompanied by an explanation of the origin of the several standards in common use, and of the causes which have led to their diversities and irregularities.

It is a great advance on any thing with which we are acquainted that has previously appeared; and only requires to be known to insure a very extended adoption.

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