authority. Scaliger praifed Calvin for not commenting on it; and Whitby confeffes that he knew not what to make of it. At last, Dr. South, "having" as Mr. G. alleges, but with great injuftice we think, 66 more wit in his brain than pure religion in his heart, boldly denounced it as a wicked and mischievous book." We cannot conceive Mr. G. correct when he afcribes this language to Dr. South. This divine, however, he fays, "has been followed by all the tribes of Deifts, Infidels, and Atheists, ever fince; thofe lordly renegadoes' [we do not perceive the propriety of the epithet]" that ftyle themfelves MONTHLY REVIEWERS included." "In many inftances, thefe hypocrites have fhewn the cloven foot." This, he fays, has been lately proved by "the pious authors" of a publication of which we must confefs that we never heard before, but which, it appears, is intituled "A Review of the Anti-Jacobin, Critical, and Monthly Reviews."

Our author mentions a fermon in which it is afferted that the Apocalypfe is "barbarous even to folocifm in its style, of an involved con ftruction, and loaded with dark apparently wild allegory," together with a Review (he does not tell us what Review) for Feb. 1798, in which this falfe and shameful flander is declared to be "founded in critical juftice." He laments that the "fhepherds of Ifrael, the shepherds of the Church of England, fit in filence, with half clofed eyes and folded arms, without lifping out an accent to recal their flocks from wandering into the wilderness of this mifchievous error." (P. x.) There is, however, one late exception, he owns, to this general charge. It is furnished by an anonymous pamphlet, printed for Hatchard, 1802, and intituled "The Evidence of the Authenticity and Divine Inspiration of the Apocalypfe ftated." But this pamphlet examines only the external evidence. It is the object of our author's "Pill for the Atheist and Infidel" to display the internal.

In this differtation the divine authority of the Apocalypfe is faid to be "logically and philofophically proved." The logical part of the proof is contained in three formal fyllogifms, of which the two first, we think, might have been omitted. They contribute nothing to the force of the argument, and ferve only to demonftrate that Mr. G. was fkilled in metaphyfics. The firft is thus expressed:

"A knowledge of events, whether past, present, or to come, is neceffary to enable a man to defcribe and communicate right ideas of thofe events. But fuch is the limited nature of the intellectual faculties of man, that his knowledge of external objects is confined to things and events which have previously existed. Therefore it is impoffible that man can defcribe and communicate right ideas of events, by the natural agency of his intellectual powers." (P. 19.)

The major propofition, Mr. G. fays, "requires no demonftration." Yet a perfon, without being a caviller, might object that it is not selfevident. For a defcription of events, not yet in existence, may certainly, by divine infpiration be fuggefted to those who do not comprehend what they are made to describe. And, in fact, we have no reafon

to

to believe that the prophets understood the meaning of every prophecy which they uttered. In proof of the minor, Mr. G. enters into an examination of the procefs by which the mind acquires its knowledge of objects. But this logic feems not very correct. "The human mind," he fays, "perceives nothing of external things until their real archetypes are prefented and impreffed upon it through the organs of the body." (P. 20.) "But, as it is impoffible for archetypes of future events, which never exifted, to be impreffed upon the human mind, it is evident that it can know nothing of them." (P. 21.) From this principle of our author it evidently follows that past events which we have not seen are as incapable of being the fubject of knowledge as future. We know not, indeed, what he means by "the archetypes of events;" but fuch events are not now in existence any more than future events. And if, as our author feems to think, all knowledge of objects must be acquired by their being presented to the mind, and impreffed upon it, through the organs of the body, it is undeniable that the mind can have no knowledge but of objects prefent. The fecond fyllogifm is conceived in the following terms.

"God, who is infinitely perfect, poffeffes the fupernatural and spiritual quality of prescience, or a knowledge of all future events. But that being who poffelles a knowledge of future events can communicate it to other intellectual beings, capable of receiving it. Therefore God can communicate a knowledge of [future] events to his intellectual creature man, who is capable of receiving it." (P. 21.)

In the major of this fyllogifm, the word fupernatural is very improperly used. A fupernatural quality is one not naturally inherent in the being poffeffed of it, but conferred by fome fuperior power. But there is no power fuperior to God; and therefore all his attributes are natural to him. Of the truth of the propofition our author has attempted a proof, part of which is contained in this fingular sentence.

"It is a problem impoffible to be folved by the wit of man, how a God, who has created all things that have existed from all eternity, who has renovated, re-created, and fuftained them ever fince; and who can renovate, re-create, and sustain them to all eternity; or annihilate them at his pleasure; without having inceffantly and eternally módels or images as it were, or rather perfect ideas of them, at one intuitive view before his infinitely comprehenfive mind: and this knowledge of all things, paft, prefent, and to come; this omniscience, includes his prefcience, and is one of his peculiar attributes." (P. 22.)

Here the author's argument is, clearly, good, but it is strangely expreffed. For, 1. The fentence is grofsly ungrammatical, there being no verb to the nominative God. 2. What Mr. G. means by recreating things, and things, too, that have exifted from all eternity, we are unable to conceive. But we fhall now transcribe his laft fyllogifm, which is of the hypothetical form.

"If man neither has nor can acquire prefcience, or a knowledge of future events, by his own natural powers; if God alone poffeffes fuch knowledge,

and

1

and can communicate it to man; and if St. John, in the Apocalypfe, has foretold many extraordinary events, which were impoffible to be foreseen by man, and which have come to pafs in after ages, with all the predicted circumstances; then it neceflarily follows that St. John must have received his prefcience and his ideas of future events from God; and written the Apocalypfe under divine inspiration." (Pp. 23, 24.)

The two firft pofitions our author confiders as fufficiently proved in the first and fecond fyllogifms. The remainder of the effay is, therefore, confined to the proof of the third pofition, which supposes 1. That the Apocalypfe contains a prediction of many extraordinary events, which were to come to país; and, 2. That many of those events have actually come to pass.

Our author first adverts to the kind of language in which this and the other prophecies are written. "It is ingeniously compofed of hieroglyphics, fymbols and allegories, taken from the natural, to represent to the mind the things and events of the moral world." It is, he thinks, the moft correct of all languages. "Each figure has a literal and moral fenfe annexed to it, and to which it refers with the niceft accuracy, and indeed with abfolute certainty." We are afraid that this is faying rather too much. At least, if what is here said be literally true, it would feem that the knowledge of this language is loft: for otherwife we should not obferve fuch difcordance among the interpreters of it. But that it was well understood by the antients our author contends from the infcriptions yet remaining on the Egyptian monuments; from the traces to be found of it in the Oriental poets; and particularly from the hiftory of the Patriarchs. And here he gives us a very curious paraphrafe on Jacob's interpretation of Jofeph's dream, as recorded in Gen. xxxvii. 9, 10. This paraphrafe, we think, deferves to be inferted; for, though, at first, it may appear a little ludicrous, it is perfectly juft.

"The sun is, as it were, the head, the enlightener and preferver of the natural world; and I bear this resemblance to it: I am the head, the inftructor and preferver, under God, of my family, my little world: the fun is, therefore, an hieroglyphic devife of me, in my patriarchal and moral cha racter. The moon is a body of the natural world, of lefs importance, and is, as it were, fubordinate to the fun, receiving that light from him which the communicates to other bodies under her. My wife is the weaker vessel, with less fortitude, and subordinate to me, and from me receives instruction respecting the management of my houthold: the moon is, therefore, an emblem of her. The stars are bodies subordinate to the sun, and attached to him by the laws of attraction and gravitation, and receive their light from him" [Here our author has, certainly, not made the patriarch a very enlightened philofopher; but, perhaps, he was, in fact, not much more enlightened, in this respect, than he is here represented.] "So my children are fubordinate and attached to me by confanguinity and the moral principle, and from me receive light and inftruction: hence the eleven stars denote my eleven fons, exclufive of Jofeph the dreamer.” (P. 26.)

Before our author proceeds directly to prove "that many of the

events foretold in the Apocalypfe have actually come to pass," he thinks it neceffary "previously to confider what was [were] the great defign and use of prophecy; and why it confifted with infinite wifdom to introduce it into his two covenants made with man for his redemption." (P. 28.) On the fubject of God's covenants with man, our author's ideas feem very confused; or, rather, he seems to have had no confiftent conception of them at all. He calls the Apocalypse "a history of the future judgments of the Father, during the continuance of the fecond covenant, the period of his grace and spiritual difpenfation.” (P. 29.) From this it would appear that, according to him, there was no covenant of grace, or spiritual difpenfation, till the coming of Chrift. In p. 43, he talks of "the neceffity of a new Revelation to revive the fear of God in the hardened hearts of finful man, [men], during the covenant of grace; for otherwise he [they] would be in a more forlorn and wretched state than under the covenant of works." Hence it seems to follow that, in Mr. G.'s opinion, till the coming of Chrift, mankind were under a covenant of works. Yet in p. xiii. of his introduction to this tract, he fays that "the first and great prophecy (Gen. iii. 15.) is the flock out of which all the prophecies of both Teftaments grow; and that the commencement of its completion may not improperly be dated from the time [when] God, in the abundance of his mercy and love for his fallen creatures, condefcended to offer them terms of falvation from mount Sinai." But the Mofaic covenant can, with no propriety, be confidered as containing the first offer of terms of falvation; nor was it, at all, a diftinct covenant of Grace. The fact is, that ever fince the fall of Adam, there has been but ONE covenant of Grace, eftablished in the mediation of the univerfal Redeemer, and fully made known only in the gospel. And even this covenant is, in one sense of the words, a covenant of works, inafmuch as good works are indifpenfible conditions required to entitle mankind to the benefits of it.

After a long and defultory digreffion concerning the ufe and intent of prophecy, in which digreffion are found many moft fanciful notions, our author comes directly to fhew that events foretold in the Apocalypfe have literally come to pass. For this purpose he fixes on the fixth chapter, of feveral verfes of which he gives an explanation. His object is to tranflate the fymbolical language of the prophet into the language of common life; and to fhew how exactly the prophecy was fulfilled. Of his fuccefs in this attempt we fhall produce fome fpecimens; and a few, we are perfuaded, will be thought fufficient.

The firft verfe explained by our author is the fecond of the chapter. This verse he fays, under four diftinét figures, gives us a brief view of the prophet's whole fubject. The firft figure is that of a white borje. Now this white horfe means the true Church of Christ. For (reader attend) as a horfe is an animal, powerful, perfevering, useful, and easily managed; fo the true Church of Chrift is fo powerful, under the fpirit of its divine ruler, that it is not only to overcome the heathen world, but even the fecond death." (P. 50.) Our author fhews how the Church is equally entitled to the epithets of perfevering and

NO. LXXXIII, VOL. XXI.

C

useful.

ufeful. Again, with regard to the colour of the horse, we are told that, as "white or light, comprehends all the orders of colours, fo the word of God in the Church [for now the horse is not the Church itfelf but the word of God] comprehends the pure order of all truths." In confirmation of this expofition, our author obferves that "Chrift, at his transfiguration, on account of his quickening and purifying fpirit, is faid to have had 'raiment white as light." And that the Church of Chrift, at his reign upon earth, are to follow him upon white horfes [that is, if our author's former explanation of the term borfes was right, upon white Churches] and clotlied in fair linen: white and clean to fhew the perfection of the word of God, in which they (his followers) are to be clothed." (P. 51.) How these examples, however, confirm our author's tranflation of this figure of a white horse, we do not well comprehend, any more than we comprehend how the followers of Christ are to be clothed with the word of God.

"In the next fentence of this verfe," fays Mr. G. "we read-FIG. 2. And be that fat upon him (the borse or Church) bad a bow." (ibid.) Here the author gives very ftrange information. "The firft figure of fitting upon a horse is taken from a king fitting upon his throne and prefiding over a nation." This we, certainly, should never have been able to discover. But at all events, "as the mere fitting upon a throne, or ruling over a nation, is no complete and perfect figure of its great ftrength and power, inasmuch as there are many weak and petty princes who fit upon thrones, fomething more was neceffary to convey the idea of the great influence and strength of the Church; and therefore, Chrift is farther reprefented as having a Bow,' the proper emblem of great strength and power." (P. 52.)

On the word fars, in the 13th. verfe of this chapter, Mr. G. obferves that a ftar in the fingular, is ufed to denote a king, or a great leader of an army, because their power is derived from fome higher authority." (P59.) From what higher authority, except that of God, is a king's power derived? We are fure that our loyal author did not think it derived from the people. But his explanation of the word heaven, in the fame verfe is inimitable. "The word heaven," he says, is often put for the exalted state and glory of any fyftem of religion; as for the Jewish and Chriftian Churches, and for the fyftem of heathen theology." (P. 60.) Here it is ufed for the latter. "But it is ufed for the former by the prophet Haggai (i. 9, 10.): Because of mine house that is waste, and ye run every one to his own house, therefore is the heaven (the Church) over you stayed from dew (or no longer feeds you with inftruction)". It undoubtedly, required no common degree of perverse ingenuity thus to torture one of the plaineft paffages in the Bible into a myftical fenfe. For the prophet thought not of the Church or of inftruction. His language is to be literally understood of the natural heaven, and of natural dew.

Of this perverfe inclination in our worthy author for myftical interpretation we shall give, from this tract, but one example more. It is, however, fuch a one as we have never yet feen equalled; and we fhall be fomewhat mortified if any of our readers be acquainted with any