standing orders enforced) no report at all, however meagre, appears of their debates in this and the foregoing session.

Indeed, had it depended on the wish of the House of Commons, their debates also would have remained wholly unrecorded. A complaint being made to the House of one Raikes, a printer of Gloucester, who had published some reports of their proceedings, they passed an unanimous resolution on the 26th of February, "That it is an indignity to, and a breach of the privilege of, this House for any person to presume to give in written or printed newspapers any account or minutes of the debates or other proceedings of this House, or of any Committee thereof." And, "that upon discovery of the authors, printers, or publishers, this House will proceed against the offenders with the utmost severity."

The points on which it had been found most difficult to come to an understanding with the Spaniards were the possession of Gibraltar, and the claim of the English to cut log-wood in the Bay of Campeachy. The latter had, for some years, been contested by the Spaniards; in 1717 the Marquis de Monteleon had delivered a memorial against it, which was met by a representation from the Board of Trade, proving that the practice was of old standing, and of just right. This representation was now laid before the House of Commons, together with numerous petitions complaining of Spanish depredations, and every art was used to inflame the public mind, and to represent the Minister as tamely submitting to insult and careless of the national wrongs.

Gibraltar was a question nearly touching the Spanish pride. It is almost incredible what deep and deadly resentment had been raised in that haughty nation, who had extended their conquering arms so far, to see a fortress upon their own shores held and garrisoned by England. They viewed it with still more bitter feelings than the French had formerly our possession of Calais, and there was scarcely a Spanish statesman of this period who might not have applied to himself the saying of Queen Mary, and declared that when he died the word GIBRALTAR would be found engraven on his heart. They openly avowed, that until it was restored, there should be no amity with England-a truce, but no peace. Thus high is the spirit of the Spaniards, so keen are they to discern, and so fierce to resent, even the slightest approaches to an insult!

1

["There is nothing," writes Lord Campbell, "in our constitutional history which surprises me so much as the long continuance of this restriction; for besides that the publication of parliamentary debates is favourable to liberty, it is highly flattering to the vanity of the members, and now pleases them so much, that when the reporters' gallery is shut, all speaking is suspended. I suspect that originally, when printing was introduced, and parliamentary proceedings excited curiosity, the government was afraid that popular haranguing would be encouraged by the publicity of the debates, and that every successive administration, even after the Revolution, thought they had an interest in making parliamentary proceedings as secret as possible, forgetting that from the circulation of their own speeches they might acquire popularity and strength. At last the officer of the House of Commons who was to enforce the standing order was committed to prison; and now, in one session, there are more reports than during the first sixty years of the last century." Lives of the Chancellors, vol. iv. p. 631, note, chap. cxxvi.]

The obstacles to a friendly intercourse with Spain, so long as we retained Gibraltar, were most strongly felt by General Stanhope on his coming to power, and he was also impressed with the idea that the fortress was of small value to England. The Opposition which afterwards urged the opposite arguments was at first not less loud in inveighing against a "barren rock" and "useless charge.' The garrison was the cause of an increase in our standing army. The expense of its establishment was great and ill regulated.* There was no English possession to protect in the Mediterranean except Minorca, which was fully adequate to its own defence. There was yet no precedent of one nation long retaining such a strong-hold on the shores of another: Under these circumstances, Stanhope formed a decided opinion as to the policy of yielding Gibraltar on certain conditions: he made this proposal to the King and to his colleagues, and obtained their acquiescence before he proceeded with it to Madrid in 1718. Yet, while allowing considerable weight to his arguments, I must maintain that our national glory demanded the preservation of this conquest; and it is evident that at a later period our national interests would have suffered by its loss.

It must be observed, however, that Stanhope never proposed an unconditional surrender; the doubt is only whether in 1718 he asked for any territorial equivalent, or whether he would have been satisfied with the accession of Spain to the Quadruple Alliance, coupled with (as was then required) large commercial advantages to our traders in South America. Amidst the secrecy and obscurity of the negotiation, we cannot distinguish the exact terms of the offer. We find, however, that it was rejected by the Spanish Court; but that in the subsequent negotiations the French government, though without any express authority, again held out this tempting bait, and gave Philip hopes of prevailing on easy terms. Thus the honour of the Regent became in some degree engaged, and he warmly seconded the claim of Philip at the Court of England. But no sooner had Stanhope sounded the House of Lords upon the subject than the country caught the alarm. The cession on any terms became most unpopular—which in England is but another word for impossible. As Stanhope declares, in a letter to Sir Luke Schaub from Paris, "We have made a motion in Parliament, relative to the restitution of Gibraltar, to pass a bill, for the purpose of leaving to the King the power of disposing of that fortress for the advantage of his subjects. You cannot imagine the ferment which the proposal produced. The public was roused with indignation, on the simple suspicion that, at the close of a successful war, so unjustly begun by Cardinal Alberoni, we should cede that fortress. One circumstance greatly contributed to excite the general indignation, namely, a report insinuated by the Opposition, that the King had entered into a formal engagement to restore Gibraltar, which was deemed a suffi

• Lord Bolingbroke to Lord Portmore, March 29, 1712.

† See ante, p. 225.

See ante, a note to p. 226.

cient ground to attack the ministry. Many libels have been published to alarm the nation, and excite them rather to continue the war, than to cede a fortress of such importance. We were accordingly compelled to yield to the torrent, and to adopt the wise resolution of withdrawing the motion; because if it had been pressed, it would have produced a contrary effect to what is designed, and would perhaps have ended in a bill, which might for ever have tied up the King's hands. Such being the real state of this business, you will endeavour to explain to the Court of Madrid, that if the King of Spain should ever wish at some future day to treat concerning the cession of Gibraltar, the only method of succeeding would be to drop the subject at present. We are much concerned that France should have interfered on this occasion; the extreme eagerness which she testified was of great detriment. Some letters and memorials on that subject seemed even to threaten a rupture. The alarm was indeed so strong, that people began to suspect France was meditating a change of system, and made Gibraltar a pretext to adopt other measures; and this was the cause of my coming to Paris."*

Stanhope's journey proved successful: the Regent was convinced by his statements, and promised not to join Spain in urging its claims prematurely. But it was not so easy for Schaub to prevail with the Spaniards. Their impatience grew so uncontrollable, that though the question was referred to the Congress to be held at Cambray, Stanhope made another effort in England in the autumn of 1720. He wrote from Hanover to lay before the Lords Justices the expediency of exchanging Gibraltar on the footing of some adequate equivalent. The Lords Justices agreed to this plan; and the cession of Gibraltar seemed determined if the consent of Parliament could be obtained. But the project was again marred by the perverseness of the King of Spain, who refused to give Florida, and wished to gain Gibraltar without any equivalent whatever.

At this period of the transaction ensued the deaths of Stanhope and Craggs, and the consequent change of the English administration. Townshend, however, into whose hands the affair now chiefly came, followed in this respect the footsteps of his predecessor. Like him he desired the cession of the fortress; like him he dreaded the resistance of the Parliament. Scarcely had he taken the seals, when he received an application from the Court of Madrid, stating in confidence, their difficulty with their own subjects, the peace being deemed in Spain highly dishonourable unless it included Gibraltar. They therefore requested, as an ostensible vindication of the treaty, a letter from King George, containing a promise of restoring the fortress some time hereafter. By advice of the two secretaries, Townshend and Carteret, such a letter was written by the King on the 29th of April, assuring His Catholic Majesty "of my readiness to satisfy you with regard to the restitution of Gibraltar, upon the

* To Mr. Schaub, March 28, 1720.

† Earl Stanhope to Secretary Craggs, October 1, 1720. See Appendix.

footing of an equivalent, promising you to make use of the first favourable opportunity to regulate this article with the consent of my Parliament. But when William Stanhope delivered this letter to the King and Queen of Spain at Aranjuez, they made so many cavils and objections to the word EQUIVALENT, which, they said, would render the letter useless,* that, at their solicitation, George the First consented to write another letter on the 1st of June, omitting the clause in question.† It was the conviction of the Ministers that the letter, even thus mutilated, left the affair entirely to the discretion of Parliament, who might refuse the cession altogether, or demand any equivalent they pleased.

Philip, however, considered, or affected to consider, the promise as unconditional; and it was always thus represented in his negotiations. Nevertheless there seems reason to believe, that if the English Parliament could have been brought to approve the cession upon the footing of an equivalent, Philip would soon have consented to yield the latter. In January, 1722, William Stanhope writes from Madrid:-"It is very unfortunate that our hands are tied as to Gibraltar, so as not to take advantage of this immoderate desire the King of Spain has to obtain it; for were it otherwise, notwithstanding the pretended promise of it, I am fully persuaded we might yet sell it for double its worth in advantages to our commerce."

At Cambray, numerous petty obstacles delayed the opening, and blighted the hopes, of the Congress. At Madrid the negotiations for Gibraltar continued to drag on with the usual slow pace of Spaniards, who, as they say themselves, are born doing business, pass their life in doing business, and die without having done any !§ Yet Philip did not relinquish his pursuit. To gain this darling object was one of his motives for rushing so eagerly into the Vienna alliance, and he then peremptorily told William Stanhope, that the immediate restitution of Gibraltar was the only means to prevent a war. Stanhope answered, that at all events it could not be done. without Parliament, which was not then sitting. "No!" exclaimed the Queen, who was present: "Why then let the King, your master, return from Germany and call a Parliament expressly for that purpose. The matter once fairly proposed would not meet with one negative in either House. Let this short argument be once made use of; either give up Gibraltar, or your trade to the Indies and Spain, and the matter, I will answer for it, would not admit of a moment's debate!"|| Unhappily, however, the two Houses, not

* William Stanhope to Lord Carteret, May 29, 1721, N. S. Hardwicke Papers. See this letter in the original French; Commons' Journals, vol. xxi. p. 285. To Sir Luke Schaub. Coxe's House of Bourbon, vol. iii. p. 22.

"Nacimos arreglando, vivemos arreglando, y por fin moriremos sin haber arreglado

nada." See Mr. Slidell's' Spain Revisited, vol. ii. p. 330.

1

William Stanhope to Lord Townshend, August 6, 1725. Coxe's Walpole.

[The late Captain Alexander Slidell Mackenzie of the United States Navy. He took the name of "Mackenzie." After gaining considerable distinction both by authorship and by active service in his profession, he died in 1848.]

having the benefit of hearing this Royal reasoning, were not convinced by it; and Philip, finding his threats as unsuccessful as his entreaties had been before, at length laid siege to the fortress, as I have already mentioned, in 1727. The siege failed, and he signed the preliminaries at the Pardo; but still, in discussing a definitive treaty, continued to claim the former promise, and to urge the expected cession.

The views of the English Cabinet at this period were still the same-anxious to pacify the Spaniards, but afraid to lose their popularity at home. In 1728 we find a letter from Mr. Poyntz to his patron, Lord Townshend, observing that "after we carry the point of Gibraltar the Spaniards will leave no stone unturned to hurt our commerce and to distress us into compliance;" and that "the Catholic King and all true Spaniards are animated against us by this single consideration." Townshend, in answer, declares, "What you propose in relation to Gibraltar is, certainly, very reasonable, and is exactly conformable to the opinion which you know I have always entertained concerning that place. But you cannot but be sensible of the violent and almost superstitious zeal which has of late prevailed among all parties in this kingdom, against any scheme for the restitution of Gibraltar, upon any conditions whatsoever; and I am afraid that the bare mention of a proposal which carried the most distant appearance of laying England under an obligation of ever parting with that place would be sufficient to put the whole nation in a flame."*

Townshend had, indeed, good reason for his fear of parliamentary or popular resistance. From the Spanish complaints the Opposition had obtained a clue to the letter of George the First, in 1721; and they now raised an outcry on two grounds: first, that there should be any idea of ceding the fortress at all; and, secondly, because, as they alleged, the ministry had disgraced the King and nation by breaking a solemn promise, however wrongly made, from whence they inferred that the war was unjust on the part of England, and that Philip was merely claiming his due. A motion to produce King George's letter was brought forward by Mr. Sandys, in February, 1727, warmly supported by Wyndham and Pulteney. Walpole replied that such a promise had, indeed, been made in a former administration, but that he could assure the House it was only a conditional promise, and void by the refusal of Spain to comply with the terms required; and that as to producing the King's letter, he held that the private letters of Princes were almost as sacred as their very persons. The motion was rejected by a large majority.

In 1729, however, the onset was renewed in the other House. No resistance was then made by the Ministers to produce the Royal letter, probably because it had already been published abroad. This

* Mr. Poyntz to Lord Townshend, June 9, 1728. Lord Townshend to Mr. Poyntz, June 14, 1728.