[1796 A.D.]

Jourdan, keeping them far apart. It was committing the same blunder, though on a much larger scale, as that which had proved fatal to Beaulieu. The archduke Charles, however, failed to take any advantage of the separation of his foes, until necessity inspired him with boldness and invention.

In June, the Austrian court drafted 30,000 men from the army of the Rhine, under Wurmser, in order to rally the relics of Beaulieu's troops, and defend, or rather regain, Italy. Weakened by this, the archduke thought fit to retreat. An advantage won by Moreau, who followed and pressed him, precipitated his retreat to the Danube. Here, however, in the strong defiles that guard the dominions of Austria, the archduke made a stand, and, not imitating, but rivalling, the new tactics of Bonaparte, he concentrated his force, bore it rapidly upon Jourdan, whom he thus overwhelmed and defeated. Moreau, deprived of the support of his colleague, was obliged to retreat on his side through the Black Forest; a manœuvre which he effected with such skill, firmness, and trifling loss, as to earn fame equal to that which a victory would have given. To the archduke Charles truly belonged the glory of the campaign in Germany.c

The young archduke was indebted to the absurdity of the French plan for a brilliant conception, which he realised with prudence; but, like Moreau, he lacked that ardour, that audacity if you will, which might have rendered the blunder of the French government fatal to its armies. Conceive what would have happened if on either side had been engaged the impetuous genius which had annihilated three armies beyond the Alps! If the 70,000 men of Moreau, at the moment they debouched from Kehl, or if the imperials, at the moment they quitted the Danube to wheel on Jourdan, had been conducted with the vigour and promptitude exhibited in the Italian campaign, assuredly the war would have been terminated most disastrously for one of the two powers.

The campaign endowed the young archduke with a resplendent fame in Europe. In France, a grateful fame was engendered towards Moreau, for having led back in safety the army compromised in Bavaria. The greatest anxiety had been felt respecting that army, especially from the time when, Jourdan being repelled, the bridge of Kehl menaced, and the communications through Swabia intercepted by a multitude of detached corps, nothing was known of its operations or its fate. But when, after an interval of poignant disquietude, it was seen debouching into the valley of the Rhine in so perfect an attitude, men were enchanted with the general who had so auspiciously redeemed it. His retreat was extolled as a masterpiece of art, and straightway compared to that of the Ten Thousand. None ventured, indeed, to oppose it to the brilliant triumphs of the army of Italy; but as there are always many whom superior genius and high fortune mortify, and whom less shining merit rather gratify, all such declared for Moreau, vaunted his consummate prudence and ability, and esteemed it preferable to the electric hardihood of young Bonaparte. From this period, Moreau had for partisans all who prefer secondary to transcendent talents; and, it must be confessed, in a republic we almost pardon enemies of genius, when we see how that genius can become culprit towards the liberty which has quickened, fostered, and raised it to the pinnacle of glory.

BONAPARTE CRUSHES WURMSER

Whilst 150,000 French thus manoeuvred to and fro betwixt the Rhine and the Danube to very little purpose, 40,000 under Bonaparte were deciding the fate of Europe. Wurmser rallied the scattered and disheartened bands of

[1796 A.D.]

Beaulieu. His fresh troops, with the relics of the Italian army, formed an army of more than 60,000 men; and with these the Austrians issued from the Tyrol. Wurmser seemed full of confidence; so much so, that whilst he advanced in person southwards down the Adige, occupying both banks to drive the French before him and relieve Mantua, he despatched 20,000 men under Quasdanowitch to march round the Lake of Garda, and cut off the retreat of the French.

General Bonaparte, engaged in pressing the siege of Mantua, was here for the first time caught slumbering on his past good fortune. He was tied, in fact, to the conquest of Mantua, which he could not bring himself to abandon : and hence the Austrians were allowed to burst upon him. His projected line of defence on the Adige was useless; for Wurmser's chief force came down in the pass betwixt it and the lake. Here Masséna was driven from his positions: Quasdanowitch did as much by Guyeux on the other side of the lake. Tidings of both reverses reached Bonaparte on the 30th of July, and shook him for the time. He was not accustomed to defensive warfare; his spirit and genius were only called forth when he attacked. His first impulse was to call a council of war; an unusual act of condescension. All counselled retreat save Augereau; 1 and his appeared but blind ardour. In his meditations of the night, Bonaparte's imagination kindled with a plan of assuming the offensive, and of rapidly attacking each division of the enemy separately. On the morrow all was active. The besieging army was instantly ordered to abandon Mantua, destroy its artillery, and rally with all the scattered corps. to the southern extremity of the lake westward of the Mincio.

1

When this was effected, Bonaparte marched to repulse Quasdanowitch, impending from the western shore of the Lake of Garda. Fortunately Wurmser allowed him time for this operation, by an idle march which he made to provision Mantua. Whilst the Austrian general was thus enjoying the sight of cannon destroyed, and other signs of a siege abandoned, the French were driving back Quasdanowitch, routing one of his corps, and intimidating the rest to inaction and retreat. Bonaparte then hurried back -he scarcely quitted horseback for many days-to face the Austrians advancing from the Adige. They came to join bands with Quasdanowitch, and drove Masséna at first from Lonato. Bonaparte in person arrived from his expedition to support Masséna along the road from Brescia. As he halted in their presence, the Austrians advanced their wings to envelope him, as well as with their right to reach as near as possible to Quasdanowitch. The French general allowed them to extend, till, seizing the moment, he rushed with his whole force upon their centre, broke through it, scattered one half, and intercepted the other, which, pursued with unrelenting activity by Junot, laid down its arms at last. Such was the combat of Lonato, fought on the 3rd of August.

Lonato is a short distance southward of Desenzano, which forms the point of the lake. Still farther south, in a direct line, is Castiglione, where certain heights formed a favourable position of defence. Thither then Bonaparte transferred his quarters to resist Wurmser; who, returning from Mantua, had rallied the divisions beaten at Lonato, and prepared to take his revenge. Both generals spent the 4th in mustering and preparing to try the fortunes

[On this occasion we find the young commander's resource and courage failing him. He called councils of war, and declared in favour of retreating across the Po. When Augereau resisted this determination, he left the room declaring that he would have nothing to do with the matter, and, when Augereau asked who was to give orders, answered, "You!" The desperate course was rewarded with success."]

H. W.-VOL. XII. 2 F

[1796 A.D.] of a battle on the following day at Castiglione. Bonaparte had ridden to Lonato to hasten the march of his rear, when a straggling body of Austrians, beaten on the 3rd, and wandering ever since in search of the main army, presented itself, and commanded the French general to surrender. Bonaparte had but 1,000 men. Assuming a bold countenance, however, he received the officer sent to summon him, in the midst of a numerous staff, and, feigning anger at the demand, replied: "Return, and tell your officer that you have found here the commander-in-chief of the French, who gives him eight minutes to surrender. He is surrounded by our division, and has nothing to hope." The astonished Austrian delivered the message, and corroborated the assertion that Bonaparte himself was there. The commander accordingly abandoned all thoughts of resistance, and, with upwards of three thousand men, surrendered to a body not one-third its number.

On the next day, the 5th, was fought the battle of Castiglione. Bonaparte, to render it decisive, had despatched orders to the corps of Serrurier, which had been engaged in the siege of Mantua, and which in its retreat from thence had not yet joined the main army, to take a circuitous route, so as to reach the left of the Austrians at a certain hour. It was in these calculations of time that Bonaparte excelled. Now the cannon of Serrurier were heard simultaneously with those of the French right wing, which advanced to the attack. The left held back, bringing the line into a semicircular form, which was also assumed by the Austrians as they pressed on. The latter, however, forming the outer circle, tended to spread as they advanced; the French concentrated as they retired. The Austrian line soon became still more weakened on the right by the necessity of drafting some of the detachments to oppose Serrurier's corps. The French suddenly ceased to retire, and began to attack. The Austrian right was driven in, at the same time that their left was thrown into disorder by Serrurier; and Wurmser, narrowly escaping capture himself, was obliged to give orders for retreat.

Thus did the fatuity of the Austrian general, in parcelling out his noble army, deliver it up to be beaten in detail by Bonaparte.1 Wurmser now saw himself worsted; but he resolved at least to avoid the fate of Beaulieu, and to preserve his force from total discomfiture. He therefore retreated into the Tyrol in as good order as was possible with troops who had lost all confidence, and who began to believe, with some reason, that the French were invincible. Whilst the conquerors reposed for the remainder of August, resuming the siege of Mantua, the court of Vienna reinforced Wurmser, the cabinet acting on the same false plan as its generals, in making petty consecutive and divided efforts, instead of a grand and overwhelming one. In the beginning of September, Wurmser was again about to assume the offensive. Leaving Davidowich in the gorges of the Tyrol, either to defend them or to advance down the Adige, according to the force opposed to him, the Austrian general descended the valley of the Brenta, taking a circuitous route towards Verona and Mantua. If he divided his force this time, it was so widely that Bonaparte would be obliged, he thought, to imitate his example.

The French commander left Wurmser to pursue his distant route, attacked Davidowich, defeated him at Roveredo, and annihilated his division in the defile of Colliano. He then, instead of returning by Verona and the Adige, to face Wurmser, marched straight after him down the Brenta, not only to attack but to cut off from him all retreat. This was hazardous; for Wurmser might in the meantime fling himself on Verona, where there was little to [In this six days' campaign 30,000 men overthrew 60,000 and killed or captured 20,000, with 66 guns and 20 standards.j]

[1796 A.D.]

oppose him but Bonaparte depended on his celerity; he hurried on, without provision, without horses, himself sharing the rations of the soldier, and thus reached the rear of Wurmser at Bassano. The Austrian was obliged to recall his troops, and a battle took place which proved the last blow to this new army and general. The latter, cut off from home, fled south to Vicenza, from thence to Legnago, where he forced the passage of the Adige. The French in vain endeavoured to intercept equally his retreat to Mantua. In this they failed, and Wurmser succeeded in throwing himself into that fortress with 15,000 troops, the relics of his army.1

POLITICAL CHANGES IN ITALY

To form the siege anew was all that was left to Bonaparte. Had the army of the Rhine been equally victorious, he might have passed the Tyrol to act in concert with it; but Jourdan was then beaten, and Moreau in retreat. The army of Italy was too weak to make such an attempt by itself. A respite, therefore, was allowed to general and soldiers. The former spent it in reorganising the friendly countries of Italy. How these were to be treated, what steps were to be taken, what hopes held forth, was an early and important point of consideration. With respect to Piedmont, we have seen that the love of propagating and extending revolution had been sacrificed to expediency. Milan demanded equal reserve; it being yet uncertain whether it was to be ceded back to Austria, or given to Piedmont as the price of a firm alliance with France. The same motives did not apply to the countries south of the Po. Modena and Reggio (the town which Bonaparte declared most ripe for liberty) rose and expelled their sovereign, uniting with Ferrara and Bologna. They formed under French protection the Cispadane Republic, and Bonaparte's correspondence tells the care he took that aristocratic influence should not be altogether crushed and excluded. This indicates the change that had already taken place in his political sentiments. Josephine, his spouse, had, at the same time, joined him in Italy, and was received with almost regal honours in each city. Her circle at Milan might have been called a court, from its brilliancy; and exactions, it is said, were not spared to support her magnificence. All this had a very anti-republican effect on the young commander. The year 1796, however, left him leisure for nought but glory. Personal ambition had not time to blend with it, and conquest had not yet sounded the hour when the generous fame of this warrior was to be sullied by political macchiavellianism.c

Now, Venice, Rome, Naples began taking up arms; Genoa and Piedmont were not to be depended upon; Austria, with the help of the victories of the archduke Charles, was about to bring a fresh army into Italy. "We must have troops," wrote Bonaparte, "or Italy is lost." The Directory, unable to send him reinforcements, at least attempted to aid him with negotiations. Three treaties of peace were signed with Piedmont, Genoa, and Naples, which secured the neutrality of these states, the passage of the French troops into Italy, and the closing of the principal ports to the English (October). By means of threats and promises, the Directory prevented Rome and Venice from declaring themselves hostile; it authorised, as we have seen, the formation of the estates of the duke of Modena, who had violated the armistice, into the Cispadane Republic; it promised the Milanese the creation of a Lombard republic; finally, it signed a treaty of alliance with Spain, which was a

[1 Thus was Wurmser's army overthrown a second time; it had lost 22,000 men and 75 guns, and the remainder was blockaded in Mantua with its general.]

[1796 A.D.] renewing of the Family Compact, and whereby the two states mutually gave each other the assistance of 24,000 men and 40 vessels (August 18th). England grew alarmed. Her financial condition was distressing; half the ports of Europe were closed to her. Ireland threatened a revolt, which France prepared to serve as England had helped that in La Vendée. Pitt seemed to yield to the wishes of the English, and sent a plenipotentiary to Paris October 22nd, but he was merely desirous of gaining time.j

The indefatigable Austria had again composed an army. Russia undertaking to provide for the tranquillity of Galicia, the imperial forces engaged in occupying the Polish provinces were sent to the Adriatic, and the marshal Alvinzi was appointed to the command of the new army, rallying the remains of Wurmser's and Beaulieu's routed divisions. A large body of this army, led by Davidowich, was to descend from the Tyrol, between the Lake of Garda and the Adige, Wurmser's first route, while the main force advanced straight over the Brenta towards the Adige. Unwilling again to raise the siege of Mantua, Bonaparte had few and inferior forces to oppose both the menaced points. Vaubois, however, was ordered to resist Davidowich, whilst the French commander-in-chief marched against Alvinzi for the purpose of giving him a severe check, and then rushing with his wonted celerity to crush Davidowich altogether in concert with Vaubois. He in consequence attacked Alvinzi the 6th of November on the Brenta, and had the advantage, but it was trifling. Immediately after, a despatch arrived that Vaubois had been driven back from the gorges of the Tyrol, and that he might not be able long to defend the position of Rivoli, the only obstacle betwixt Davidowich and Verona. This was dangerous. Unable to master the army before him, he was menaced with another in his rear. Bonaparte instantly retreated to the latter town, left his army there, and hurried in person to Rivoli, where he excited by his presence the courage of the soldiers, and rebuked two regiments which had fled in the last affair. He ordered it to be inscribed upon their colours that they no longer formed part of the army of Italy.

THE DEFEAT OF CALDIERO; THE VICTORY OF ARCOLA

He then hastened back to Verona, within a few leagues of which the Austrians had penetrated, Alvinzi taking a skilful and strong position on the heights of Caldiero. At daybreak, on the 12th of November, the French attacked Alvinzi with their wonted ardour, and endeavoured to drive him from Caldiero; the attempt was vain; they were worsted; and attributing their defeat to the rain and sleet, they were obliged to retire to Verona. Here for a day's space Bonaparte was stricken with despondency: he was, indeed, in a critical situation; the fruit of all his victories about to be ravished from him, through the fault, as he felt, of the Directory, who refused him reinforcements, whilst the Austrian army had been re-completed four times. He had asked but two regiments, and even they had not appeared. He vented his rage in a despatch, in which he despaired, he said, of preventing Alvinzi from relieving Mantua.

It was always in one of his dark fits of despite rather than despondency that the bright idea of retrieval and of re-seizing victory was struck forth, like lightning from the cloud of night. Bonaparte conceived a plan: his troops were ordered under arms at nightfall on the 14th; it was not for attack, however they were ordered to evacuate Verona on the side remote from the enemy, leaving merely a force to guard the walls. Having issued from the town, they marched all night southwards along the Adige