But to what result this alarming question might have tended can still only be matter of conjecture, for, happily, the apprehended crisis never came. The remonstrances which Sir John Norris had been instructed to make, combined with those of the Danish Court, and probably also of the Austrian agents, proved sufficient to deter the Czar from his projects against Mecklenburg, and induce him to re-embark the greater part of his troops; and thus was quietly averted an enterprise which it seemed almost equally dangerous for England to suffer or repel.

Whilst, however, the Russian expedition seemed to be impending, the King justly considered it of the utmost importance to lose no time in concluding his treaty with France. "Such was the impatience of some people," says Stanhope to Townshend, "that I assure you I have had much ado for this fortnight last past to withstand the importunity of M. Bernsdorf* and others, who pressed me to frame an article here with the Abbé (Dubois), touching Mardyke, and to send him with it to the Hague, with orders to Mr. Walpole to sign it; so apprehensive were they of your delays in England. I did resolutely withstand this." But when, on the 6th of October, N. S., the article, as settled by Lord Townshend himself in England, reached Hanover, Stanhope, seeing no further objection, and impressed with the necessity of speedily closing with France, cheerfully complied with the King's repeated injunctions, and signed the preliminary agreement with Dubois. It was at the same time agreed that the Abbé should immediately proceed to the Hague, and there sign the treaty in form with the English plenipotentiaries, General, lately created Lord, Cadogan, and Horace Walpole. To the latter Stanhope wrote as follows:-"I must recommend to you, by the best means you are able, to dispose the Pensionary and our other friends in Holland to give the greatest despatch to our business, that they also may be ready to sign without loss of time. But if you find that the forms of proceeding in Holland will occasion a necessary delay, I desire you will send me your opinion whether it will not then be the properest course for you to acquaint the Pensionary with the reasons his Majesty has to get the French tied down immediately by something under their hand, and for that purpose that you and the Abbé should sign the treaty; but with this express agreement on both sides, that the States are to be admitted into it as parties as soon as the necessary forms of their proceeding will allow them to come in."† In a despatch to Secretary Methuen,

* Bernsdorf had a strong personal interest in the Mecklenburg affair; his chief estate (three villages) being in that duchy. These three villages are described some years afterwards as still the mainspring of his political views. Lord Stanhope to Secretary Craggs, July 10, 1719. Appendix.

† Despatch, Oct. 6, 1716, N. S. Coxe's Walpole, vol. ii. p. 98. The reader will find in another part of Coxe's Walpole, (vol. ii. p. 310,) a letter from Townshend to Stanhope, dated Sept. 15, 1716, and enclosing another from Lord Bolingbroke to Sir William Wyndham, according to which there seemed every reason to expect immediately a fresh attempt from the Jacobites. It seemed therefore of the utmost importance that the Pretender should be forced to cross the Alps as soon as possible, and this still further explains the haste for the French treaty.

Stanhope adds, that, in the King's opinion, the Dutch cannot possibly take it amiss, since the clause for their accession would fully secure their interests; that the full powers lodged at the Hague, and intended for the three powers' signing jointly, may possibly not be sufficient to authorise a separate signature; but that, in such a case, it was his Majesty's pleasure that proper powers should be forthwith sent from England.

It is to be observed, that during the whole progress of this negotiation, the British plenipotentiaries at the Hague had made frequent and positive assurances to the States that the treaty should not be finally concluded without including them. On the part of the States there was still no objection raised to the treaty itself, but it was found that the slowness of Dutch forms would prevent their signature for some time longer. Under these circumstances, it was the opinion of Stanhope that the urgency of northern affairs rendered it impossible to admit of such delay, and that the spirit of the engagement to the States would be fully and honourably performed by the clause which stipulated that they should, as soon afterwards as they pleased, be admitted as parties to the treaty. Such was also the view of the subject taken by Cadogan. But the second plenipotentiary, Horace Walpole, espoused the opposite sentiment with the utmost vehemence. "I cannot, for my life, see why the whole system of affairs in Europe should be entirely subverted on account of Mecklenburgh. . . . . . I had rather starve, nay die, than do a thing that gives such a terrible wound to my honour and conscience. I should look upon it as no better than declaring myself a villain under my own hand. . . . . I will lay my patent of reversion in the West Indies, nay, even my life, at his Majesty's feet, sooner than be guilty of such an action;"-these are amongst the expressions of his letters. He ended by an earnest request both to Stanhope and Townshend, that he might be permitted to return home, and leave the signing of the treaty to his colleague alone.

Whether the scruples of Horace Walpole in this instance be thought well or ill founded, they at all events deserve that respect and esteem due even to the excess of honourable and punctilious feelings. It may, however, be questioned whether he is still entitled to the same praise when we find him, to relieve himself from his perplexing situation, secretly suggesting to his brother-in-law, Lord Townshend, the idea of raising up fictitious obstacles in the way of the King's orders for the utmost despatch. "Is it impossible," he asks, "that the unanswerable arguments of our friends in Holland, the contrary winds, the usual delays in passing powers under the Great Seal, or some other excuses that may be proper to be made to the Abbé, should prevent our signing with him before the States are ready?"*

Lord Townshend, a man of the highest honour and probity, was

• Coxe's Walpole, vol. ii. p. 105.

utterly incapable of any such official treachery as pretending to obey whilst in reality opposing the injunctions of his sovereign. In his answer to Horace Walpole, through his secretary Poyntz, it is plainly declared, that though "his Lordship is entirely of your opinion as to the inconveniences that are to be apprehended from signing this treaty separately, yet he thinks you cannot well decline the King's positive commands; at least no relief is to be obtained against them from hence." Lord Townshend himself, in a subsequent letter of explanation to M. de Slingeland, condemns the idea. of eluding the King's intentions as "a pitiful artifice and evasion."* By some singular accidents, however, his conduct bore a very great appearance of what he so strongly and so sincerely condemned. On the 28th of September he had written to Hanover, dissuading a separate signature; but admitting that, if it should be resolved upon, the powers already sent to the plenipotentiaries at the Hague would be quite sufficient for that purpose. Only four days afterwards he wrote again, saying that the powers were insufficient, and that new ones would be necessary, without, at the same time, giving his reasons for the change in his judgment. This omission, which proceeded only from haste or spleen, was not unnaturally imputed by the King and by Stanhope to his concurrence in the views of Horace Walpole, and his determination to find pretexts for delay. Another incident now arose to strengthen and confirm these suspicions. The new full powers forwarded by Townshend were found to be drawn up in the most general and guarded terms, not making the slightest mention of the treaty with France, and seeming, therefore, as if they were purposely intended to avoid any thing like an approval or recognition of it from the British Cabinet. Abbé Dubois considered these powers much too loose and vague to be secure; he refused to sign the treaty upon them,† and it became necessary again to send to England for fresh powers. Lord Townshend afterwards satisfactorily accounted for these suspicious circumstances in his conduct. "The full power," he says, "was conceived in general terms, including all particulars, and therefore, as was thought here, the better fitted to suit all unforeseen circumstances that might arise. . . . Mr. Methuen himself concluded the treaty of Portugal in virtue of such a full power; and several others have done the like, without any one's making the objection now started by Abbé Dubois."‡ Subsequently, in a private letter, Lord Townshend adds,

...

* Coxe's Walpole, vol. ii. p. 159.

"L'Abbé Dubois manda aussi-tôt au Duc d'Orléans qu'il était impossible de ne pas voir dans cet incident l'effet d'une intrigue ministérielle, dont le but était de prolonger la négociation jusqu'à l'ouverture du Parlement où l'on comptait bien la faire entièrement avorter." (Mém. de Sevelinges, vol. i. p. 229.) In a previous letter Dubois observed, "Que Lord Stanhope lui avait avoué que si la conclusion de l'alliance se remettait jusqu'à l'ouverture du Parlement d'Angleterre, l'autorité qu'il pouvait avoir dans la Chambre Basse et le crédit de Robert Walpole ne seraient pas suffisans pour empêcher l'opposition d'attaquer et même de faire rompre l'alliance." (Ibid. p. 223.)

Letter to the King, Nov. 11, O. S, 1716. Coxe's Walpole. On the other hand, Stanhope, in his letter to Townshend of Nov. 11, N. S., complains, “Que l'on s'est écarté de la route commune, et des formes constamment usitées ;" and this appears to be

"Indeed, the true reason of my choosing to have them drawn in general terms was, that if the King should think it necessary to have his ministers sign separately before those of the States, that separate instrument might, according to his Majesty's intentions, be afterwards perfectly sunk upon our signing all together, and no footsteps of any such order appear in the full powers whenever they should come to be made public together with the treaty."* These explanations fully acquit Lord Townshend of any treacherous design. But when the news of Dubois's objection, and of the consequent difficulties and delays, reached Hanover, without any explanation at all from Lord Townshend, who, on the contrary, in his later despatches, studiously and pointedly abstained from noticing in any manner the signature of the preliminary agreement with Dubois, and who had even dropped a hint of his own resignation,† it is no wonder that both the King and Stanhope should have believed Lord Townshend to have completely espoused the views of Horace Walpole, and participated in the violent language of the latter. "All this together," writes Stanhope, "makes me think that what I have done here is so highly disapproved of, that special care is taken not to make a single step in acknowledgment of it, and that it will be for me alone to answer for what I did in pursuance of the King's repeated orders, on reasons which I consider most justly founded, and which. I shall be ready to maintain against all those who may think proper to assail them." On the whole, whilst fully admitting that Townshend's conduct was free from blame, I cannot but think the appearances against him so strong, as no less fully to justify the suspicion and resentment of Stanhope.

We are now come to the celebrated schism in the great Whig administration of George the First. Stanhope, under the influence of the feelings I have just mentioned, immediately went to the King (they were then at the hunting seat of Gohre), and tendered his resignation. The King, however, would by no means accept it, being scarcely less offended than himself at Lord Townshend's supposed behaviour, and having at the same time against that minister and Robert Walpole other motives of displeasure, to which I have not yet alluded. With all his great merits (and I believe that there never lived a more upright and well-meaning man), it could scarcely be denied, even by Townshend's warmest partisans, that he was sometimes careless in his business, violent and overbearing in his manner. George the First, who seldom either neglected his affairs, or forgot his dignity, had early perceived these occasional deficiencies in his minister, and, during his absence from England, they

greatly confirmed by what passed at the Hague: "L'Abbé Dubois avait cependant offert de se contenter de ce plein pouvoir, pourvu que Lord Cadogan l'assurât par écrit qu'il était dans une forme usitée en Angleterre. Mais ce ministre s'était refusé à donner cette assurance. Mém. Sécrets de Sevelinges, vol. i. p. 230.

To M. Slingeland, Jan. 1, 1717, O. S. Coxe's Walpole.

+ Coxe's Walpole, vol. ii. p. 126, and 117.

Letter to Lord Townshend, Nov. 11, 1716, N. S. Coxe's Walpole.

were frequently repeated and exaggerated to him by his German favourites.

With Walpole also the King was, at this time, seriously at variance as to some money for the Munster and Saxe-Gotha troops. These had, under the authority of Parliament, been taken into the British service, at the time of the Pretender's landing in Scotland. On the suppression of the rebellion there was no further occasion for these auxiliaries; still, however, the agreement having been already signed, it became necessary to make some payment in dismissing them. This the King had advanced from his own resources, but now declared that Walpole had promised him to make good the sum from the British treasury; whilst Walpole, on the other hand, was no less positive in "protesting before God that I cannot recollect that ever the King mentioned one syllable of this to me or I to him, but my memory must fail me when his Majesty says the contrary." There seems no need to impeach the recollection or the veracity of either the Monarch or the Minister. George the First could speak no English; Walpole could speak no French nor German: the only channel of communication between them was bad Latin, and nothing could be more probable than that they should misunderstand each other.

All these and several other grounds of dissatisfaction with the brother ministers were improved to the best advantage by Baron Bothmar in England, and by the Duchess of Kendal at Hanover. The former, as Townshend vehemently declared, "has every day some infamous project or other on foot to get money;"† in which he was most properly, but sometimes perhaps a little roughly and unguardedly, checked by that Minister. At this time especially, he appears to have had hopes of a considerable sum from the French lands in the island of St. Christopher, which had been ceded to England at the Peace of Utrecht; and there is no doubt that his private correspondence with the King afforded him a full opportunity of retaliating upon those who caused his disappointment. The Duchess of Kendal, on her part, had undertaken, for what contemporaries term a "consideration," but posterity a "bribe," to obtain a peerage for Sir Richard Child, a Tory member of the House of

Walpole to Stanhope, Nov. 11, 1716, O. S. Coxe's Walpole. See the treaties for the Munster and Saxe-Gotha troops in the Commons' Journals, March 28, 1717.

Lord Townshend to Stanhope, Oct. 16, 1716, O. S. Coxe's Walpole. At a later period I find the following character of Bothmar in a letter from Craggs:-"C'est bien le plus faible raisonneur sur les affaires que j'aie à mon avis connu de ma vie. Quand les petits genies veulent faire les habiles gens ils ne manquent jamais de tomber dans la mauvaise foi, comme les femmes qui veulent, malgré nature être spirituelles, se jettent à corps perdu dans la médisance." To Mr. Schaub, July 21, 1719. Hardwicke Papers, vol. xxxvii.

Walpole says upon this, in a letter to Stanhope of Sept. 28, 1716, O. S. :—“I understand by Bothmar that the King is pretty much determined to have the whole produce at his own will and private direction; and what is suggested to bring this matter immediately into a transaction is the danger there may be that the Parliament may by some act or vote lay their hands upon it and prevent the King's intentions."-I find from the Commons' Journals that full returns on the value of these lands were moved for and ordered. April 12, 1717.