PREFACE.

I AGAIN take the field with a new volume of Military History; but it may be thought by some, that it is only to occupy ground already surveyed to the square inch, and which has been pretty well trodden under foot by the many crossing paths of previous wanderers. Turenne and Condé, Prince Rupert, Montrose, and Cromwell, are names "as familiar as household words to men and women, young and old. It is with a desire to call the actions of these old Warriors back to modern military study that I venture to put forth these volumes. Surely Turenne was a Warrior and "a ripe and good one," and the story of his career may be rendered most instructive to young officers. Montrose is one whose life is cherished principally for its romance, but hitherto he has been scarcely brought into prominent notice as being distinguished by such an extraordinary genius in War as the world has rarely witnessed. The first Napoleon, whose natural genius for war excelled that of most Commanders, must himself share the palm with the Great Marquis in this respect. It may perhaps surprise some, to find King Charles the First in my list of "Warriors!" Nevertheless it cannot be denied that he saw as much service in the field as most men: and this is considered a legitimate plea to satisfy the claims of many a modern Warrior. I think he will be found to have possessed higher qualities for an officer than has been commonly supposed, because these were too often dashed by the great infirmity of his mind--a dis

trust of his own judgment.

Fairfax, like Monk (whose life will appear hereafter), has never had full justice done to his military character, because he has been tested only by civilians, who appear to have overlooked his martial conduct.

An article in the recent "Quarterly Review" heralds the revival to the army of an old military question, which, like those dazzling meteors that periodically recur, comes forth at intervals with a captivating brilliancy, but subsides again and again at intervals, without ever obtaining a settled place in our military system. Theoretic War is a common accompaniment of times of peace, and when the profession have little experience of the rough practice of soldiering its annals lose for the moment their bloody characteristic, and it passes into the hands of clever and ingenious men, by whom it attains a dreamy grandeur, that captivates the young and inexperienced among us. The question mooted is, to reduce the proverbial uncertainties of a conflict into a sort of mathematical problem, and to render the most unrestrained excitement to which the human mind can be exposed amenable to the regular movement of a time-piece. My opinion on such a matter may be of little moment; but I will confess that the science that is thought to be established on theories of war does not find more favour in my mind than it did in that of the Great Master in whose school I desire to enrol myself. I am disposed to notice it in this place, because I hold it to be a questionable, if not a dangerous study for those officers who have had no experience of the practice of war; for, while flattering the uninitiated, it must inevitably lead to disappointment, as it has done again and again. I do not believe that any great strategist has ever been a

successful leader of armies; and I have never met with an old campaigner who believes in the science as otherwise than very partially applicable to the field.

The object of the Reviewer is to put forth some recent works as a directory for modern war, principally deriving its precepts from Continental writers. The master, like the Prophet with Nebuchadnezzar, sets forth the dream as well as the interpretation. To establish a rule of his own making, he gives an illustration of his own drawing. He does not permit himself to be tied down by any previous authority, nor does he quote any to establish his dicta. He says "War has its rules like any other science," yet he fails to note whence he derives them, and takes up the subject without any reference to what has been previously established by common consent or otherwise. Were lawyers or doctors to establish the principles of a science in a like manner, woe betide the client and the patient. I may appear fanciful, and I do not affect to speak positively, when I affirm that the Archduke Charles, who is among the authorities noticed, was the most successful rival of Napoleon, while, with his morning mind and muscle, he followed out his own manly sense in the operations of war; but after he endeavoured to fight by rule, he was invariably worsted. General Jomini (another of the Reviewer's great authorities), whose historical writings are excellent, but whose authority on strategy is doubted, never was, as is well known, a leader of men in the field, who earned any repute, as such, either at Berlin or Paris. Frederick and Napoleon, who are, without any just reason, adopted as preachers and teachers in the school, treated the science of war quite as an after-thought in their glorious carcers, but both mostly acted in direct variance to all rules.

But before proceeding further in the discussion of Strategy, I would desire to separate it altogether from things mixed up with it by the Reviewer. The necessity of a good staff, and a good commissariat, and an efficient military train, is not disputed; neither is the entire art couched in the word "Tactics." This last is admitted to be the very corner-stone of military operations, and may overcome fortune, in despite of Strategy. Every officer who has seen even an hour's service must have learned by experience the power of Tactics to save formations in the darkest necessities of a contest. On Tactics the successful handling of troops principally depends. Many thoughtless young men, who have never gone beyond a barrack-yard, despise drill (which is, in fact, the mother's milk of Tactics) as a tedious, and, as they would deem it, an unprofitable waste of time; but of such a notion every soldier should disabuse his mind. Discipline, and the power of readily handling masses, is the indispensable means of success in War.

Having now disencumbered the question of Strategy of those things which are really no part of it, I would ask of its advocates, if, as is asserted, War is subject to fixed laws, why are the rules of Strategy sought to be established upon very limited examples in history 1? If the rules assumed be indeed the real science of War, it ought to be applicable to every contest that was ever waged. And what is also remarkable, the "cases cited" are (amongst the few that are given) derived freely from the late War in the United States,-a contest as yet very imperfectly

1 What principle of strategy gave the victory to Condé at Rocroy? How many more of Frederick's successes were due to the inspiration of the moment than to science? What was it but the crudest effort of genius that brought to an end Napoleon's three days' battle at Arcole? There was certainly no strategy involved in it.