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But he never neglected the secondary thing that may assail it. That the theatres. In 1805 and again in 1809, British Admiralty has not given us, when engaged with Austria in central and the present position in the MediterEurope, he left in the north of Italy ranean is a melancholy comment on a force sufficient to "contain" the Aus- Mr. Churchill's assurance of March 18, trian armies that were operating on 1912: “The Admiralty are prepared to the Po or Tagliamento-a force strong guarantee absolutely the main security enough to avert any catastrophe in of the country and of the Empire day that quarter. The British Admiralty by day for the next few years." It has thus neglected the teaching of his- cannot guarantee the security of the tory and the principles of war in de. Mediterranean without which, as Adnuding the Mediterranean.

miral Mahan has shown, the British This step has been taken at a time Empire falls to pieces, the interior line when a war is actually in progress in to India is lost, Malta and Egypt are that sea be ween Italy and Turkey. exposed, and attacks on the British Italy is now in possession of Rhodes trade-routes in the Atlantic facilitated. and the main bases in the Æge& l. She Unless Malta and Egypt with their is establishing a naval base at Tobruk garrisons are to be cut off and overon the confines of Tripoli, and hence. whelmed, with the withdrawal of our forward a strong military Power will fleet we must either (1) withdraw altobe planted to the west of Egypt. gether our Mediterranean garrisons, or Though the Italian Government is on (2) double them and construct modern excellent terms with the British Gov- defences armed with the heaviest ernment, the fact remains that Italy

modern guns.

What effect the loss of is the ally of Germany. On the east- these two positions in war would exert ern frontier of Egypt, is another mili- upon the situation in India may be left tary Power of growing strength, Tur- to the imagination. Kaye and Mallekey, and the progress of her Hedjaz son have shown that British military railway is a distinct menace to the weakness in the Crimea was one of the British position in that country. More. causes of the Indian Mutiny. And the over, from the days of Bismarck, Ger- loss of our Mediterranean possessions many has always aimed at using would not merely stimulate revolt but Turkey against the British Empire in would also prevent us from promptly Egypt, and the Taba demonstration, to dealing with it; it might even bring the which reference has already been cruisers of the Triple Alliance into the made, was the first indication of the Indian Ocean by the Suez Canal and peril to us of such a policy. It would interfere with any attempt to move renot be easy to combine Italy and Tur- inforcements from Australia and Cankey in a common movement against ada. It would, in fact, bring down ourselves, but Napoleon achieved feats the Empire with a crash. as difficult. A Power which is weak The peril is then immense.

To conand which has widely scattered mari- ceal it, the Malta Conference, or the time possessions always invites attack, members of the Government who took for such possessions whet the appetite part in it, are believed to have devised of ambitious nations and provide all one of these half-measures which apthe members of a vast coalition with peal to politicians. No alliance is to loot. The only guarantee of those be concluded with France, but she is to possessions is control of the sea, and be invited to make an agreement, uncontrol of the sea can only be exer- der which she will do for us what we cised by a naval force superior to any- are not prepared to do for ourselves,

It may

and meet the Mediterranean fleets of At no point, then, in the next three the Triple Alliance. To aid her in this years will France be in a position to task, the British fleet at Gibraltar is, meet, without very substantial aid we are told vaguely, to be strengthened. from England or Russia, the navies It is therefore of paramount importance of the Triple Alliance in the south. In to consider two points: (1) What naval pre-"Dreadnoughts” France has a force assistance France can give, and (2) of eleven effective ships launched not what reinforcements, without special

more than twelve years. Italy posmeasures, which, if taken at all, must sesses six such ships and Austria nine; be taken immediately, we can afford but, making allowance for the inferior to despatch to the south of Europe. quality of the older Austrian and Ital

In war the French Navy will have to ian ships, France is superior to Italy face serious liabilities in the protection

and Austria combined in the older of French interests, which must come types of ships. Still there is nothing first. It will have to cover the com

whatever to encourage hope in French munications between France, Corsica, victory at sea against these two Medand the French dominions in northern "iterranean Powers in the near future, Africa, including Tunis, which may even if we throw in the four old Britbe exposed to Italian attack.

ish battleships at Gibraltar. The have to guard the transfer of the nine- French programme, moreover, cannot teenth French army corps from Algeria

be accelerated, and for two reasons; the to Marseilles, in order to give France French slips are now fully occupied, the maximum of force to meet the vast

and the French armor-plate making rearmies which Germany will deploy in sources are fully tasked; while in view Lorraine. Its chiefs would have their of the danger on land which France hands full, even if the French navy

has to face in Lorraine, any diversion were overwhelmingly strong. But un.

of her resources from her army to her fortunately that navy is still suffering fleet is unwise, so long at least as the from the disastrous results of M. Pel

British people refuse to adopt compulletan's administration ten years ago.

sory service. Money is needed for the He has gone, but his evil works live French Army, and in the interests of after him. Not all M. Delcassé's efforts

the Triple Entente it can be best spent have been able to make good the accu

in that direction. Russia will have no mulated defects. An abundant supply “Dreadnoughts” complete in either the of trustworthy powder is lacking. The

south or north of Europe before 1915, investigation which followed the fear

if then. ful disaster in the Liberté proved that

So, then, the solution of the problem none of the powder in existence in 1911

depends on the force which England could be regarded as safe; and the man.

can detach to the south of Europe with. ufacture of the French explosive is a

out risking disaster in the north. That, slow and difficult operation. For the

again, depends on what Germany does time being, then, the French fleet is

and the number of ships she completes. greatly handicapped. In the imme- And that again, depends on whether diate future, it will compare as follows

Germany accelerates or does not; and with the Italian and Austrian Navies

that, again, depends on whether the in “Dreadnoughts":

German General Staff and the Kaiser

and Admiral Tirpitz determine to Complete in December 1912 0 1 1 April 1913

strike quickly or to "wait and see"

0 2 1 October 1913 2 4 2

whether the, fruit will not drop into April 1914

France Italy Austria

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2 6 3

their mouths without striking. April 1915 4 8? 4 dismiss from our minds the idea that


Let us


any man or any policy can change have, that is to say, denuded the Par German intentions. The fatal fact is cific, for our old armored cruisers in that the British Empire stands in the Pacific waters are not to be taken seway of German oversea expansion, and riously, and the single Australian that the very geographical position of "Dreadnought" will hardly weigh in the British Islands is now construed the scale. Of our twenty-six "Dread. as an offence to German national feel- noughts," eighteen will be battleships to ing. The iceberg and the Titanic are the German sixteen, and eight will be moving, as in Mr. Hardy's strange and battle-cruisers to the German five. Our passionate poem, on convergent courses; margin in battleships will be two and the forces that guide Germany are cold in battle-cruisers three, making a total as ice, the momentum behind them, it of five. This is not one single ship seems to the writer, is as formidable as too many; it is many ships too few, if that of Nature herself; the Titanic has we are to be prepared to meet at our no captain on her bridge, and all warn- "average moment" an attack by the ings are ignored by those who are driv- German Navy at its "selected moment." ing her. The “unsinkable ship” and The pre-“Dreadnoughts” on either side the "invincible Navy"-what a strange will not count materially in 1913, so parallel.

vast has been the progress in ordnance, Because Germany has not accelerated armor, and design, and so great will be in the past, therefore our Pacifists con- our difficulty in finding officers and clude that she will never accelerate.

We have nothing here to spare There could be no greater error. If for detachments to the Mediterranean her cold, calculating leaders see any without courting and provoking disaschance of victory and mean to fight, ter at home. they will accelerate. We must be But special measures are still possiprepared for it; if not, we are court- ble, if the Government will act and not ing destruction. By pressing forward walk blindfold to doom. The hours · her “Dreadnoughts" of the 1911 pro- are precious, for the measures must be gramme, Germany can have twenty- instantly taken if they are to be ef. one ships of this type complete by Oc- fective; postponed till next year they tober 1913, and perhaps a little earlier. will come too late. The necessary We may, then, have to meet twenty-one steps are these: “Dreadnoughts” in the North Sea in (1) Acceleration of our 1911 proOctober 1913, the date when in relation gramme of five “Dreadnoughts." By to France, the navies of the Triple Al. working overtime, and offering the con. liance in the Mediterranean will be at tractors special premiums for quick detheir maximum strength; and when the livery, it might be possible to add all Russian military reorganization will these five ships, or certainly four of not have been completed.

them, by October 1913. The step will Failing special measures, our force cost money, and much money; but the at that date will be twenty-six “Dread. funds are there in the six and a half noughts,” excluding the Australian millions of surplus. The five ships ship. To get twenty-six we have been could be sent south, and would do compelled to break our agreement of something to redress the balance and 1909 with the Dominions, to keep at give France the support which she will home one "Dreadnought” cruiser, need. which we pledged ourselves to despatch (2) Commencement of the 1912 proto the East, and to divert from the gramme in July 1912, instead of Jan. Pacific the New Zealand ship. We uary 1913, which would enable us to detach an additional ship to the Med- Were these steps taken this month, iterranean early in 1915.

the cost would be no greater than that (3) A supplementary programme of of a large addition to the garrisons in at least two “Dreadnoughts” to provide the Mediterranean and the reconstrucfor the Mediterranean in the future. tion of the Mediterranean fortresses, With the acceleration, that would im- and the peril of war in the immediate pose on our yards as much work as future would be decidedly diminished. they could carry out without delay. No shift, no half-measure will give se

(4) A supplementary programme of curity. The British Empire is probatwenty destroyers for the Mediterra- bly fast approaching the fatal moment nean, to replace the five ancient craft when the efficiency of its national ornow marooned at Malta. We cannot ganization and of its national defences replace them from our ordinary pro- will be tested by the terrible shock of gramme, for, as Mr. Churchill has him. war. Our national credit, with Conself admitted, our position in modern sols at 76, has been gravely shaken. destroyers as against Germany alone is Qur naval predominance is in extreme unsatisfactory. Germany, in actual danger. Our army has no relation to fact, will have ready for sea almost as our Imperial necessities, and is weak many modern destroyers as ourselves in numbers and indifferently armed. (German strength in 1913, probably 120, Our national spirit is such that our not more than twelve years launched; statesmen's one preoccupation is with British strength outside Mediterranean votes; their one object to divide and in 1913, 143).

disintegrate the United Kingdom. (5) Provision of light gun arma- "Whatsoever a man soweth, that shall ments for our larger mail steamers, to he reap.” Do not even they sometimes be always carried on board, and to be tremble at the thought of the crop manned by naval reservists for whom which they are preparing? a subvention would be paid. This is One final word on the Committee of an essential step, as there is now no Defence. If the members of that longer time to build cruisers for the body were worthy of their trust, all the defence of the trade-routes, which are non-politicians among them would ere exposed to a host of German commerce- now have resigned en masse as a prodestroyers.

test against the errors of our defence (6) Addition of six thousand officers policy. In the Morocco crisis of 1911 and men, the maximum that can be they never lifted a finger, so far as the trained, to be followed by a similar ad- writer can discover, to remedy the aber. dition next year.

The conditions of rations and neglect of the Admiralty. payment and service in the new Imme. In the spring of the present year, they diate Reserve to be modified at once, sat still while the fleet was being as it is becoming evident that good withdrawn from the Mediterranean, men cannot be obtained on the terms and left it to Lord Kitchener to play proposed.

the manly part. The National Review.

H. W. Wilson.

THE FOLK SONG FALLACY. We have heard a good deal during upon the native folk-song. Only in this the last few years of the “national way, we are told, can English music spirit" in music, and the necessity of hope to rise as a whole to the level of founding a “national English school" that of France and Germany. The people who talk in this way have ap- diction. Let us look at a few of Sir parently never stopped to examine very Hubert Parry's divagations in his exclosely the meanings of the terms they cellent “Art of Music.” He insists are using. The vaguer and more gen- more than once upon what he regards eral a word is, the more cautious we as a fundamental distinction between should be in our use of it, for it will the Italian" and "the Teutonic" way prove impossible to apply it with the of conceiving music. The former peosame validity in detail as in the mass. ple aim at "external beauty," the lat.

When we find Mr. Cecil Sharp, for ter at "internal beauty." "The bent example, telling us that “when every of the Germans,” he says, speaking of English child is, as a matter of course, the eighteenth century, "was not so made acquainted with the folk-song of much towards beauty as towards exhis own country, then, from whatever pression and character.

Their very class the musician of the future may type of beauty was different from that spring, he will speak in the national of the Italians. The Italians looked musical idiom" we are constrained to for beauty of externals, and the Gerask-What is the “national musical mans for beauty of thought.” This idiom"? It is a high-sounding term, distinction, he holds, is racial in its and an easy one to make a certain kind origin, being visible again in the works of merely verbal resonance with; but of the painters of the two nations. But can Mr. Sharp or any one else show us later on, when he is speaking of the that it has any meaning whatever in new spirit that Schubert brought into terms of concrete fact? If "the national the song, Sir Hubert Parry tells us that musical idiom” is so positive, unmistak. "Mozart, and the Italians among whom able a thing that it will come like sec- he represents the highest type, usually ond nature to any one who has ab. make long meandering passages of melsorbed a sufficient number of folk- ody with no very definite articulation. songs, ought we not to be able to iso- The true Teuton, aiming at concentralate the essence of it and express it in tion of expression, compresses his some simple verbal formula? Yet who thought into figures which are specially will undertake to do this in connection definite and telling." The typical with the music of any country? Who Italian, then, is a German! Mozart, in could ever hope, for instance, to find fact, though a German, is not a “true one common formula for the idioms of Teuton" like Schubert. It certainly Debussy, d'Indy, Berlioz, Bizet, Saint- looks as if Schubert's Teutonism were Saëns, Bruneau, and Massenet? Is safe enough; but on the very next page there, in fact, such a thing as a French Sir Hubert Parry rules him too out of “national musical idiom"? If so, will court. Schumann, he says, “was gifted some ardent partisan of nationalism with more of the familiar Teutonic diskindly tell us what it is?

position to reflect and look inwards The truth seems to be, as Mill and than Schubert, whose gaiety of the Huxley long ago pointed out, that of all Viennese type generally kept him in ways of accounting for the differences touch with the outward aspect of between the arts and customs and con- things." That is to say, the true Teustitutions of nations, that of attributing ton is not a true Teuton in comparison them all to "race" is the most superfi- with a truer Teuton! Nay, it even apcial. The lax habit of mind that al- pears that people who are not Teutons lows people to be satisfied with these at all can be truer Teutons than some pseudo-explanations almost invariably whose Teutonism is unquestionable. decoys them into a maze of self-contra- Sir Hubert Parry, in working out a

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