front. Kutusoff having chased the French beyond the Dnieper, thought his task completed. But Tchi chagoff and Wittgenstein, from north and south watching the course of the Beresina, resolved to intercept Napoleon's passage. The army was now reduced to about 14,000 men; 500 mounted officers formed the emperor's guard, in lieu of the 35,000 veterans lately glorying in that name. To force the passage of the Beresina with a skeleton army was idle. Still Napoleon quitting the main road, and flinging himself amongst the forests, sought out the banks of the river. In these woods he fortunately stumbled on the corps of Victor. With what sad surprise did these soldiers regard the shattered remnant of their comrades from Moscow? The fated Beresina still reinained to be crossed. Both parties throughout the war, however, seemed to vie as to which should commit most blunders; and admiral Tchichagoff, miscalculating the designs of the French emperor, watched every place of passage, save the one actually attempted. Two frail bridges were thrown over the stream. Part of the army, once more respectable in numbers, crossed, and was able to defy Tchichagoff. But Wittgenstein was pressing on the eastern side. Victor, now intrusted with defending the rear, could scarcely hope to hold out, whilst the stragglers and rabble of the army passed over the bridges. One of his divisions was already cut off and taken, and Victor himself was driven to the water's edge, whilst the crowd still choked the passage, tumbled each other into the stream, or rushed amidst its floating ice, to escape the Russian bullets. In the midst of the terror and the rush, one of the bridges gave way, and the yell that arose (for women formed no small portion of the stragglers) was such as might appal even the heart of a soldier. At night Victor retreated across the stream, and destroyed the last bridge, leaving behind him his artillery, and crowds of prisoners. The Beresina froze completely in a short time after, forming a huge grave, in which the dead did not decay. In spring the Russians had leisure to count the bodies. They amounted to an army's number, between thirty and forty thousand. From the Beresina, crossed in the last days of November, he French pursued the road to Wilna, their first Russian conquest, presenting the appearance of a complete rout, the corps of Victor as disorganized as those of its more wearied comrades. Still there were 80,000 men, counting the garrison of Wilna. With these a stand might be made,—at least, a momentary one. But to repair the great disaster without an other army, such as Napoleon's personal presence and exertion could alone command from France now reluctant and despondent, was impossible. The political tidings from the 1813. NAPOLEON RETURNS TO PARIS. 261 capital were also disquieting. A conspiracy for the overthrow of the imperial power had nearly succeeded. The emperor, therefore, resolved to quit the army, and hasten to Paris. Leaving the command to Murat, Napoleon left Smorgoni on the road to Wilna in a sledge, accompanied by Caulaincourt duke of Vicenza. His apparition at Warsaw is related in lively terms by the abbé de Pradt, his envoy there. The con versation was a long soliloquy on the part of the emperor, in which he represented his fortunes as still capable of being repaired. But his oft-repeated comment of "There is but one step from the sublime to the ridiculous," showed how fully sensible he was to the magnitude of his fall. On the 18th of December he arrived at the Tuilleries quite unexpected by the empress. Thus did a year commenced by him at Dres den as a suzerain of monarchs, terminate in a hasty and dis graceful flight. CHAP. XI. THE FALL OF THE EMPIRE. It sometimes happens in history, as in life, that our sympathies refuse to obey our judgment; a circumstance that renders the task of narration difficult. At present, for instance, what war was ever more just, more sacred, more patriotic, than that which the Russians, and, at their voice, all Germany, rushed forward to wage against their victor and invader, Bonaparte? This man too, however heroic, is not unstained by crime. The liberties of his own country, the independence of Europe, had expired beneath his hand. He had shown himself selfish, ruthless in the pursuit of ambition; and still, with all this, such is the propensity which we have to worship power and grandeur of mind, that this very man excites our pity for his merited fall, his well-earned misfortune. The dramatic interest of his situation outbalances political judgment; and even the satisfaction with which a Briton must regard the destruction of the emperor of the French, is dashed by a high and generous sympathy for Napoleon. This generous sentiment has been avowed too boldly by one party, and decried and censured too inveterately by the other, both unavoidable consequences of contemporaneous feeling. But it is now time to cast away the prejudices and passions of the moment, and to assume the place and judgment of posterity with respect to scenes and persons past. The first view presented by affairs, on Napoleon's reaching Paris, was somewhat reassuring. Lor Wellington, victorious at Salamanca, had still retreated subsequen* to that battle, and Madrid remained in the hands of the French. The army he had left might rally, he hoped, upon the Niemen. At home, a daring conspiracy had nearly succeeded, on a report of the emperor's death; but the falsehood of this discovered, it had fallen of itself. The senate, the court, the capital, however stricken by the altered tone of the imperial bulletins, appeared still loyal and obsequious. The levies of 1813 awaited him. The artillery of the marine was at his disposition. He might count upon a formidable army, such as would at least check the advance of Russia. But darker and darker tidings came thick upon each other, to overshade these hopes. Macdonald had been deserted by the Prussian army under Yorck. Murat and the viceroy had fallen back upon the Oder; the former seizing the opportunity to desert the army altogether, and retire to Naples. Schwartzenberg had concluded, on the part of Austria, an armistice with Alexander, that might possibly grow into an alliance. Russia had concluded a treaty with England, and it seemed no longer possible to pacify one without contenting both. The entire defection of Prussia followed, announced by the flight of Frederic William from Potsdam, to meet the emperor Alexder at Breslau. This, as well as the advance of Wittgenstein, compelled the French to abandon the Oder for the Elbe, and limit their hopes of defence to this new frontier. Napoleon learned these tidings at Fontainbleau, where he was busied in making an arrangement with the pope. He hurried once more to his senate, declaring "what sufficed me yesterday cannot suffice to-day," and fresh levies, anticipating the conscription of years to come, were decreed. In March, Prussia joined Russia in war against France. Bernadotte, at the head of his Swedes, in the pay of England, now lifted his banner against the emperor. There remained but Austria neutral; and even had that court been bound, as was far from the case, by ties of gratitude towards Napoleon, it could scarcely resist the general outcry of all Germany to avenge and liberate itself. Napoleon left St. Cloud on the 15th of April. In a few days he was with his army, now once more on the Elbe and the Saale, reduced to fight near the field of Jena those Prussians whom it had conquered there. The emperor brought to the 40,000 men under the viceroy a new army of upwards of 80,000,―all, however, young soldiers that had never yet seen fire. "What shall we do with such sucking pigs?" exclaimed an old general on beholding them. The allies were in possession and in advance of Dresden. They marched on the 1st of May to prevent Napoleon from occupying Leipzig, and met 1813. LUTZEN AND BAUTZEN. 263 nim a short distance from that town, at Lutzen, the scene of the last victory aud death of Gustavus Adolphus. The Prussians, under Blucher, led the attack. The quarrel being now more German than Russian, it was for the Germans to bear the prunt. The Prussians were not backward to measure themselves with their enemies, and avenge their former defeats: but this they vainly attempted at Lutzen. Napoleon's young army, encouraged by his presence and words, repulsed every effort and remained masters of the field. Still there were no longer the brilliant results, the cannon, colors, baggage taken. The fashion of panic was over. The French had fought until they had taught their foes their own warlike obstinacy. By one of the first shots of the campaign fell marshal Bessières, duke of Istria, the old commander of the guard. Leipzig was no longer the aim of Napoleon after his victory. He occupied Dresden also, and prepared to pursue the allies over the Elbe. Success, however, as well as defeat, were instruments to work his ruin. At Dresden he received the envoy of Austria, who now proposed to change her character of ally for that of mediator. She demanded certain augmentation of territory, still not extending her views to Italy, and the independence of the smaller German states. Concession to these not arrogant demands would, in the words of the em peror Francis, have consolidated the dynasty of Bonaparte. He would not admit them, however. A bridge had been thrown over the Elbe, and he marched to attack the Austrians and Prussians at Bautzen. They were in a position of great strength, occupying those hills which form the natural bound aries of Silesia. Napoleon forced the passage of the Spree in their front, and occupied Bautzen. He was obliged to spend the whole of the 20th in so fighting and manoeuvring as to get within reach of the allies. On the 21st the battle was fought. He commenced by simultaneous attacks on the wings; the line, however, was so extended, embracing many leagues, and intersected with hills, that it was impossible to watch the success of these movements. Till assured of this, Napoleon would not advance his centre. He was himself with it in the midst of the cannonade, and fell asleep, overcome by fatigue. At length, upon hearing fresh sounds of artillery in the distance, his officers awoke him. By the direction of the sound he knew his wing to be victorious, and instantly ordered forward his centre and guard. The allies were beaten, and obliged to evacuate their line of defence, which covered Silesia, and retire into Bohemia. But their retreat was orderly, leaving not a cannon nor a prisoner. At the close of one of the combats which followed up the action, some of the emperor's staff, Duroc, Kirchener, and Le Brun, went to water their horses at a brook: it was then that one of the last cannon fired by the retreating enemy cut Kirchener in two, and struck Duroc. He was considered the only friend of Napoleon. The latter, whatever must have been his inward grief, did not display those theatrical signs of it which divers memoir writers have imagined and described. The circumstance most worthy of remark in the battle was, that the Prussians showed the most obstinate and warlike spirit; such as, if shown at or even after Jena, would have rendered their subjugation impossible; whilst the Russians had relaxed in their ardor, and did not equal their allies. They were far from their homes, and cared less for German than for French. This shows that a national cause of quarrel is the first requisite for military courage. The victory of Bautzen opened to the French a passage to the Oder. Glogau was relieved, Breslau occupied, Berlin itself threatened. The Russian and Prussian armies retreated towards Austria, imploring its aid. It was at this moment that the emperor Francis interposed with his mediation. A message, proposing an armistice, reached the French camp the day after the battle of Bautzen. After some conferences, Napoleon consented to it, in order that negotiations might commence. If ever the hand of fate was visible, it was in the fall of Napoleon. Had he been repulsed from Bautzen ere Austria had entered into stipulation with the allies, this, power would not have pressed for more than the independence of Germany; and Napoleon might and ought to have granted it. Now she made the same request; the abandonment of the duchy of Warsaw to the three powers, of Illyria to herself, the re-establishment of the Prussian monarchy, and the dissolution of the confederation of the Rhine. But now Bonaparte could not, would not yield; and Austria was flung into the alliance of his enemies. "How much did England give you to make war upon me?" asked he of Metternich, imprudently insulting that statesman. And, in truth, Great Britain did put forth all her powers on this occasion, and at the right time. Sweden was in her pay; and now subsidy treaties were concluded with Russia and with Prussia. Her victories, as well as her purse, contributed to rouse and push to its conclusion that European reaction against France, which otherwise might have lan guished. The tidings of the battle of Vittoria, in which Wellington and the British showed that their powers and talents were not confined to defensive warfare, came at the very epoch to strengthen the confidence of German courts and ministers. Austria insisted with firmness that Napoleon should be contented with the Rhine for his frontier. He, in evading the |