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cession of changes, and our attention is conually called to the events which are incesitly happening around us. These form a set objects vastly more interesting to us than the mer; being the sources of almost all the pleares or pains we receive from external objects. e study of the events which happen around becomes highly interesting, and we are strongly cited to prosecute it; but they are so numeus and so multifarious that the labor would immense, without some contrivance for abreviating and facilitating it. The same help fers itself here as in the study of what may be alled quiescent nature. Events, like existences, -re susceptible of classification, in consequence f resemblances and distinction; and, by attenion to these, we can acquire a very extensive cquaintance with active nature. Our attention aust be chiefly directed to those circumstances n which many events resemble each other, while hey differ perhaps in a thousand others. Then we must attend to their most general distinctions, hen to distinctions of smaller extent, and so on. In this way, accordingly, we have advanced in our knowledge of active nature, and are graJually and by no means slowly, forming assemplages of events more and more extensive, and listributing these with greater and greater precision into their different classes.

from all others, and the conversation of the most illiterate never confounds them. The general employment of the active and passive verb is regulated by it. The tower was demolished by the soldiers; the town was overthrown by an earthquake;' are sentences that express two relations, and no school-boy will mistake them. The distinction therefore is perceived or felt by all. Nor is any language without general terms to express this relation, cause and effect. Nay, even brutes show that they expect the same uses of every subject which they formerly made of it; and, without this, animals would be incapable of subsistence, and man incapable of all improvement. From this alone memory derives all its value; and even the constancy or natural operation would be useless, if not matched or adapted to our purposes by this expectation of and confidence in that constancy.

The result of all the enquiries of ingenious men, to discover the foundation of this irresistible expectation, is, such is the constitution of the human mind.' It is a universal fact in human thought; and it appears to be an ultimate fact, not included in any other still more general. This is sufficient for making it the foundation of true human knowledge; all of which must in like manner be reduced to ultimate facts in the human thought.

This persuasion of the constancy of nature we must consider as an instinctive anticipation of events similar to those which we have already experienced. The general analogy of nature should have disposed philosophers to acquiesce in this. In no instance of importance to our safety or well-being are we left to the guidance of our boasted reason; God has given us the surer conduct of natural instincts. No case is so important as this; in none do we so much stand in need of a guide, which shall be powerful, infallible, and rapid in its decisions. Without it we should remain incapable of all instruction from experience, and therefore of all improvement.

In describing those circumstances of similarity among events, and in distributing them according to those similarities, it is impossible to overlook that constancy which is observed in the changes of nature, in the events which are the objects of our contemplation. Events which have once been observed to accompany each other are observed always to do so. The rising of the sun is always accompanied by the light of day, and his setting by the darkness of night. Sound argument is accompanied by conviction, impulse by motion, kindness by a feeling of gratitude, and the perception of good by desire. The uniform experience of mankind informs us that the events of nature go on in certain regular trains; and, if sometimes exceptions seem to contradict this general affirmation, more attentive observation never fails to remove the exception. Most of the spontaneous events of nature are very complicated; and it frequently requires great attention and penetration to discover the simple event amidst a crowd of unessential circumstances which are at once exhibited to our view. But, when we succeed in this discovery, we never fail to acknowledge the perfect uniformity of the event to what has been formerly observed. Hence we firmly believe that this uniformity will still continue; that fire will melt wax, will burn paper, will harden clay, as we have formerly observed it to do; and whenever we have undoubted proofs that the circumstances and situation are precisely the same as in some former case, though but once observed, we expect with confidence that the event will also be the same.

2

Many proofs of the universality of this law of human thought are not necessary. The whole language and actions of men are instances of the fact. In all languages there is a mode of construction used to express this relation as distinct

In

Our sensations are no doubt feelings of our mind. But those feelings are accompanied by an instinctive reference to something distinct from the feelings themselves. Hence arise our perceptions of external objects, and our very notions of this externeity, if we may use the term. like manner, this anticipation of events, this irresistible connexion of the idea of fire with the idea of burning, is also a feeling of the mind; and this feeling is by a law of human nature referred, without reasoning, to something external as its cause; and, like our sensation, it is considered as a sign of that external something. It is like the connexion of the truth of a mathematical proposition. The conviction is the sign or indication of this relation by which it is brought to our view. In the same manner, the irresistible connexion of ideas interpreted as the sensation or sign of a necessary connexion of external things or events. These are supposed to include something in their nature which renders them inseparable companions. To this bond of connexion between external things we give the name of causation. All our knowledge of this relation of cause and effect is the knowledge o

consciousness of what passes in our own minds, during the contemplation of the phenomena of nature. If we adhere to this view of it, and put this branch of knowledge on the same footing with those called the abstract sciences, considering only the relations of ideas, we shall acquire demonstrative science. Any other view of the matter will lead us into inextricable mazes of uncertainty and error.

We thus, then, perceive that the natural procedure of our faculty of abstraction and arrangements in order to acquire a more speedy and comprehensive knowledge of natural events, presents them to our view in another form. We not only see them as similar events, but as events naturally and necessarily conjoined. And the expression of resemblance among events is also an expression of concomitancy; and this arrangement of events in consequence of their resemblance is in fact the discovery of those accompaniments. The trains of natural appearance being considered as the appointments of the Author of Nature, has occasioned them to be considered also as consequences of laws imposed on his works by their great Author, and every thing is said to be regulated by fixed laws. There is a great resemblance between the expression natural law, and grammatical rule. Rule in grammar expresses merely a generality of fact, whether of flexion or construction. In like manner, a law of nature is to the philosopher nothing, but the expression of a generality of fact. A natural or physical law is a generally observed fact; and, whenever we treat any subject as a generally observed fact, we treat it physically. It is a physical law of the understanding, that argument is accompanied by conviction; it is a physical law of the affection that distress is accompanied by pity; it is a physical law of the material world that impulse is accompanied by motion. And thus we see that the arrangement of events, or the discovery of those general points of resemblance, is in fact the discovery of the laws of nature; and one of the greatest and most important is, that the laws of nature are constant. This view of the universe is incomparably more interesting and important than that which is taken by the natural historian; contemplating every thing that is of value to us, and, in short, the whole life and movement of the universe. This study, therefore, has been dignified with the name of philosophy and of science; and natural history has been considered as of importance only in so far as it is conducive to the successful prosecution of philosophy.

The philosopher claims a superiority on another account: he considers himself as employed in the discovery of causes, and that it is by the discovery of these relations that he communicates to the world such important knowledge. Phifosophy, he says, is the science of causes. The vulgar are contented to consider the prior of two inseparably conjoined events as the cause of the other; the stroke on a bell, for instance, as the cause of sound. But it has been clearly discovered by the philosopher that between the blow on the bell and the sensation of sound, there are interposed a long train of events. The blow sets

the bell a trembling; this agitates the atm tact with the bell; that the air immediately b yond it; and thus between the bell and the may be interposed a numberless series of even and as many more between the first impres on the ear and that last impression on the serv by which the mind is affected. He can no ispe therefore follow the nomenclature of the va Which of the events of this train therefore s cause of the sensation? None of them: It is something, which inseparably connects any te of them, and constitutes their bond of These causes he considers as residing in our both of the connected objects: diversities m respect must therefore constitute the most portant distinctions between them. They therefore with great propriety called the que ties, the properties, of these respective subjec As the events, from which we infer the existens of these qualities of things, resemble in m respects such events as are the consequences the exertion of our own powers, these quain. are frequently denominated powers, for energies. Thus, from the instance of the sou of a bell, we infer the powers of impulse, eir ticity, nervous irritability, and animal sensibilt

From this necessary connexion between t objects around us we not only infer the poster event from the prior, or, in common languag the effect from the cause, but we also infer prior from the posterior, the cause from t effect. We not only expect that the presence a a magnet will be followed by certain motions in iron filings, but, when we observe such motion we infer the presence and agency of a mag. Joy is inferred from merriment, poison in sudden or unaccountable death, fire from smole, and impulse from motion. And thus the pearances of the universe are the indications d the powers of the objects in it. As all our know ledge of the sentiments of others is derived fra our confidence in their veracity; so all knowledge of nature is derived from our conf dence in the constancy of ber operations credulity in our neighbour's veracity, resulting from that law of our mental constitution which we speak, conducts us in the one case, and the constancy of nature, by which we in general laws from particular facts, conducts us the other. It is by the successful study of this language of nature that we derive useful knowledge. The knowledge of the influence of m tives on the mind of man enables the statesman to govern kingdoms, and the knowledge of the powers of magnetism enables the mariner to pil a ship through the pathless ocean.

Such are the high pretensions of philosophy. It is to be wished that they be well founded; fa we may be persuaded that a mistake in this pa ticular will be fatal to the advancement of knowledge. An author of great reputation gives us an opportunity of deciding this question in the way of experiment. He says that the ancients were philosophers, employed in the discovery of causes, and that the moderns are only natura historians, contenting themselves with observing the laws of nature, but paying no attention t the causes of things. If he speaks of their pr fessed aim, we apprehend that the assertion f

pretty just in general. With very few exceptions, indeed, it may be affirmed of his favorite Aristotle, the philosopher car' Eoxy, and of Sir Isaac Newton. We select these two instances, both because they are set in continual opposition by this author, and because it will be allowed that they were the most eminent students of nature (for we must not call them philosophers), in ancient and modern times.

Aristotle's professed aim, in his most celebrated writings, is the investigation of causes; and, in the opinion of this author, he has been so successful that he has hardly left any employment for his successors beside that of commenting upon his works. We must, on the other hand, acknowledge that Newton makes no such pretensions, at least in that work which has immortalised his name, and that his professed aim is merely to investigate the general laws of the planetary motions, and to apply these to the explanation of particular phenomena. Nor will we say that he has left no employment for succeeding enquirers; but, on the contrary, confess that he has only begun the study, has discovered but one law, and has enabled us to explain only the phenomena comprehended in it. But his investigation has been complete: he has discovered, beyond all possibility of contradiction, a fact which is uniform through the whole extent of the solar system; namely, that every body, nay that every particle in it, is continually deflected towards every other body; and that this deflection is, in every instance, proportional to the quantity of matter in that body towards which the deflection is directed, and to the reciprocal of the square of the distance from it. He has therefore discovered a physical law of immense extent. Nor has he been less successful in the explanation of particular phenomena. Of this there cannot be given a better instance than the explanation of the lunar motions from the theory of gravity begun by Newton, Mathesi sua facem præferente; and now brought to such a degree of perfection, that if the moon's place be computed from it for any moment within the period of 2000 years back, it will not be found to differ from the place on which she was actually observed by the 100th part of her own breadth

We may challenge the Aristotelians to name any one cause which has really been discovered by their great master, whether in the operations of mind or of body. They must not adduce the investigation of any natural law in which he has sometimes succeeded. With still greater confidence may we challenge them to produce any remarkable instance of the explanation of natural phenomena either of mind or body. By explanation, we mean an account of the production, and an appreciation of all the circumstances, susceptible of a scrupulous comparison with fact, and perfectly consistent with it. It is here that the weakness of this philosopher's hypothesis is most conspicuous; and his followers acknowledge, that, in the enquiries which proceed by experiment, they have not derived great assistance from Aristotle's philosophy. But this, say they, does not derogate from the pre-eminence of his philosophy, because he has shown that the particular fields of observation are to be cultivated only

by means of experiment. But surely every field of observation is particular. There is no abstract object of philosophical research, the study of which shall terminate in the philosophy of universals. There is therefore great room for suspecting that Aristotle and his followers have not aimed at the discovery of causes, but only at the discovery of natural laws, and have failed in the attempt.

Into the previous question, Is it possible to discover a philosophical cause, that something which is neither the prior nor the posterior of the two immediately adjoining events, but their bond of union and this distinct from the union itself? we are not disposed to enter at length.

Much has been written on this subject. The most acute observation and sound judgment have been employed in the study: but, in all these researches, no phenomena have occurred which look like the perception or contemplation of a philosophical cause, or this power in abstracto. No philosopher has ever pretended to state such an object of the mind's observation. Those causes, those bonds of necessary union between the naturally conjoined events or objects, are not only perceived by means of the events alone, but are perceived solely in the events, and cannot be distinguished from the conjunctions themselves. They are neither the objects of separate observation, nor the productions of memory, nor inferences drawn from reflection on the laws by which the operations of our own minds are regulated; nor can they be derived from other perceptions in the way of argumentative inference. We cannot infer the paroxysm of terror from the appearance of impending destruction, nor the fall of a stone when not supported, as we infer the incommensurability of the diagonal and side of a square. This last is implied in the very conception or notion of a square; not as a consequence of its other properties, but as one of its essential attributes: and the contrary proposition is not only false, but incapable of being distinctly conceived. This is not the case with the other phenomenon, nor any matter of fact. The proofs which are brought of a mathematical proposition are not the reason of its being true, but the steps by which this truth is brought into our view; and frequently, as in the instance now given, this truth is perceived, not directly, but consequentially, by the inconceivableness of the contrary proposition.

Hume derives this irresistible expectation of events from the known effect of custom, and the association of ideas; an explanation which begs the very thing to be proved, when it ascribes to custom a power of any kind. Besides, on the genuine principles of scepticism, this custom involves an acknowledginent of past events, of a something different from present impressions, which, in this doctrine, are the only certain existences in nature.

Leibnitz and Malebranche deny that there is any such connexion, and assert that the events of the universe go on in corresponding trains, but without any causal connexion, just as a well regulated clock will keep time with the motions of the heavens without any kind of dependence on them; that this harmony of events was pre

established by the Author of the Universe, in subserviency to the purposes he had in view in its formation, &c. But, without insisting on the fantastic wildness of this ingenious whim, it is enough to observe that it also is a begging of the question, because it supposes causation when it ascribes all to the agency of the Deity.

That we do perceive the relation of causation as distinct from all others, and in particular as distinct from the relation of contiguity in time and place or the relation of agent, action, and patient, must be concluded from the uniformity of language, which never confounds them except on purpose, and when it is perceived. But even here we shall find that none of the terms used for expressing those powers of substance, which are conceived as the causes of their characteristic phenomena, really express any thing different from the phenomena themselves. Let any person try to define the terms gravity, elasticity, sensibility, and the like, and he will find that the definition is nothing but a description of the phenomenon itself. The words are all derivatives, most of them verbal derivatives, implying action, gravitation, &c. As the general resemblances in shape, color, &c., are expressed by the natural historian by generic terms, so the general resemblances in event are expressed by the philosopher in generic propositions, which, in the progress of cultivation, are also abbreviated into generic terms. This abundantly explains the consistency of our language on this subject, both with itself, and with the operations of nature, without however affording any argument for the truth of the assumption, that causes are the objects of philosophic research as separate existences; or that this supposed necessary connexion is a necessary truth, whether supreme or subordinate. But since the perception of it has its foundation in the constitution of the human mind, it seems entitled to the name of a first principle. We are hardly allowed to doubt of this when we consider the importance of it, and the care of nature to secure us, in all things essential to our safety and well-being, from all danger, from inattention, ignorance, or indolence, by an instinct infallible in its information, and instantaneous in its decisions.

Causes, therefore, say some of our ablest writers on this subject, are no more cogniscible by our intellectual powers than colors by a man born blind nay, whoever will be at the pains to consider this matter will find that necessary connexion, or bond of causation, can no more be the subject of philosophical discussion by man than the ultimate nature of truth. It is precisely the same absurdity or congruity as to propose to examine light with a microscope. All that we can say is that their existence is probable, but by no means certain. But all this is indifferent to the real occupation of the philosopher, and does not affect either the certainty, the extent, or the utility of the knowledge which he may acquire.

We are now able to appreciate the high pretensions of the philosophy of lord Bacon, and its claim to scientific superiority. The true object of the philosopher is not causes: his discoveries are nothing but the discovery of general facts and physical laws; and his employment is the same

with that of the descriptive historian. Hem serves and describes with care and accuracy te events of nature; and then he groups them classes, from resembling circumstances, detec in the midst of many others which are dissimil and occasional. By gradually throwing out mo circumstances of resemblance, he render classes more extensive; by carefully mark those circumstances in which the resemblance observed, he characterises all the different cl and by a comparison of these with each othe in respect to the number of resembling circu stances, he distributes his classes according their generality and subordination: thus exhau ing the whole assemblage, and leaving noth unarranged but accidental varieties. In t procedure every grouping of similar events ipso facto, discovering a physical law; and te expression of this assemblage is the expressin of that law. And, as every observation of th constancy of fact affords an opportunity for e erting the instinctive inference of natural cor nexion between the related subjects, every sur observation is the discovery of a power, prope or quality, of natural substance. This observe tion of event is all we know of the connexion all we know of the natural power. When the philosopher proceeds further to the arrangene of events, according to their various degrees a complication, he is making an arrangement a all natural powers according to their various de grees of subordinate influence. And thus s occupation is similar to that of the descripti historian, classification and arrangement; and this seems to constitute all the science attaina by both.

SECT. III. THE PHILOSOPHY AND RULES &

KEPLER, SIR ISAAC NEWTON, &c.

In the above view philosophy may be defined the study of the phenomena of the universe, discover the general laws which indicate powers of natural substances, to explain saberdinate phenomena, and to improve art: philosophy is the study of the phenomena of the universe, with a view to discover their causes, explain subordinate phenomena, and to impro

art.

The task is undoubtedly difficult, and wil exercise our noblest powers. The employment is manly, and the result important. It therefore justly merits the appellation of philosophy, though its objects are nowise different from those which occupy the attention of other men.

A philosophical history of nature consists in a complete or copious enumeration and narration of facts, properly selected, cleared of all extr neous circumstances, and accurately narrated. This constitutes the materials of philosophy. We cannot give a better example of this branch at philosophical occupation than astronomy. From the beginning of the Alexandrian school to this day astronomers have been at immense pains observing the heavenly bodies, to detect their true motions. This has been a work of prod gious difficulty: for the appearances are such as might have been exhibited although the real m tion had been extremely different. Not that our form senses give us false information; but we hasty, and frequently false judgments, from these

bformations; and call those things deceptions sense, which are in fact errors of judgment. at the true motions have at last been discovered, d described with such accuracy that the hisry may be considered as nearly complete. This to be found in the usual systems of astronomy, here the tables contain a most accurate and 'noptical account of the motion; so that we can 11 with precision in what point of the heavens planet has been seen at any instant that can be amed. Sir Isaac Newton's Optics is such anoher perfect model of philosophical history, as ar as it goes. This part of philosophy may be alled phenomenology.

རྩོད་སྡུང་

L A general knowledge of the universe may thus be easily acquired and firmly retained, by classiication and arrangement; which must proceed on resemblances observed in the events; the subsequent arrangement must be regulated by the listinctions of which those resemblances are still susceptible. This assemblage of events into groups must be expressed. They are facts; therefore the expression must be in propositions,which form, taken together, natural or physical laws. This observation of physical laws is always accompanied by a reference of that uniformity of event to a natural bond of union between the concomitant facts, which is conceived by us as the cause of this concomitancy; and therefore this procedure of the philosopher is considered as the discovery of those causes, or powers of natural substances, which constitute their physical relations, and may justly be called their distinguishing qualities or properties. This view of the matter gives rise to a new nomenclature. We give to those powers generic names, such as sensibility, intelligence, irritability, gravity, elasticity, fluidity, magnetism, &c. These terms mark resembling circumstances of events; and no other definition can be given of them but a - description of these circumstances. In a few cases which have been the subjects of more paintful or refined discussion, we have proceeded farther in this abbreviation of language. Want of attention to the pure meaning of the words thus originated, has frequently occasioned very great mistakes in philosophical science. We shall give an instance of its most successful application to the class of events already adduced.

other body; and that the simultaneous deflections were proportional to the quantity of matter in the body towards which they were directed, and to the reciprocal of the square of the distance from it. Thus was the law made still more general. He compared the deflection of the moon in her orbit with the simultaneous deflection of a stone thrown from the hand, and describing a parabola; and he found that they followed the same law, that is, that the deflection of the moon in a second was to that of the stone in the same time as the square of the stone's distance from the centre of the earth to the square of the moon's distance from it. Hence he concluded that the deflection of a stone from a straight line was just a particular instance of the deflections which took place through the whole solar system.

The deflection of a stone is one of the indications it gives of its being heavy; whence he calls it gravitation. He therefore expresses the physical law which obtains through the whole solar system, by saying that every body gravitates to every other body; and the gravitations are proportional to the quantity of matter in that other body, and inversely proportional to the square of the distance from it. Thus we see how the arrangement of the celestial phenomena terminated in the discovery of physical laws; and that the expression of this arrangement is the law itself. Since the fall of a heavy body is one instance of the physical law, and since this fall is considered by all as the effect of its weight, and this weight is considered as the cause of the fall, the same cause is assigned for all the deflections observed in the solar system; and all the matter in it is found to be under the influence of this cause, or to be heavy; and thus his doctrine has been denominated the system of universal gravitation. Philosophers have gone farther, and have supposed that gravity is a power, property, or quality, residing in all the bodies of the solar system. Sir Isaac Newton does not say so. He contents himself with the immediate consequence of the first axiom in natural philosophy, viz. that every body remains in a state of rest, or of uniform rectilineal motion, unless affected by some moving force. Since the bodies of the solar system are neither in a state of rest, nor of uniform rectilineal motion, they must be considered as so affected; that is, that there operates on every one of them a moving force, directed towards all the others, and having the proportions observed in the deflection.

It is to our present purpose to show how the observation and arrangement of phenomena terminate in the discovery of their causes, or of the powers or properties of natural substances. This is a task of great difficulty, as it is of great importance. Of this difficulty there are two chief