Posen, the capital of that part of Poland acquired by Prussia. From thence he went to Warsaw. Here naturally occurred the great question of re-establishing the ancient kingdom of Poland; an act of rapacity not long achieved, until it was dearly expiated. Napoleon might have called himself the avenger of Poland, and might have called it into being. I would indeed have been his wisest policy, a piece of gene rosity that might, in the future crisis of his fortune, hav saved him from general ruin. But Napoleon was too selfish he preferred raising up a kingdom for his worthless brother Jerome, to restoring one of the most ancient and heroic in Europe. There were difficulties in the way, no doubt. Prussia should disgorge the province of Posen; Austria, that of Gallicia. But Austria might have been indemnified. At the sight of Russian and Prussian eagles flying from War saw, the Poles were in exultation. Their patriotism and na tional spirit revived; they reassumed their national dress, and their youth crowded into the Polish regiments now formed to act in concert with the French. Napoleon was resolved, indeed, to make use of their zeal; but to reward it by national independence, was a stretch of generosity requiring efforts and sacrifices from which he shrunk. "Shall the throne of Poland be re-established? Shall the nation resume its existence, and start from the tomb to life? God alone, who holds in his hand the combinations of events, is the arbiter of this great political problem. But certainly never were circumstances more memorable, or more worthy of interest." Such was the vague language, respecting Poland, of the Imperial bulletins.

The Russian armies had abandoned Warsaw, but were still not far from this capital and from the Vistula, where Napoleon intended to pass the winter with his army, pressing the siege of Dantzic, and awaiting the 80,000 fresh conscripts, which he demanded to be with him before the spring. It was necessary, however, to clear his front, and intimidate the Russians, a new enemy, by some striking feat. Lannes, for this purpose, attacked the Russian corps under Beningsen at Pultusk: but that general made a stubborn and skilful resistance; he manœuvred so as to expose the French to a dreadful fire of artillery, which wounded their chiefs, and occasioned great slaughter. Beningsen was at last, indeed, obliged to retreat; but the French lost their aim, and, instead of disheartening, gave fresh confidence to the Russians. Bonaparte ordered his army into the winter-quarters first designed.

Here, however, the French were not allowed to remain more than the first fortnight of the year 1807 in repose. The

1807.

BATTLE OF EYLAU.

211

active Beningsen was well aware of the advantage which the winter of their climate gave to his hardy Russians over the French. He therefore mustered his army, joined with it the relics of the Prussians under Lestocq, and formed the project of penetrating between the main body of the French and their left wing, which bordered the Baltic, covering the iege of Dantzic. In the end of January, Napoleon learning his, was obliged to take the field. He marched northwards. with the idea of intercepting Beningsen. But sending word of this his intention to Bernadotte, who commanded the left wing, the messenger and letter were seized by Beningsen, who, in consequence, drew back. Thus the projects of both the Russian and French commanders failed. Napoleon, however, marching north, came up with Beningsen at Willenburg; and from thence the two armies, the one retreating, and the other pursuing, traversed rapidly the country between the rivers Aller and Passarge. Beningsen, irritated by the close pursuit, and the privations of his soldiers, resolved to turn upon the enemy, and make a stand at the little town of Preusch Eylau. He first endeavored to defend it; and during the evening of the 7th of February, Bagration and Barclay de Tolly made the most gallant efforts to keep off the enemy. The latter, intrenched in the cemetery, was not driven from it till late at night.

On the morning of the 8th the Russians were drawn up in front of Eylau, on which town, and on all its issues, their artillery opened a furious fire. Under this the French were obliged to come forth in order to engage in the battle. Great difference exists as to the stated numbers of each army: they were probably equal; the Prussians under Lestocq being absent on one side, Ney and Bernadotte on the other. The aim of both generals was to overthrow his adversary's left. Bonaparte, in addition, sent strong columns against the Russian centre; but these, in the midst of smoke, and a heavy fall of snow, which prevented their seeing, missed the right direction, and got engaged between the Russian right and centre. Thus the head of the column was flanked on both sides, whilst the reserve charged them in front. There ensued a dreadful scene of confusion and slaughter; and Bonaparte was obliged, n order to extricate his troops, to send on his cavalry and reserve to charge, which increased the fury and indecision of the battle. Davoust by this time had arrived, by a considerable circuit, on the left flank of the Russians, and drove it in. It folded up, as it were about to make a steady retreat, when the Prussians under Lestocq arrived, and renewed the engagement. Davoust retreated in turn. But, at the same time, Ney arrived with his division on the other extremity of III.-14

the Russians. Thither was transported the heat of combat. Mutual and inveterate charges took place betwixt him and Beningsen. Order there was no longer any. The Russians, huddled together in a small space,.refused still to quit the ground; and the French being in equal confusion, their generals in vain endeavored to bring them in formed or decisiv masses on the foe. It was, in fact, a drawn battle; th slaughter incalculable on either side, and rendered mor frightful by the snow which covered the ground, and which still fell upon the wounded, dying itself with their blood. The. Russians had not yielded their ground on the day of battle, but they had been dreadfully cut up, with no succor to expect, while Bernadotte's fresh division was still behind Napoleon's. Beningsen, therefore, retreated on the following day.

The emperor had contemplated making the same movement; but on the disappearance of the Russians, he remained at Eylau an entire week, and then retired to occupy with his army the line of the river Passarge, his head-quarters being established at Osserode. Here he dispatched a messenger with offers of peace to the king of Prussia; whilst, on the other hand, he took measures for reducing Dantzic, for calling up reinforcements and supplies for his army.

The tidings, that a battle of doubtful success had been fought towards the extremities of Prussia, filled the Parisians with alarm. The funds experienced a considerable fall. So miraculous indeed had been the good fortune of Napoleon, that people looked to its breaking like a spell, and considered reverses as probable. The same feeling prevailed in the army; and more than one general counselled a retreat behind the Vistula, all looking with a distaste little short of presentiment, to prosecuting war in such distant and inhospitable regions. Napoleon, however, persisted in remaining on the Passarge, where he tarried until the month of May, when Dantzic surrendered to general Lefebvre, giving its name to its captor. Reinforcements had reached both armies. Beningsen commenced the summer campaign by attempting to force his way over the Passarge on the 5th of June. He was worsted on one point by Bernadotte, who was wounded in the head. The French then became attackers in turn, and drove the Russians behind the Aller. After an action at Heilsberg, both armies marched northwards, the Russians on the east side, the French on the west side of the Aller. It became necessary for the former, however, to pass the river, as they wished to preserve Königsberg, and at Friedland was the bridge and road which led thither. The French had but one division, that of Ney, immediately opposite to Friedland. Beningsen pushed over forces to attack it. Napoleon was at Eylau; he

1807.

1

BATTLE OF FRIEDLAND.

213 hurried, however, to Friedland with the rest of his army, and found Ney making what resistance he could. It was the 14th of June; Bonaparte remembered that it was the anniversary of Marengo, and welcomed it as betokening good fortune. Forming his columns in the passes of the woods, he allowed Beningsen to cross the bridge of Friedland with the greater part of his army. The Russian did not suspect that the whole army of the French were lying in wait for him when he thus ventured. But the several columns soon issuing from the wood, their cannon getting into position and opening upon him, convinced Beningsen that he was forced to fight at a disadvantage, and without the possibility of retreating. He drew out his line, however, its left communicating with the bridge. At this point Napoleon of course directed his chief attack, to cut off the enemy. Ney led it; and in his ardor to reach the bridge, he was routed, and the head of his column broken. Dupont supported him and rallied the men. Napoleon, however, thought best to achieve the victory with his artillery, which from many points played upon the Russians, who were now concentrated and formed in squares. Heavy charges of cavalry now and then filled the pause of cannon; and at length, towards evening, the Russians having much suffered, and many of their squares broken, the French infantry again advanced with musketry, and completed the victory. As the cannon raked the bridge, there was no retreating by it. The Russians flung themselves into the river; but the attempt to swim across was impracticable to the Russian soldier, charged and accoutred as he was. Thousands were drowned, in addition to those who perished in the field. Such was the decisive victory on which Napoleon reckoned, and which he had long desired, as the means of disposing the Russian emperor to an accommodation.

Königsberg now surrendered. Beningsen had retreated with his army beyond the Niemen, the natural boundary of Lithuania. The French soon arrived in pursuit upon its banks. The Russians demanded an armistice. It was granted; and preparations made for an interview between the emperors. The first instant of repose, Napoleon issued a proclamation to his army: "In ten days' campaign," said he, " “you have taken 120 pieces of cannon; killed, wounded, or taken 60,000 Russians, Königsberg, its shipping, &c. From the banks of the Vistula you have flown to the Niemen with the rapidity of the eagle. Soldiers! you are worthy of yourselves and of me!" A raft was now prepared in the midst of the Niemen, off Tilsit. On the 25th of June the emperors met upon this raft, embraced, and conversed for a considerable space. One of the first words of Alexander expressed his

resentment against England. The ministry then in power, the successors of Fox, had departed from the Pitt system of subsidizing largely, and the Russian monarch thought it fit and just to execrate Great Britain for not paying him to defend himself. The sentiment, however, was eminently calculated to conciliate the conqueror, who replied, that in that case the terms of their treaty would be easily settled. On the following day Alexander crossed to the town of Tilsit, and the two emperors were soon upon terms of friendship: and equality. Not so the unfortunate monarch of Prussia, who arrived a suppliant, and was treated by his conqueror with harshness and disrespect. Even the czar, won upon by the ascendency and talents of Napoleon, felt his sympathy diminish for his unfortunate ally. Not even the presence of the queen of Prussia could conterbalance these new predilections of Alexander, or soften the premeditated rigor of Bonaparte.

There is much inexplicable in the French emperor's severe treatment of Prussia, contrasted as it is with his lenience and respect towards Austria. The latter had been at the head of three coalitions against France: the former, after one brief expedition, had remained neutral, and by so doing had procured the ascendency of France; yet, when at last driven to resist, she is punished more than the inveterate and unflinching enemy. Bignon, as we have seen, attributes this to Napoleon's having at first set his heart on an intimate alliance with Prussia, and to having been disappointed in this view The reason is not sufficient. Bonaparte had warred as a gen eral against Austria; in that inferior grade he could not but respect an illustrious enemy; and this early impression he never altogether shook off. But Prussia was the enemy of Napoleon, of the emperor, who had condescended to personal vituperation, and who scribbled against Frederic, his queen, and court, in the Moniteur. Now the pen is a less generous weapon than the sword, especially in the hands of a soldier; and its use had created an acrimony both in Napoleon against Prussia, and in the Prussian court against him, that was ungenerously remembered in the hour of his own triumph and his enemy's ruin.

The reason given by Bignon was, however, to a certain degree influential. The French sovereign had need of on ally amongst the three great powers of the north and east he could afford to be friendly and merciful to that one. He first looked to Austria, which, having no sea-ports, could not support him against England, and indeed would not. He then turned towards Prussia, whose mean and vacillating_policy disgusted and alienated both him and Great Britain. Now he