The Palmyra. defence, the avowed purpose of Lieutenant Gregory being to capture her upon suspicion. The case presented was that of a hostile attack, made by a vessel of war of the United States, on a foreign vessel, known to be regularly commissioned, and sent in for adjudication, after her character was satisfactorily explained. But even supposing there was probable cause for the seizure and detention, that would not excuse, unless it was followed by an actual condemnation. Probable cause will not excuse from remunerative damages, in any case, unless of a capture jure belli, or where it is expressly provided as a justification by some municipal law. This doctrine was clearly recognised by the court in the case of The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362. [ *8 January 15th, 1827. STORY, Justice, delivered the opinion of the court. -This is the case of a proceeding in rem, by a libel of information, founded on the act of congress of the 3d of *March 1819, ch. 75, as continued in force by the act of congress of the 15th of May 1820, ch. 112. The second section of the former act authorizes the president "to instruct the commanders of public armed vessels of the United States, to seize, subdue and send into any port of the United States, any armed vessel or boat, or any vessel or boat, the crew whereof shall be armed, and which shall have attempted or committed any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure, upon any vessel of the United States, or of the citizens thereof, or upon any other vessel." The fourth section declares, "that whenever any vessel or boat from which any piratical aggression, search, restraint, depredation or seizure, shall have been first attempted or made, shall be captured and brought into any port of the United States, the same shall and may be adjudged and condemned to their use, and that of the captors, after due process and trial, in any court having admiralty jurisdiction, and which shall be holden for the district into which such captured vessel shall be brought, and the same court shall thereupon order a sale and distribution thereof accordingly, and at their discretion." The brig Palmyra is an armed vessel, asserting herself to be a privateer, and acting under a commission of the King of Spain, issued by his authorized officer at the Island of Porto Rico. She was captured on the high seas, on the 15th of August, A. D. 1822, by the United States vessel of war Grampus, commanded by Lieutenant Gregory, after a short resistance, and receiving a fire from the Grampus, by which one man was killed, and six men were wounded. She was sent into Charleston, South Carolina, for adjudication. A libel was duly filed, and a claim interposed; and upon the proceedings in the district court of that district, a decree was pronounced by the court, that the brig be acquitted, without any damages for the capture, injury or detention. From this decree, an appeal was made, by both parties, to the circuit court; and upon the hearing in that court, where, for the first time, the officers of the privateer were examined as witnesses, the circuit court pronounced a decree, affirming *so much of the decree of the district [ *9 court, as acquitted the brig, and reversing so much of it as denied damages, and proceeded finally to award damages to the claimants, to the amount of $10,288.58. From this decree, there was an appeal, interposed on behalf the United States and the captors, to the supreme court. The cause came on to be heard upon this appeal, at February term 1825, and upon The Palmyra. inspection of the record, it did not then appear that there had been any final decree, ascertaining the amount of damages. The court were of opinion, that if there had been no such decree, the case was not properly before the court upon the appeal, there not being any final decree, within the meaning of the act of congress. The court considered, that the damages were but an incident to the principal decree; that the cause was but a single one; and that the cause could not, at the same time, be in the circuit court for the purpose of assessing damages, and in this court upon appeal, for the purpose of an acquittal or condemnation of the vessel. The questions indeed were different; but the cause was the same. Upon this ground, the appeal was dismissed. But at the last term of the court, it appearing that, in point of fact, there had been a final award of damages, and that the error was a mere misprision of the clerk of the circuit court, in transmitting an imperfect record, the court, upon motion of the appellants, at the last term, ordered the cause to be reinstated. It is now contended, that this court had no authority to reinstate the cause, after such a dismissal: 1. Because it may operate to the prejudice of the stipulators or sureties, to whom the privateer was delivered, upon stipulation, in the court below; and 2. Because the cause was capable of being heard in this court, upon the appeal, in respect to the decree of acquittal, that being the only decree in which the United States had any interest as a party; and that as to the damages, the captors were the only persons responsible for damages, and they alone had a right of appeal respecting the same; so that by operation of law, the cause had become divided into two separate and distinct causes, in which each party was an *10] actor. This court cannot concur in either objection. Whenever a stipulation is taken in an admiralty suit, for the property subjected to legal process and condemnation, the stipulation is deemed a mere substitute for the thing itself, and the stipulators liable to the exercise of all those authorities on the part of the court, which it could properly exercise, if the thing itself were still in its custody. This is the known course of the admiralty. It is quite a different question, whether the court will, in particular cases, exercise its authority, where sureties on the stipulation may be affected injuriously; that is a subject addressed to its sound discretion. In the present case, there was no ground for surprise or injury to the stipulators, nor, indeed, to any party in interest. If there had been no final award of damages, the cause would not have been properly before this court, and the appeal itself, being a nullity, would have left the cause still in the circuit court. But as such an award was made, the appeal was rightfully made; and the dismissal, being solely for a defect of jurisdiction apparent on the record, and founded on a mistake, constituted no bar to a new appeal, even if a general dismissal might. The appeal, then, might, at any time within five years, have been lawfully made, and have bound the parties to the stipulation, to all its consequences. The difference between a new appeal, and a reinstatement of the old appeal, after a dismissal from a misprision of the clerk, is not admitted by this court justly to involve any difference of right as to the stipulators. Every court must be presumed to exercise those powers belonging to it, which are necessary for the promotion of public justice; and we o not doubt, that this court possesses the power to reinstate any cause, dis The Palmyra. missed by mistake. The reinstatement of the cause was founded, in the opinion of this court, upon the plain principles of justice, and is according to the known practice of other judicial tribunals in like cases. The other objection has not, in our opinion, a more solid *founda[*11 tion The libel was filed by the district-attorney, as well in behalf of the United States, as of the captors, and prayed, as usual, a condemnation of the vessel, and distribution of the proceeds. This fact is noticed, for the purpose of answering the observation made at the bar, as to the parties to the libel. It has been supposed, that the United States, and the captors, are to be deemed severally libellants, having distinct rights, both of prosecution and appeal. But this proceeds upon a mistake. In every case of a proceeding for condemnation, upon captures made by the public ships of war of the United States, whether the same be cases of prize, strictly jure belli, or upon public acts in the nature of captures jure belli, the proceedings are in the name and authority of the United States, who prosecute for themselves as well as for the captors. The captors cannot, without the authority of the government, proceed to enforce condemnation. The suit is, in form and substance, a proceeding by and in the name of the United States, for the benefit of all concerned. And whether the question respect the point of condemnation, or of damages, the United States have a right of appeal co-extensive with the whole matter in litigation, and may interpose their protection, to guard their agents and officers against injury and damages. These agents and officers are, indeed, in a certain sense, parties to the suit, as the seizing officer is, in cases of mere municipal seizures; and when the claimant makes himself, by a demand of damages, an actor in the suit, no doubt exists, that the court may proceed to decree damages against them, and thus entitle them to a separate right of appeal, if the government should feel that it had no further interest to pursue the suit. But still the right to damages must always be dependent upon the question of condemnation or acquittal, for it can never be successfully contended, that if a condemnation be finally adjudged, a decree for damages can be maintained. And on the other hand, in a case of acquittal, the whole circumstances of the case must be taken into consideration, in order to ascertain that the case is one which justifies an award of damages. *In the present case, there [*12 was an appeal entered by the district-attorney, for the United States, and also for the captors, from the decree of the circuit court. If this decree was final, such an appeal brought up the whole cause, as to all the parties; and would, in point of law, have produced the same effect, if, in form, the appeal had only been in the name of the United States. If the decree was not final (as upon the original record it appeared to this court not to be), then it was void as to all parties. Either way, then, there never was any separation of the parties libellants, so as to give rise to the point of separate independent causes. We are, then, of opinion, that the whole cause is now rightfully before us. It is contended on behalf of the appellees, that the present suit cannot be maintained, because the libel itself is fatally defective in its averments. It is said to be too loose, inartifical and general in its structure, to give a just foundation for any judgment of condemnation. If this were admitted to be true, the only effect would be, supposing the merits, on the evidence, appeared to be in favor of the libellants, that the court would, accord The Palmyra. ing to its known course of practice, remand the cause to the circuit court, with directions to allow an amendment of the libel, and ulterior proceedings consequent thereon. But there is asserted to be another fatal defect in the averments of the libel, which is incapable of being cured, because it cannot be established in point of fact; and that is, that the offenders are not alleged to have been convicted, upon any prosecution in personam, of the offence charged in the libel. The argument is, that there must be a due conviction upon a prosecution and indictment for the offence in personam, averred and proved, in order to maintain the libel in rem. In respect to the first objection, it must be admitted, that the libel is drawn in an inartificial, inaccurate and loose manner. The strict rules of the common law as to criminal prosecutions, have never been supposed by this court to be required in informations of seizure in the admiralty for forfeitures, which are deemed to be civil proceedings in *rem. Even on *13] indictments at the common law, it is often sufficient to state the offence in the very terms of the prohibitory statute; and the cases cited by the attorney-general are directly in point. In informations in the exchequer for seizures, general allegations bringing the case within the words of the statute, have been often held sufficient. And in this court, it has been repeatedly held, that in libels in rem, less certainty than what belongs to proceedings at the common law, will sustain a decree of condemnation, if the words of the statute are pursued, and the allegations point out the facts, so as to give reasonable notice to the party, to enable him to shape his defence. There is, indeed, in admiralty proceedings, little ground to insist upon much strictness of averment, because, in however general terms the offence may be articulated, it is always in the power of the court to prevent surprise, by compelling more particular charges as to the matters intended to be brought forward by the proofs. In general, it may be said, is sufficient, in libels in rem, for forfeitures, to allege the offence in the terms of the statute creating the forfeitures. There may be exceptions to this rule, where the terms of the statute are so general as naturally to call for more distinct specifications. Without pretending to enumerate such exceptions, let us look at the allegations in the amended libel in the present case. It charges, "that the said brig, called the Palmyra, &c., was, and is, a vessel from which a piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint and seizure, has been first attempted and made, to wit, upon the high seas, in and upon the schooner Coquette, a vessel of the United States, and of the citizens thereof, and in and upon the master, officers and crew of the said schooner Coquette, citizens of the United States; and also in and upon the Jeune Eugenie, a vessel of the United States, and of the citizens thereof, and in and upon Edward L. Coffin, the master, and the officers and crew of the said vessel, being citizens of the United States, and also in and upon other vessels of the United States, their officers and crews, citizens of the United States, and in and upon other vessels of various nations, states and *king*14] doms, their officers and crews, citizens and subjects of said states and kingdoms." Now, whatever may be said as to the looseness and generality, and consequent insufficiency of the latter clauses of this allegation, the former specifying the Coquette and Jeune Eugenie (upon which alone the proofs mainly rely for condemnation), have, in our opinion, reasonable and sufficient certainty. It was not necessary to state in detail the particular acts consti The Palmyra. tuting the piratical aggression, search, depredation, restraint or seizure. The general words of the statute are sufficiently descriptive of the nature of the offence; and the particular acts are matters proper in the proofs. We may, then, dismiss this part of the objection. The other point of objection is of a far more important and difficult nature. It is well known, that at the common law, in many cases of felonies, the party forfeited his goods and chattels to the crown. The forfeiture did not, strictly speaking, attach in rem; but it was a part, or, at least, a consequence, of the judgment of conviction. It is plain, from this statement that no right to the goods and chattels of the felon could be acquired by the crown, by the mere commission of the offence; but the right attached only by the conviction of the offender. The necessary result was, that in every case where the crown sought to recover such goods and chattels, it was indispensable to establish its right, by producing the record of the judgment of conviction. In the contemplation of the common law, the offender's right was not divested, until the conviction. But this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures created by statute, in rem, cognisable on the revenue side of the exchequer. The thing is here primarily considered as the offender, or rather the offence is attached primarily to the thing; and this, whether the offence be malum prohibitum, or malum in se. The same principle applies to proceedings in rem, on seizures in the admiralty. Many cases exist, where the forfeiture for acts done attaches solely in rem, and there is no accompanying penalty in personam; many cases exist, where there is both a forfeiture in rem and a personal penalty. *But in [*15 neither class of cases, has it ever been decided, that the prosecutions were dependent upon each other. But the practice has been, and so this court understands the law to be, that the proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by, any criminal proceeding in personam. This doctrine is deduced from a fair interpretation of the legislative intention, apparent upon its enactments. Both in England and America, the jurisdiction over proceedings in rem, is usually vested in different courts from those exercising criminal jurisdiction. If the argument at the bar were well founded, there could never be a judgment of condemnation pronounced against any vessel coming within the prohibitions of the acts on which the present libel is founded; for there is no act of congress which provides for the personal punishment of offenders, who commit "any piratical aggression. search, restraint, depredation or seizure," within the meaning of those acts Such a construction of the enactments, which goes wholly to defeat their operation, and violates their plain import, is utterly inadmissible. In the judgment of this court, no personal conviction of the offender is necessary, to enforce a forfeiture in rem, in cases of this nature. Having disposed of these questions, which are preliminary in their nature, we may now advance to the consideration of those which turn upon the merits of the cause. These questions are: 1. Whether the present be, upon the facts, a case for condemnation? and if not, 2. Whether it be a case of remunerative damages? for vindictive damages are and must be disclaimed. Upon the first point, it is unnecessary to go into any examination at large of the various facts preceding and accompanying the capture, because the judges are divided in opinion; and consequently, according to the known practice of |