BOOK III. The scheme being thus far perfected, the king 1698. wrote a letter from Loo to lord Somers, dated

to

my

August the 15th, 1698, expressed in the following cautious terms: "I imparted to you before I left England, that in France there was expressed lord Portland some inclination to come to an agreement with us concerning the succession of the king of Spain; since which count Tallard has mentioned it to me, and has made such propositions; the particulars of which my lord Portland will write to Vernon, to whom I have given orders not to communicate them to any other besides yourself, and to leave to your judgment to whom else you would think proper to impart them: to the end that I might know your opinion upon so important an affair, and which requires the greatest secrecy. IF IT BE FIT this negotiation should be carried on, there is no time to be lost; and you will send me the full powers under the great seal, with the names in BLANK, to treat with count Tallard."*

In reply, the chancellor, then indisposed at Tunbridge, wrote to the king, saying, "that lord Orford, Mr. Montague, and the duke of Shrewsbury, had been made acquainted with the subject of his majesty's letter;" and stating, though in faint and feeble terms, the various objections which occurred to them on the perusal of the papers Hardwicke Papers.

transmitted by the earl of Portland. "As to BOOK III. what would be the future condition of Europe if 169s. the proposal took place, we thought ourselves," says the chancellor, with surely too great a refinement of modesty, "little capable of judging. But it seemed, that if Sicily was in the French hands, they will be entirely masters of the Levant trade; that if they were possessed of Finale and those other sea-ports on that side, whereby Milan would be entirely shut out from relief by sea, or any other commerce, that duchy would be of little signification in the hands of any prince; and that, if the king of France had possession of that part of Guipuscoa which is mentioned in the proposal, besides the ports he would have in the ocean, it does seem, he would have as easy a way of invading Spain on that side as he now has on the side of Catalonia." After all, lord Somers concedes in the king's favor the grand points, that England was not disposed to enter into a new war; that France could not be expected to relinquish so rich a succession without considerable advantages: and that the king would no doubt reduce the terms as low as can be done; and he concludes with sending the blank commissions under the great seal, as required.

on the

The object of William was most assuredly to Reflections prevent a future desolating and destructive war proposed Treaty of in Europe. But could it be imagined by a Partition.

BOOK NI. prince so celebrated for sagacity that the em 1698. peror would acquiesce in an arrangement so inju

rious to his interest, and so contrary to his pretended rights? No; it is evident, from the tenor of his letters to the pensionary Heinsius, that the king of England did not so far flatter or deceive himself. Would the court of Madrid ever be prevailed upon to confirm this arbitrary distribution of its territories, equally incompatible with national dignity and national prejudice? Could the sincerity of France itself be depended upon in this business? The court of Versailles had probably too much political penetration to expect this project to be peaceably executed. They hoped by these means to secure the amity, or at least the neutrality, of England; and any opposition from the emperor would disengage them from the obligation of confining themselves, if successful, within the letter of the treaty. " It does not appear, "says lord Somers, in his elaborate answer to the king, "in case this negotiation should proceed, what is to be done on your part, in order to make it take place; whether any more be required than that the English and Dutch should 1 sit still, and France itself to see it executed. If that be so, what security ought we to expect, that, if by our being neuter the French be successful, the French will confine themselves to the terms of the treaty, and not attempt to make

In these BOOK ĮIL

farther advantages of their success?" circumstances, a severe but obvious and indispensable duty was imposed on the lord chancellor to represent to the king, in the most energetic language, the pernicious consequences which must inevitably result from this strange and impracticable project; and peremptorily to refuse, at the risque of incurring the utmost displeasure of the king, to transmit the extraordinary, and unconstitutional commission required of him. Even supposing, against all probability, the eventual acquiescence of Spain and the emperor in this treaty, what arrangement more favorable to the interests of France could, even the most successful war command, or the caprice of chance devise, than the present, by which so many rich and valuable provinces were incorporated with her empire?

་

The chief object of the king and kingdom of Spain was to preserve unimpaired, by a simple and absolute devolution to one of the rival claimants, the unity and grandeur of the Spanish monarchy. But the courts of Vienna and Versailles did not for a moment indulge the hope, that Europe would permit the crown of Spain to be held in conjunction either with the imperial or Gallic diadem. The real views and efforts of the emperor were directed to the exaltation of his second son, the archduke Charles; and of the king of

1698.

1

BOOK III. France, of his grandson the duke of Anjou, second 1698. son of the dauphin, to the Spanish throne: and it

Treaty of Partition signed.

was a maxim universally received amongst the Spaniards themselves, that the empire of Spain could neither be dismembered on the one hand, or absorbed and swallowed up in the vortex of any collateral power on the other. The king of Spain had shewn himself sufficiently inclined to favor the pretensions of the house of Austria, in contradistinction to those of the house of Bourbon; but his vanity was flattered by the adulatory solicitations of the rival powers, and his jealousy alarmed at the idea of an irreversible settlement of the succession; so that his weak and feeble mind, though he had death in near and terrific prospect, could not attain to any resolute and steady decision.

The commission under the great seal of England had no sooner arrived, than the treaty was formally signed, October 11th, 1698, by the earl of Portland, and Sir Joseph Williamson, ambassador at the Hague, on the part of the king of England, and on that of the king of France by M. Tallard, in the preamble of whose powers it is said, "that the desire of maintaining the peace of Europe, together with the esteem and friendship which Louis king of France and Navarre had conceived for his most dear and beloved bro