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Ramsay v. Allegre.

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countries of the European continent. Such, too, was the law of Scotland, until it was recently altered by a decision "founded principally, as it seems, upon a desire to render the law of Scotland conformable to the law of England upon this subject." (Abbott, pt. 2, ch. 3, 14, p. 142.) How far the limits prescribed to the jurisdiction of the admiralty in England over maritime contracts, by the decisions of the commonlaw courts, after ages of controversy, had been adopted in this country, before the revolution, and how far the grant of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction in the constitution of the United States is to be construed with reference to those decisions, are questions foreign to the purpose of this note. The only question here is, whether Mr. Pinkney was warranted in quoting this passage *" and the cases [*642 there cited," as an authority for the position, that "the maritime law has given such a lien, which may be enforced in the admiralty.' The question is not, whether the authority is conclusive to support the position; but whether it is sufficiently pertinent to render it probable that it was actually referred to for that purpose. It may be, that there is, as is contended in the above opinion, some discrepancy among the decisions of the admiralty judges in this country on the subject; but still the cases collected in a note to the American edition of Abbott (p. 160), are believed to be sufficient to rescue the argument attributed to Mr. Pinkney from the imputation oʻ being directly contradicted by the authoritics quoted to sustain it. The case of The Levi Dearborne, determined by Mr. Justice Johnson in the circuit court of Georgia, is also quoted by Mr. Pinkney for the same purpose. That "this quotation was in point," will appear by the following extract from the opinion of the learned judge, as we find it reported by Mr. Hall. "The lien on vessels for material-men and shipwrights, exists only in a foreign port. Where the owner is present and resident, the common-law principle must govern; in such case, no lien on the vessel is created. In the case of the owner, who, though present when the work and materials are furnished, is transient and non-resident, I am disposed to think otherwise, and that in such case the lien attaches. It is proper also to state, what shall be deemed a foreign, and what a domestic port, as to this question: the seaports of the different states ought, in this respect, to be considered as foreign ports in relation to each other. Charieston, for instance, is a foreign port, as to a claim of this nature made in Savannah." 4 Hall's Law Journ. 101.

4. That "in the case of a domestic ship, it was long since settled by the most solemn adjudications of the common law (which was the law of Maryland), that mechanics have no lien upon the ship itself for their demands, but must look to the personal security of the owner." This position is not denied to be supported by the authorities said to have been quoted by Mr. Pinkney; but the error imputed to the report consists in the asserted liability of a foreign ship to such a lien, which (as it has been seen) is recognised and enforced by the general maritime law, and which appears also to have been maintained by several admiralty judges in this country, and especially, by Mr. Justice JoHNSON, although it may not have been adopted by the peculiar law of England.

In making these remarks, the editor has certainly not been influenced by any feelings of disrespect towards the learned judge by whom the above opinion was delivered, nor even by a desire to controvert the peculiar doctrines maintained in that opinion. It is his own character for accuracy and integrity as the reporter of the decisions of this court which the editor feels to be assailed, and therefore *seeks [*643 to vindicate. It is a duty which he owes to the court, to the profession, and to his own reputation, to maintain the fidelity of the reports, which are received as authentic evidence of the proceedings and adjudications of this high tribuual. If they are not to be relied on in this respect, they are worthless. In closing his labors, the editor has the consolation of reflecting, that it has been his humble aim to do justice to the learning and talents of the bar, and to uphold the honor and dignity of the bench. How far he has succeeded in this attempt, it does not become him to speak; but he is willing to submit to the impartial judgment of his professional brethren, whether the above accusation is supported by evidence.

INDEX

TO THE

PRINCIPAL MATTERS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.

The References in this Index are to the STAR *pages.

ADMIRALTY.

The Palmyra...

1. A question of probable cause of seizure, under the piracy acts of the 3d of March 1819, ch 75, and the 15th of May 1820, ch. 212. *1 2. In such a case, although the crew may be protected by a commission bonâ fide received, and acted under, from the consequences attaching to the offence of piracy, by the general law of nations, although such commission was irregularly issued; yet, if the defects in the commission be such as, connected with the insubordination, and predatory spirit of the crew, to excite a justly founded suspicion, it is sufficient, under the act of congress, to justify the captors for bringing in the vessel for adjudication, and to exempt them from costs and damages. Id. 8. Although probable cause of seizure will not exempt from costs and damages, in seizures under mere municipal statutes, unless expressly made a ground of justification by the law itself, this principle does not extend to captures jure belli, nor to marine torts generally, nor to acts of congress authorizing the exercise of belligerent rights to a limited extent, such as the piracy acts of the 3d of March 1819, ch. 75, and the 15th of May 1820, ch. 112.......... Id.

4. Explanation of the decree of this court in the case of the The Antelope, 10 Wheat. 66, and 11 Id. 413. The Antelope.... *546 5. Quare? Whether a suit in personam in the admiralty may be maintained against the owner of a ship, by materiai-men furnishing supplies for the ship in her home port, where the local law gives no specific lien upon the ship, which can be enforced by a proceeding in rem? Ramsay v. Allegre......... *611 6. However this may be, in general, such suit cannot be maintained, where the owner has given a negotiable promissory note for the

debt, which is not tendered to be given up, or actually surrendered, at the hearing...Id. See CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES: JURISDICTION, 5, 6.

BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY

NOTES.

1. An unconditional promise, by the indorser of a bill or note, to pay it, or the acknowledg ment of his liability, after knowledge of his discharge from his responsibility, by the laches of the holder, is an implied waiver of due notice of a demand from the drawee, acceptor or maker. Thornton v. Wynn........* 183 2. A mere agreement by the holder of a bill with the drawer, for delay, without any consid eration for it, and without any communication with, or assent of the indorser, will not discharge the latter, after he has been fixed in his responsibility, by the refusal of the drawee, and due notice to himself. McLe more v. Powell.......

*554

3. Wherever the government of the United States, through its lawfully authorized agents, becomes the holder of a bill of exchange, it is bound to use the same diligence, in order to charge the indorser, as in a transaction between private individuals. United States v. Barker.... *559

4. Where the United States were the holders of certain bills of exchange, and their agent in New York was directed, by a letter from the secretary of the treasury, dated Washington, December 7th, 1814, to give notice of nonacceptance to the drawer and indorsers, residing in New York, and notice was given to the indorser, on the 12th of the same month, the mail which left the 8th having arrived at New York at 35 minutes past 10 o'clock, A. M. on the 10th: Held, that the indorser

was discharged by the negligence of the
holders.

Id.
5. So also, where the United States were the
nolders of other bills, and their agent in New
York was directed, by a letter from the secre-
tary of the treasury, dated Washington, May
8th, 1815, to give notice of non-payment to the
drawer and indorsers residing in New York,
and notice was given to the indorser, on the
12th of the same month, the mail which left
Washington on the 8th, having reached New
York early on the morning of the 11th:
Held, that the indorser was discharged by
..Id.
the negligence of the holders...

CASES COMMENTED ON, AND CON-
FIRMED OR OVERRULED.

1. English v. Darley, Bos. & Pul. 61; Nat-
wyn v. St. Quintín, 1 Id. 652. Discharge of
indorser of bill by laches of holder. McLe
more v. Powell....
.*555, 557
2. Fitzherbert v. Mather, 1 T. R. 12. Fraud
or concealment, to avoid the policy. General
Interest Ins. Co. v. Ruggles...
*415
3. Fowle v. Common Council of Alexandria, li
Wheat. 320. Demurrer to evidence. Colum-
bian Ins. Co. v. Catlett....

*389

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jurisdiction of this court from the judgments
of the highest state court, in cases arising
under the constitution, laws and treaties of
the Union. Williams v. Norris.......*124
8. Oliver v. Maryland Ins. Co., 7 Cranch 487.
Deviation..
..... Id. *390
9. Osborn v. Bank of the United States, 9
Wheat. 855. Jurisdiction of the courts of the
Union in suits brought by the postmaster-
general. Postmaster-General v. Early.. *149
10. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362. The Marianna
Flora, 11 Ibid. 2. Probable cause of seizure.
The Palmyra.....

.*17

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2. But if the rights of those not before the
court are inseparably connected with the
claim of the parties litigant, so that a final
decision cannot be made between them, with-
out affecting the rights of the absent parties,
the peculiar constitution of the circuit court
forms no ground for dispensing with such
parties....

... . . . Id.
3. But the court may, in its discretion, where
the purposes of justice require it, retain ju-
risdiction of the cause, on an injunction bill,
as between the parties regularly before it,
until the plaintiffs have had an opportunity of
litigating their controversy with the other par-
ties, in a competent tribunal; and if it finaily
appear by the judgment of such tribunal,
that the plaintiffs are equitably entitled to
the interest claimed by the other parties, may
proceed to a final decree upon the merits. Id.
4. A question of fact, upon a bill filed to set
aside the sale and assignment of a land-war-
rant, upon the ground that it was obtained
by fraudulent misrepresentation, and taking
undue advantage of the party's imbecility of
body and mind. Conner v. Featherstone..*199
5. Evidence deemed insufficient, and bill dig.
missed...
.....Id.
6. Rule of equity, that where land is sold as for
a certain quantity, a court of equity relieves,
if the quantity be defective, only applicable
to contracts for the sale of land in a settled
country, where the titles are complete, the
boundaries determined, and the real quantity
known, or capable of being ascertained by
the vendor. Dunlap v. Dunlap... ... . *575
7. Relief in equity against a judgment at law,
upon certain bonds given for the indemnity
of the obligee, as indorser of notes drawn by
the obligor, the consideration having failed.
Scott v. Shreeve ...
.*605

8. The assignee of such bonds takes them sub-
ject to all equities existing between the ori-
ginal parties.....
...ld.

See LEX LOCI, 1.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

1. The authority to decide whether the exigencies
contemplated in the constitution of the
United States, and the act of congress of
1795, ch. 101, in which the president has

authority to call forth the militia, "to execute
the laws of the Union, suppress insurrections,
and repel invasions," have arisen, is exclu-
sively invested in the president, and his
decision is conclusive upon all other persons.
Martin v. Mott....
......*19

2. Although a militia-man, who refused to obey
the orders of the president, calling him into
the public service, under the act of 1795, is
not, in the sense of the act, "employed in the
service of the United States," so as to be sub-
ject to the rules and articles of war; yet he
is liable to be tried for the offence, under the
5th section of the same act, by a court-mar-
tial called under the authority of the United
States....

..Id.

8. Where, in an action of replevin, the de-
fendant, being a deputy-marshal of the United
States, avowed and justified the taking the
plaintiff's goods, by virtue of a warrant issued
to the marshal of the district, to collect
a fine imposed on him by the judgment of a
court-martial, described as a general court-
martial composed of officers of the militia of
the state of New York, in the service of the
United States (six in number, and naming
them), duly organized and convened, by gen-
eral orders, issued pursuant to the act of con-
gress of February 28th, 1795, ch. 101, for the
trial of those of the militia of the state of
New York, ordered into the service of the
United States in the third military district,
who had refused to rendezvous and enter into
the service of the United States, in obedience
to the orders of the commander in chief of
the state of New York, of the 4th and 29th
of August, 1814, issued in compliance with
the requisition of the president, made in pur-
suance of the same act of congress, and al-
leging that the plaintiff, being a private in
the militia, neglected and refused to rendez-
vous, &c., and was regularly tried by the said
general court-martial, and duly convicted of
the said delinquency: Held, that the avowry
was good.....
.Id.

4. It is not necessary, in such a case, that it
should appear, in point of fact, that the par-
ticular exigency actually existed; it is suffi-
cient, that the president has determined it,
and all other persons are bound by his
decision.
. Id.*32

5. It is unnecessary to set out the orders of
the president; it is sufficient to show, that the
governor of the state called out the militia
upon the requisition of the president...Id.*33
6. It is not necessary, that the court-martial for
the trial of delinquent, under the act of 1795,
should be composed of the precise number
of officers required by the rules and articles of
war for the composition of general courts-
martial in the army..
....Id.*35

7. A court-martial, regularly organized under
the act of 1795, ch. 101, does not expire
with the termination of a war then ex-
isting....
Id.*37

8. Under the 25th section of the judiciary act
of 1789, ch. 20, where the construction of
any clause in the coustitution, or any statute
of the United States, is drawn in question, in
any suit in a state court, the decision must
be against the title or right set up by the
party, under such clause of the constitution
or statute, or this court has no appellate
jurisdiction in the case; it is not sufficient,
that the construction of the statute was
drawn in question, and that the decision was
against the title of the party; it must appear
that his title depended upon the statute.
Williams v. Norris ....
.......*117

9. Where, in such a case, the validity of a statute
of any state is drawn in question, upon the
ground of its being repugnant to the consti-
tution of the United States, and the decision
has been in favor of its validity, it is neces-
sary to the exercise of the appellate jurisdic-
tion of this court, that it should distinctly
appear, that the title or right of the party
depended upon the statute..

... Id.
10. Under the 25th section of the judiciary act
of 1789, ch. 20, this court has no appellate
jurisdiction from the final judgment of the
highest court of a state, in a suit where is
drawn in question the construction of a
statute of, or a commission held under, the
United States, unless some title, right, privi-
lege, or exemption, under such statute, &c.,
be specially set up by the party, and the de-
cision be against the claim so made by him.
Montgomery v. Hernandez..
.*129

11. Where a suit was brought in a state court,
upon a marshal's bond, under the act of
April 10th, 1806, ch. 21, by a person injured
by a breach of the condition of the bond, and
the defendants set up as a defence to the ac-
tion, that the suit ought to have been brought
in the name of the United States, and the
court decided, that it was well brought by
the party injured in his own name: Held,
that the exemption here set up being merely
as to the form of the action, and no question
arising as to the legal liability of the defen-
dants, under the act of congress, this court
has no authority to re-examine the judgment,
so far as respected the construction of that
part of the act, which provides, that suits on
marshals' bonds "shall be commenced and
prosecuted within six years after the said
right of action shall have accrued, and not
afterwards.".....
...Id.

12. The circuit courts of the Union have juris-
diction, under the constitution, and the acts
of April 30th, 1810, ch. 262, § 29, and of

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