to the directory :-" I shall chase Beaulieu over the Po, follow him, and occupy Lombardy; before a month I hope to be on the mountains of the Tyrol, to communicate with the army of the Rhine, and, in concert with it, carry the war into Bavaria." The directory in return, or rather Carnot, its war organ, applauded the zeal of the young general, directing him to drive the Austrians into the Tyrol; and then, in lieu of following them, to divide the army, leave half in Lombardy under Kellerman, and march with the rest southward against Rome and Naples.* The letter, at the same time, reminded Bonaparte that he was to consult the commission of the directory on all important occasions. This latter hint, as well as the proposal of dividing the army, stirred the temper of the young general. He replied sharply that nothing great or decisive could be effected but by one commander, and him moreover uncontrolled. "Break the unity of military thought, and you lose Italy. Kellerman is a more experienced and a better officer than I. But together we could do naught but blunder.".

In the meantime Bonaparte, having achieved the conquest of Piedmont, now entered upon that of the Milanese. The army of Beaulieu, though diminished by defeat, was still of force capable to defend a country bounded and intersected by so many rivers. Immediately betwixt the French and Milan ran both the Tesin and the Po. Bonaparte, in his negotiations with the court of Turin, had insisted on having Valenza, on which was a bridge over the Po. He had done so in order to deceive Beaulieu into the belief that he intended to pass there. The Austrian was caugnt in the snare; posted his army at the confluence of the two rivers, and prepared to dispute the passage. Instead, however, of their crossing both streams in following a straight line upon Milan, a circuit on the right bank of the Po would bring the French to Piacenza, farther down the stream than where the Tesin meets it. By crossing there, in lieu of Valenza, the latter stream was altogether avoided, and Beaulieu's retreat threatened to be cut off. Bonaparte, to effect this, undertook a forced march of thirty-six

* Some of the advice contained in this letter of Carnot is not a little characteristic:

"Let the republican troops remain in the Milanese and levy contributions. You will arrive there just in harvest. Manage so that the army of Italy will not need to draw any thing from home." And again, "If the pope should make offers of peace, demand first of all that he put up public prayers for the prosperity and success of the French republic. Some of his fine monuments, his statues, pictures, medals, books, his silver madonnas, and even his church bells, may defray the expenses of our visit.”

Thus we see that two kinds of spoliation attributed to Bonaparte origin ated in the order of the directory.

1796.

BRIDGE OF LODI.

111

hours to Piacenza, which he reached on the 7th of May. With the aid of what boats he could seize, a bridge was thrown over the Po, and the army passed on the 9th. It did not hesitate to attack the nearest Austrian division, which was routed, and fled to Pizzighitone on the Adda. No river or line of defence now intervened betwixt the French and Milan. Beaulieu, anticipated and foiled in his project of defending the bridge of Valenza on the Po, hurried to a place himself behind the Adda, the next river eastward of Milan. The French general instantly resolved to force this line of defence ere the Austrians had time to strengthen it. Until this was achieved he deferred taking possession of Milan. Pizzighitone, the nearest town that contained a bridge over the Adda, was too well garrisoned and defended. Bonaparte pressed on to the next bridge, tracing upwards the course of the river. This was at Lodi.

On

Beaulieu had made good his retreat thus far. Half of his army, however, he had been obliged to send by a circuitous direction, in order to throw a garrison into the castle of Milan. This half the French general hoped to intercept, if he could succeed in routing the remainder, about 12,000 men, which Beaulieu kept with himself at Lodi. To drive the advanced guard of this body from Lodi and beyond the Adda, was an easy task. But to dispossess them of the bridge was an attempt so rash, that the Austrians considered it impossible Otherwise they would have destroyed the bridge, or at least an arch of it. But it was now too late for this, as the French cannon were instantly ordered to play upon it. Beaulieu, on his side of the bridge, raked it with thirty cannon. either side the shower of grape-shot was dreadful; but the French were covered by the walls and houses of Lodi, whilst the Austrians were exposed. Their general, in consequence, drew them out of reach of shot; thus trusting the defence of the bridge to the formidable battery alone. Seeing this, Bonaparte formed his stoutest grenadiers in column, and prepared to cross, whilst the cavalry menaced to pass by a ford at no great distance. At a word the column rushed on the bridge. Its front was shattered, almost ere it was formed, by the hower of shot. It even hesitated, till the generals placed themselves at its head, and cheered it on; whilst the light troops, dropping down the wooden buttresses of the bridge, passed underneath to distract the enemy. The first fire of the battery was the chief obstacle; that withstood, the French rushed on the Austrian guns, and bayoneted the cannoneers. The cavalry followed, and had time to form and charge ere the main line of the tardy Austrians could come up. These

withstood the assault but for a few minutes. They gave way and fled, leaving behind their artillery, colors, and some thousand prisoners. Thus was completed the rout of Beaulieu, the shattered remains of whose army retired towards the Tyrol and the provinces of Venice.

The victory of Lodi was won on the 10th of May. On the 15th, Bonaparte made his triumphant entry into Milan, where a large portion of republicans and personal admirers welcomed the hero. Uncertain, however, yet, as to the po litical fate of the country, and already less a Jacobin from the eminence he had obtained, he kept a prudent reserve, and showed not the same haste to revolutionize that he had shown to conquer. He, however, levied a large contribution, not only upon Milan, but upon Parma and Modena, as the price of an armistice: part of his terms with the latter town being the surrender of its richest works of art, destined to adorn the museum of the Louvre.

Seven or eight days appeared to Bonaparte a sufficient period of repose for himself and his army after their fatigues and combats. Milan, too, where money, good cheer, and admiration awaited them, might prove enervating to their valor. On the 24th, therefore, he resumed his march eastward, and reached Lodi, when tidings of a general revolt, which had awaited but the signal of his departure, reached him. He instantly hurried back to Milan; there the insurrection had been put down. At Pavia, on the contrary, it had been successful. With not more than 1000 men, the general marched against a city of 30,000 inhabitants, where, moreover, the insurgents had got possession of the citadel, and disarmed the French garrison. With the artillery, his sovereign arm against the populace, Bonaparte battered down the gates, entered, and swept the streets with grapeshot, rendering himself master of Pavia. He rewarded his successful band by several hours of pillage, which the soldiers effectually employed, principally in the goldsmiths' shops and the great pawnbroking establishment. The officers left in command of the garrison, who had delivered the citadel, he condemned to be shot; and thus having done summary justice by the insurrection, the general rejoined his

army.

He now entered the Venetian states, little respecting the neutrality of that government. As the Austrians had traversed them, Bonaparte resolved to take the same liberty, without however, if possible, exciting the enmity of Venice, which he by turns menaced and cajoled. Beaulieu, reinforced, had retired behind the Mincio, a river which runs from the lake

1796.

A. STRIANS EVACUATE ITALY.

113 of Garda to Mantua, and determined to defend its passage. He had taken possession of Peschiera, a fortress on the river, where it issues from the lake, despite the Venetians, and posting his troops along the stream, his centre at Borghetto, he awaited the French. But the confidence of the Austrians was gone; the hardiest enterprise was no longer rash, when undertaken by the French against them. After ome manœuvring, Bonaparte, on the 30th of May, attack Borghetto, where there was a bridge over the Mincio. Beau lieu took care to destroy an arch; but, in despite of this, the French crossed chin-deep in the river, beat their enemies on the opposite side, and re-established the bridge. Hitherto Bonaparte had never brought his cavalry into action. Useless in the mountains, this force became of prime necessity in the plains. Want of habit of fighting, and the starved condition of the horses, were obstacles. On approaching Borghetto, Bonaparte assigned to it the task of attacking; and to make sure of its staunchness, surrounded it with the rest of the army. Murat and Bessières were the officers whom he employed to train and lead the cavalry, which soon equalled the infantry in courage and effectiveness. A surprise occurring soon after, in which Bonaparte was well-nigh captured, gave him occasion to form a corps of picked men to act as guards to his person. He thought proper, however, as yet, to call them guides.

The Austrians now abandoned Peschiera, and retired into the gorges of the Tyrol, Mantua being the only town of Italy where the Imperial eagle still floated. It was an almost impregnable place, completely surrounded by a marsh or lake, traversable merely by raised roads or causeways. Famine, however, might reduce it, and Bonaparte formed the siege. To take up a position, so as to protect this siege, was the next important point; for the Austrians merely waited for reinforcements to re-issue from the Tyrol, and again strike a blow for Lombardy. The Adige formed the best line of defence, being deep, rapid, and of short course. Verona and Legnago were its keys and bridges. Venice was most reluctant to yield them; but by half menace, half cajolery, Bonaparte obtained possession, and garrisoned them.

Thus, in the commencement of June, was the third act of the military drama of 1796 completed. He first annihilated Piedmont, and in the next he grasped the Milanese. In that just concluded, he set foot upon the Adige, and bade defiance to the last efforts of Austria. Pausing there, Bonaparte, forbidden by the directory to engage his army in the Tyrol, marched with a strong division across the Po, to terrify

southern Italy into submission. Naples, though lately profuse in vaunts and menaces, now trembled. Rome followed the example, and purchased the mercy of Bonaparte at the price of some millions of ready money, an enormous quantity of provisions, and her best works of art.

While all these glorious feats had been achieved with an army of 40,000 men, Moreau and Jourdan, on the Rhine, had 150,000 at their disposal; and the Austrians under the archduke Charles, no less. Moreau was an able general; but he had not reached that grand unity of plan which inspired Bonaparte. He was also under the control of Carnot, an able minister, but one who pedantically endeavored to regulate from his cabinet the march of armies in the field. In war, as in medicine and other arts, there is always some new nostrum considered sovereign for the time. Carnot's maxim was to turn and force the wings of an enemy's army; which to do more effectually on the Rhine, he divided the French force, giving one half to Moreau, the other to Jourdan, keeping them far apart. It was committing the same blunder, though on a much larger scale, as that which had proved fatal to Beaulieu. The archduke Charles, however, was prudent as Moreau himself, and failed to take any advantage of the separation of his foes, until necessity inspired him with boldness and invention. In June, the Austrian court drafted 30,000 men from the army of the Rhine, under Wurmser, in order to rally the relics of Beaulieu's troops, and defend, or rather regain Italy. Weakened by this, the archduke thought fit to retreat. An advantage won by Moreau, who followed and pressed him, precipitated his retreat to the Danube. Here, however, in the strong defiles that guard the dominions of Austria, the archduke made a stand, and, not imitating, but rivalling the new tactics of Bonaparte, he concentrated his force, bore it rapidly upon Jourdan, whom he thus overwhelmed and defeated. Moreau, deprived of the support of his colleague, was obliged to retreat on his side through the Black Forest; a manœuvre which he effected with such skill, firmness, and trifling loss, as to earn fame equal to that which a victory would have given. To the archduke Charles truly belonged the glory of the campaign in Germany.

Whilst 150,000 French thus manœuvred to and fro betwixt the Rhine and the Danube to very little purpose, 40,000 under Bonaparte were deciding the fate of Europe. Wurmser rallied the scattered and disheartened bands of Beaulieu. His fresh troops, with the relics of the Italian army, formed an army of more than 60,000 men; and with