these great works, and greater designs, Stanhope publicly observed, "If Spain goes on at this rate, and has the same success in the other establishments she has in view, there is no power will be able to resist her!"* The Spaniards on their part, roused by their own successes, might be pardoned for assuming a prouder tone, and displaying their high national spirit; they might speak more slightingly than ever of all foreign nations, and forget at the moment that they had a Frenchman for their King, an Italian for their Minister, and a Fleming for their General!

From negotiations at Madrid, let us now turn to warfare in Sicily. The Piedmontese had become very unpopular in the island; many towns and districts rose in insurrection against them; and in one, Caltanisetta,† forty of their soldiers were butchered by the savage peasantry. The only places that could offer any resistance were Syracuse, Trapani, Melazzo, and Messina; in the first of which Maffei, the Viceroy, had taken refuge; but it was against the latter that De Lede directed his arms, leaving only a small detachment to the westward for the blockade of Trapani. To march along the Sicilian coast is by no means an easy task, from the great number of FIUMARAS, which have never any bridges to cross them, and which, according to the season, display either swollen and impetuous torrents, or dry and rugged beds of huge stones. The Spanish infantry was, accordingly, transported to Messina by sea; while only the cavalry proceeded along the shore, its vanguard commanded by the Marquis de Villadarias, the old and gallant adversary of the English in the Bay of Cadiz, and on the field of Almenara.

The city of Messina gladly opened its gates to the invaders; but the citadel, which had a garrison of 2500 Piedmontese, required a regular siege; and trenches were opened against it on the 31st of July. Its safety was an object of the deepest solicitude to the Austrians in the kingdom of Naples, foreseeing that they themselves would infallibly be the next object of attack. Their Viceroy, Count Daun, was a brave and skilful officer; but the troops under his orders were few;§ and it is certain that, had he been left only to his German soldiers (the Neapolitan are scarcely worth reckoning), he would, so far from assisting Maffei, have speedily shared his fate.

But the mighty arm of England was already outstretched for his succour. On the very day after the investment of Messina, the

This is a testimony to which Alberoni referred with pride after his fall. See his Apology, Hist. Register, 1722, p. 208.

This is, I presume, the Cantanieta of San Phelipe. The Spanish writers are often careless as to names. One of their strangest blunders relates to Syracuse, which, from a resemblance of sounds, they sometimes confound with the capital of Aragon, and call Zaragoza de Sicilia.

There is a proverbial saying in Sicily, that the island contains only un monte, un fonte, e un ponte; meaning Etna, Arethusa, and a bridge over the Salso near Alicata. (Capt. Sinyth's Sicily, p. 199.)

According to St. Simon there were only 6000 foot and 1500 horse in the kingdom. (Mém. vol. xvi. p. 279, ed. 1829.) Tindal speaks of eight or twelve thousand. (Hist. vol. vii. p. 214.) Considering how long a Spanish invasion of Naples had been expected by the Emperor, even the highest of these numbers appears incredibly small.

fleet of Sir George Byng anchored in the Bay of Naples. The possibility of an attack upon Sicily had not been overlooked in the Admiral's instructions; he was directed, in that case, "with all his power to hinder and obstruct the same;" and he, therefore, immediately landed, to concert measures with Count Daun. He was informed that the last letters from Vienna gave hopes of the King of Sicily's speedy accession to the Quadruple Alliance, his Majesty having already requested the aid of the Imperial troops, and consented to admit them into the Sicilian fortresses. Under these circumstances, it was resolved that Daun should despatch, and Byng convoy, a detachment of 2000 German infantry to the garrison of Messina. These men being embarked in TARTANAS, the Admiral bore away for the straits of the Faro; but still hoping to prevent hostilities, he sent his first captain to the Marquis de Lede with a conciliatory letter, proposing a suspension of arms for two months. This overture being civilly declined, he put the Germans, for safety, into Reggio, and sailed through the Faro in search of the Spanish fleet.

The Spanish Admirals, meanwhile, were benumbed by that indecision which, in military matters, is perhaps still more pernicious than error. Castañeta does not appear to have been guided by any positive orders from his Government; but was directed, in all difficulties, to apply to Patiño, the INTENDENTE, as he was called, of the whole expedition, who, having been eighteen years a Jesuit, may be presumed to have had somewhat less of naval than of religious or political knowledge. From fear of responsibility, or ignorance of details, Patiño gave only a very vague answer, amounting to little more than that the Spanish fleet should provide for its safety. A council of officers, convened thereupon, and comprising, besides Castañeta, the Rear-Admirals Mari, Chacon, and Cammock, could scarcely be said to deliberate; it only wavered. Much loose conversation passed; no useful resolution was taken. The only sensible scheme was that of Cammock, an Irishman in the Pretender's interest and the Spaniards' service, who proposed that they should remain at anchor in the road of Messina, ranging their ships in line of battle, with their broadsides to the sea, by which means they might not only have been supported by the batteries and troops on shore, but, from the variety and force of the currents, would have rendered a regular attack upon them extremely difficult, if not impracticable.* This proposal being over-ruled, the Admirals put out to sea, without any fixed determination either to fight or to retreat; but continued lingering and hovering, first off Cape Spartivento, and then off Cape Passaro, until in the morning of the 11th of Au

The station of the Spanish fleet was at a beautiful bay called Il Paradiso, about two miles north of Messina. About a century after the action, it was viewed by a very experienced and intelligent naval officer (Capt. Smyth), who observes, that “had the fleet remained at anchor there (as Cammock proposed), it would have been very difficult to annoy it." (Sicily and its Islands, p. 112.) Among the Stuart Papers I have found "his Majesty's private instructions to Admiral George Cammock."

*

gust they saw Byng and his squadron close upon them. The British fleet was superior in force as well as in discipline; for, though the Spaniards had most ships, several of these were only brigs or armed merchantmen, whilst none of the British vessels carried less than fifty guns. On the approach of the English, Mari and six men-ofwar, which were separated from the main fleet of the Spaniards, drew nearer to the Sicilian coast; and Byng despatched a division, under Captain Walton, to intercept them. There seems little doubt that the English Admiral would not have shrunk from the responsibility of the first attack; but the firing, in fact, was begun by Mari's ships, and, being returned by the English, there ensued a general engagement. A slight breeze, which sprung up, carried the English fleet into the very midst of the Spanish, and mingled the ships of both nations together. The Spaniards, without order and concert, and vessel after vessel, attacked in succession by a superior force, found even the highest courage, the most stubborn resistance, unavailing. Castañeta himself, as bold in action as irresolute in council, endeavoured to cheer his seamen by the most determined bravery; and even when wounded in both legs, this Spanish Widdrington still continued to fight upon his stumps. But both his efforts and his example were in vain. Even had the English been fewer, I may be pardoned for believing that they would still have been victorious. Castañeta was made prisoner, and the greater part of his fleet either taken or destroyed. Admiral Cammock alone, with ten ships of war, forced his way from the battle, and found shelter in the port of La Valetta. In an opposite direction Mari had also made his escape with some ships of the line; but Captain Walton, being sent in pursuit, compelled them to surrender. Walton's report, on this occasion, is remarkable for simplicity, the usual attendant and the surest recommendation of merit. It was merely, "Sir, we have taken and destroyed all the Spanish ships which were upon the coast: the number as per margin." A naval writer well observes, that the ships which Captain Walton thrust into his margin would have furnished matter for some pages in a French relation.‡

The loss of the English in the action of Passaro was not considerable; only one ship, the Grafton, suffered severely. To have thus annihilated the Spanish armada might be thought something more than merely a declaration of war; yet Byng affected not to consider it as such, and sent a complimentary letter to De Lede, urging that

The total number of guns in the English fleet was 1400, in the Spanish 1284; and two vessels included in the latter list were not in the action, having been sent to Malta under Admiral Guevara. (Campbell's Lives of the Admirals, vol. iv. p. 427 and 438.) †That the Spaniards began the action is always urged in the English State Papers of this period, and is distinctly admitted by San Phelipe (Coment. vol. ii. p. 195). The Spanish historian is somewhat testy at this battle. He observes, that the English are superior seamen to the Spaniards, because they study nothing else (porque estos no tienen otro oficio), but that the Spanish courage is far higher (imponderable valor, mas que las Ingleses!) (p. 191 and 195).

Campbell's Admirals, vol. iv. p. 428.

the Spaniards had begun the battle, and that they ought not to look upon this accident as a rupture between the two nations. This compliment, it may well be supposed, was very coldly received by men still smarting under the loss and shame of their defeat. Nor did it deaden their zeal for the reduction of Messina; on the contrary, they pushed their attacks with so much vigour, that, in spite of the efforts of the Austrian troops at Reggio, and the activity of the British fleet in the straits, the place surrendered at the close of September; and Byng thereupon sailed back with his squadron to Naples.

The conduct of the English Admiral in fighting the Spanish fleet was entirely approved by the English ministry. It is remarkable that Stanhope, who had left Spain before any news of the action had arrived,* writes to Byng from Bayonne on the 2d of September, recommending the very course which the Admiral had already taken: "Nothing has passed at Madrid which should divert you from pursuing the instructions you have... . . If you should have an opportunity of attacking the Spanish fleet, I am persuaded you will not let such an occasion slip; and I agree perfectly in opinion with what is recommended to you by Mr. Secretary Craggs, that the first blow you give should, if possible, be decisive. The two great objects which I think we ought to have in view are, to destroy their fleet if possible, and to preserve such a footing in Sicily as may enable us to land an army there.' The manner in which the Admiral had anticipated these directions was much praised; even the Spaniards acknowledged his high personal merit; and, on his return from his command, this brave and skilful officer was deservedly raised to the rank of Viscount Torrington.

The high-flown hopes which Alberoni had cherished of the Spanish armament may give us some idea of his burst of rage at its defeat. He wrote to the Marquis de Monteleon in most vehement terms, loudly complaining of breach of faith, and commanding that minister to depart immediately from England. His letter and the ambassador's to Mr. Craggs, were also, by his direction, made public in London, with the view of raising a national ferment against the ministry. But the indignation of Alberoni was not confined to words; he gave orders, in direct violation of the Treaty of Commerce, to seize the British goods and vessels in the Spanish ports, and to dismiss the British Consuls from the Spanish territory. Numerous privateers also were fitted out and sent forth against the British traders. Yet it is remarkable that, in spite of these mutual injuries, the breach was not yet considered complete and decisive, and that a declaration of war from England was still withheld.

Coxe conjectures that "before Earl Stanhope quitted the capital, some intelligence of the discomfiture of the fleet probably reached Alberoni." (House of Bourbon, vol. ii. p. 330.) But this is certainly an error. The action was fought on the 11th, Lord Stanhope set out on the 26th; and on examining the dates at which other tidings of the Sicilian army reached Madrid, it will be found that they never came in so short a time. Nor could a vessel be speedily despatched from a fleet just defeated and dispersed. Nor is Coxe's supposition to be reconciled with Alberoni's burst of indignation at the first public announcement of the battle.

We are also assured that an edict was published at Madrid by beat of drum, prohibiting all persons from speaking of the disaster of the fleet; an order which, as it seems suited only for the meridian of Tunis or Algiers, I should have thought utterly incredible in Spain, were it not recorded by most unimpeachable authority.*

Alberoni himself, irritated and not dismayed by his reverses, haughtily persevered in his domestic preparations and foreign cabals; and I shall now proceed to relate the issue of his manifold schemes in Holland, Piedmont, Sweden, France, and England.

The commercial jealousy of the Dutch, and their natural slowness, were turned to the best advantage by the Marquis Beretti Landi, the Spanish ambassador. He had, however, an able antagonist in the minister from England, Earl Cadogan, whose great influence with the States rested not merely on his talents and services, but also on his known intimacy with the Duke of Marlborough, and on his marriage with a Dutch lady of powerful connections. Neither of these distinguished rivals altogether prevailed. Cadogan, indeed, obtained the accession of Holland to the Quadruple Alliance; but Landi delayed it for several months, and until the cause of Spain. had been struck by further disasters.

At the Court of Turin there was no such opportunity for hesitation; the difficulties of Victor Amadeus were pressing and immediate. He found his kingdom of Sicily at the same time claimed by Charles and attacked by Philip. No succour, no hope appeared for him in any quarter; on the one side stood the Quadruple Allies, presenting the treaty and demanding his signature, and on the other side there gleamed 30,000 Spanish bayonets against him. Even after the expedition to Sicily, Alberoni had not altogether lost his hope of cajoling Victor Amadeus: he represented the conquest of the island as only a precautionary measure to prevent its transfer from its rightful owner, and expressed an ardent zeal for the preservation of the Peace of Utrecht. But the artifice was too gross, and easily seen through.† The King of Sicily determined, that if he must lose his island, he would at least incline to that power which offered a positive, though insufficient compensation for it; he therefore broke off all intercourse with Spain, acceded to the Quadruple Alliance, and consented to give over to Imperial troops the remaining fortresses of Syracuse, Melazzo, and Trapani. His regal title of Sicily was soon after exchanged for that of Sardinia, still held by his descendants; and this was perhaps the only negotiation which the House of Savoy had ever yet carried on without extracting from it some advantage.

In Sweden and Russia, the schemes of Alberoni seemed at first more hopeful; and, according to his own expression, there was reason to expect that the northern clouds would break in thunder and

* "On publie au son du tambour une défense de parler du désastre de la flotte." (Duc de St. Aignan to the Regent, Sept. 17, 1718. Mém. de Noailles, vol. v. p. 96.)

"Esta carta (del Cardinal) en la realidad era absolutamente inutil, y no debiera haber Alberoni perdido tiempo en ella." (Ortiz Compendio, vol. vii. p. 336.)