terms of that act were to put an end to its operation, had arrived. By the bill of this session, now possessing the force of complete law, Parliament had "otherwise provided." The old oaths, renewed in the Act of Union, had been swept away; a new oath had been introduced in their place. The event, therefore, contemplated by the Act of Union, when its operation should cease, had arrived; and if he was thus freed from it, he was freed from the only enactment under which he could have been called on to take the Oath of Supremacy, and subscribe the Declaration. He was entitled to take his seat, as if the Act of Union quoad hoc had never existed.

Again, on the fair and true construction of the Relief bill itself he was entitled to take his seat. By the second section, the right of sitting, on taking the single oath there set down, was extended to all Catholics being peers, and all members returned, after its commencement, to the House of Commons. The provision as to peers was useful in finding out the true meaning as to commoners. Between the 30th of Charles 2nd, and the present time, two Catholics had been created peers, viz. the earl of Kenmure and baron French. They had been created peers, when it was impossible for them to exercise the rights of the peerage by sitting in Parliament. As peers, they stood in the same relation to the new act with members returned before its commencement. Yet undoubtedly, under this clause, they would be entitled to take their seats. Must not the true meaning be the same in relation to commoners? Must not the rights and privileges of the people be held to have as full effect under the

second branch of the clause, as the king's prerogative under the first? But at the very worst, if the words, any Catholic who shall be returned as a member of Parliament after the passing of the act" did not include his case, and expressly admit him, beyond all doubt it did not expressly exclude him, or put a negative on the right which he was now claiming. It did not touch him at all; and his right, on the grounds which he had already stated, to sit without taking the oaths, remained uniujured by any thing this clause contained.

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Lastly, he claimed this right, under the express words of the late statute itself. The 10th section was in the following words; "and be it enacted, that it shall be lawful for any of his majesty's subjects, professing the Roman Catholic religion, to hold, exercise, and enjoy, all civil and military offices, and places of trust or profit under his majesty, his heirs, or successors, and to exercise other franchise or civil right, except as hereinafter excepted, upon taking and subscribing at the times and in the manner hereinafter mentioned, the oath herein before appointed and set forth, instead of the Oaths of Allegiance, Supremacy and Abjuration, and instead of such other oath or oaths as are or may be now by law required to be taken for the purpose aforesaid, by any of his majesty's subjects professing the Roman Catholic religion." It was impossible for even professional subtlety to throw a doubt over words so express. The clause was plain, distinct, anxiously complete. The word "franchise," was introduced in the 5th clause, which provided that Catholics should vote at all elections;

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"franchise," as relating to corporations, was again mentioned in the 14th section yet in this 10th section, Parliament, for fear any franchise had been omitted, had wisely introduced the word "franchise," again. The clause went to give Catholics all "civil rights," under certain specific exceptions, none of which had any reference to the claim now in question. This section, then, expressly gave him every civil right on condition of taking the oath contained in the statute, and that oath alone; and certainly the right which he claimed, viz. a right to sit in Parliament, in virtue of an election reported by a committee of that House to be legal, regular, and formal, was a "civil right." That right he demanded: That right, in so far as the question of his being entitled to exercise it depended on the taking of oaths, he being a Catholic, was the matter in question; this section declared what was required of him, being a Catholic, to entitle him, being a Catholic, to exercise this, or any other "franchise or civil right;" therefore, on complying with this section, his right to exercise his franchise was completed in the express terms of the existing law. This is a summary of Mr. O'Connell's argument, in which there were more points than one very strongly put, and which he delivered with a temperance very different from his customary displays in the arena of the Association, and well fitted to conciliate the good will of the House. The discussion that followed was conducted almost entirely by the lawyers; they took the charge of discovering the true meaning of the act, in an assembly of the very men who had made it a law, but who were now

amazingly at a loss to ascertain what had truly been their own intentions. The Solicitor-general remarked, very justly, in relation to the first point made by Mr. O'Connell-that the Act of Union, in not repeating the penalties, allowed Catholics to enter Parliament without taking the oathsthat it would have been most desirable to have found that out sooner, as all the agitation, and heart-burnings, and schisms, occasioned by the late measure, would have been avoided, when it was known that it gave nothing at all. But the first mistake on this point lay in supposing that the 1st of William and Mary abrogated the statute of Elizabeth in relation to the necessity of taking the Oaths of Allegiance and Supremacy, before the lord steward or his deputy, before entering the House. The first parliament of William and Mary was assembled by missives from the Prince of Orange. It was necessary that its members should take some oaths, and this act was passed, which turned a convention into a Parliament. In that act an alteration was made in the oaths to be taken at the table of the House; but it had no reference whatever to the oaths to be taken above stairs before the lord-steward or his deputy. This was proved by the fact that the commission then made out for the lord-steward differed in nothing from former commissions, except that he and his deputies should administer the Oath of Supremacy as it was regulated by the first of William and Mary; and from that day down to the present time, the practice of administering the oaths by the lord-steward, before members went into the House, had invariably continued.

The act of Elizabeth remained in force; and if a member, therefore, should sit without having taken these oaths before the lord-steword, his seat, ipso facto, became forfeited.

The other point was, that the Act of Union imposed no forfeit ures or penalties on a neglect to take the oath. Before the Union, the oaths to be taken by members of Parliament in Ireland were the same with those imposed in England. This had been declared by Yelverton's act in 1782 or 1783, in consequence of doubts which had arisen; and the only difference was, that, as Ireland had no lordsteward, the oaths were taken at the table of the House. It was difficult to see how, where there were separate legislatures taking the same oaths, their union should abrogate the necessity of taking oaths at all. But it was not left to conjecture: the Act of Union itself declared, "That all laws in force at the time of the Union shall remain in force, subject only to such alterations and regulations, from time to time, as circumstances may appear to the Parliament of the United Kingdom to require." There was no exception, directly or indirectly, as to the taking of oaths in either House; and accordingly, since the Union, various acts of indemnity had been passed in favour of individuals who had failed to take those very oaths. There had been such acts in 1805, 1812, and 1814, to protect members who had taken their seats without having taken the oaths. To put the matter beyond a doubt, the very first clause of the late act itself declared, that, up to the moment at which it became law, the taking of the oaths and making of the de

clarations, now in question, had been necessary as qualifications for sitting and voting in Parliament.

To the point which Mr. O'Connell had male, that the Act of Union, if it continued the penalties as well as the oaths, continued them only till Parliament should "otherwise provide," an event which had happened by the passing of the late act, the Solicitor-general adverted very slightly, and passed on to the argument founded on the Relief bill itself. To the latter, his answer was this. No man, before the late statute, could take his seat, until he had taken the Oaths of Supremacy, and Allegiance before the lord high steward, and had taken them over again at the table of the House, making, likewise, on the latter occasion, the Declaration against transubstantiation, the invocation of saints, and the sacrifice of the mass. Now, the late statute repealed all such declarations; and therefore, if it had stopped at the first clause, no member could take his seat without having first taken the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of Supremacy before the high steward, and without having subsequently taken the Oath of Supremacy in the House. But the next clause bestowed capability on a certain class of persons, enacting that "From and after the commencement of the Act, it shall be lawful for any person professing the Roman Catholic religion, being a peer, or who shall after the commencement of this Act be returned as a member of the House of Commons, to sit and vote in either House of Parliament respectively, upon taking and subscribing an oath" which follows. The act conferred this new right, not on those who were returned as mem

of the act, but on those only who should be returned after it. Then since it was clear, that, before coming to the second clause of the act, no one could enter the House without taking the Oath of Allegiance and the Oath of Supremacy, and since the second was a clause enabling Roman Catholics to sit and vote in Parliament on taking a certain oath, how could Roman Catholics have that right conferred on them by words of a general nature contained in a subsequent clause? There was a reason why such should be the case, in another act of legislation, which run parallel with this act. Though the disfranchisement of the 40s. freeholders was not included in this act, it was understood to be a condition annexed to it; and therefore, to secure the beneficial effects expected from it, it was no less necessary than just, to interpose the restriction of the second clause, so as to prevent the return of members by individuals of that class whom it was thought expedient to disfranchise. As the disfranchisement of a part of the Irish freeholders had been one of the conditions on which the Relief bill had been granted, it was fitting that no Roman Catholic should reap the benefit of the Relief bill, until the Irish elections were conducted upon that new principle, which the Disfranchisement bill would introduce into the elections for Ireland; for otherwise, Mr. O'Connell, or any other person, who was returned under the old system, would have been entitled to claim the benefits of the new system, which it never was the intention of the legisla ture to grant him,

or civil right" in the 10th section, was still weaker than those that preceded it. The Solicitor-general did not mean to deny, that the right to sit in Parliament was a civil right; but he denied that it either was, or if the act got fair play, and the bene fit of the ordinary rules of interpretation, could be, included under the words as used in this part of the statute. The Catholics laboured under a triple disqualification, parliamentary, civil, and municipal, and the very preamble of the bill followed this division, "sitting and voting in Parliament" "the enjoyment of offices""franchises and civil rights." To remove this triple disqualification was the object for which Parliament had legislated; and Parliament had followed out that object very distinctly. The three first clauses of the act related to the right of the Roman Catholics to sit and vote in Parlia ment; and the last of them declared that the oath appointed to be taken by them should be taken before the same persons, at the same times, and in the same manner, as the oaths and the declaration, now required by law, are respectively directed to be taken. The act next proceeded to prescribe the oaths of office, the time and manner of taking them, and the penalties to attach to such persons as should not take them within the stipulated time after their admission into office. It then went on to provide regula tions respecting their admission to franchises or other civil rights, and specified how they were to be complied with before the necessary municipal officers. But Mr. O'Con

nell said, "I will disregard every thing given me by the first clause, and will take the general words of this tenth clause as comprehend ing the grant of every privilege and every right which I seek to exercise." Such an argument was most unwise; for on his own showing, he would be completely out of court. The 10th section enacted that "it shall be lawful for any of his majesty's subjects, professing the Roman Catholic religion, to exercise any other franchise or civil right, upon taking and subscribing at the times and in the manner hereinafter mentioned the oath herein before appointed." Now Mr. O'Connell, on his own showing, had not taken the oath in the manner hereinafter mentioned, but in the manner before mentioned; for he had taken the oath before the lord high steward or his deputy, and not, as the act afterwards required from all holders of any franchise or other civil right, before certain municipal officers. He was ready to admit, that, if there were no other clauses in the bill relative to the right of sitting and voting in Parliament, the words " any other civil right," might give him every thing for which he was contending; but taking all this act together, looking at the first clause of it relative to the admissibility of Roman Catholics into Parliament, and comparing it with the subsequent clauses relative to their admissibility to office-he must say that it did appear to him that this act excluded Mr. O'Connell as completely and as effectively, as if the words "any other civil right" had been erased from it. The Solicitor-general concluded with moving that "It is the opinion of this House that, Mr. O'Connell having

been returned as a member to this House before the commencement of the act passed in the present session for the Relief of his majesty's Roman Catholic subjects, is not entitled to sit or vote in this House, unless he first takes the Oath of Supremacy."

The argument of the Solicitorgeneral was supported by Mr. Fergusson, Mr. Sugden, Mr. Doherty, and sir James Scarlett; although the last of these learned gentlemen held that many parts of the case were by no means free from difficulty. On the other hand, Mr. G. Lamb, and Mr. Maurice Fitzgerald thought that, since there were doubts among the lawyers, it would become members, who were no lawyers, to give the applicant the benefit of the doubt, and hold the to be included under the general relieving and conciliatory spirit and purview of the statute. Mr. W. Wynn suggested, as the best mode to be followed in cases like the present, where a doubt arose from the terms of an act of Parliament being apparently in contradiction with its spirit, that a

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declaratory act should be passed, stating that the individual in question was intended to have been included in the permissory clause. Mr. Brougham maintained that the weight of the argument was in favour of Mr. O'Connell. His argument on the provision of the Act of Union, that its enactments as to oaths should cease, when Parliament should "otherwise provide," and on the fact that Parliament had "otherwise provided," by passing the late bill, had remained without an answer, or an attempt at answer. There was no clause including, in express terms, the