"Wellington, to frustrate all the skill of that his most glorious victories would be "all the French Commanders united; but followed by the necessity of retreat, how "we cannot help reflecting, that our be- were the ministers in England to be able "loved Hero is mortal; a chance shot,- to foresee, much less to prevent, such ne"a fever, might blast all our hopes; and cessity? This writer, who, a few "the prospect of dragging on the war in weeks ago, ascribed to Lord Wellington "Spain, like a Walcheren expedition, exclusively the merit of having nearly an "would be enough to reduce the most zea- nihilated the French army, has now the cool "lous friend of his country to despair." | impudence to tell his readers that the British This paragraph sets out with a posi- army is, numerical strength, not much more tion, from which, though laid down in so than a third part of that of the French army; dogmatical a manner, I must beg leave ex- and that, if the latter should bear down plicitly to dissent. In one way, indeed, it is upon him, he must be compelled to retire the business of a minister to turn victory to into Portugal. Well, and what of that? account. It is his business, and I said at Could the ministers in England prevent the the time, that it was the business of our French army from being so strong, or did iminister, to turn the victory of Salamanca they give imperative orders for undertaking to account, by offering Napoleon, who was those marches, those battles, and those alleged to be the defeated party, terms of sieges, by which the English army must peace; but, in a military point of view, it have been so materially reduced? Let any is not only the business of a general, and candid man put this question to himself, especially of a commander in chief, to turn and I am persuaded the answer will be the his own victories to account; but, it is his contrary of that which is suggested by this business to avoid fighting, and, of course, writer.-We are here told, that our sick to avoid gaining victories, unless he be and wounded being removed from Madrid convinced that he can turn them to account; to Salamanca gave our friends at the former for, unless victory be attended with bene- place much concern; that it was indica ficial results, every life lost in the acquir- tive of a change about to over-cloud all their ing of it is a life thrown away. Strictly bright prospects. There is no question speaking, it is not a victory, with which of the truth of this; but, how could this word we always associate the idea of ad- change be ascribed to the deficiencies of our vantage as to the main object contended for. cabinet, who were not upon the spot, who If, for example, a commander be success- could know very little of what was going ful, as MELAS was at the battle of Ma- on, who had exercised no control over the rengo, in the former part of the day, and movements of our commander, and in whose if he be defeated in the latter part of the power it was not to prevent any of the day, no man thinks of saying that he has causes which compelled him to retreat? If gained a victory. And, if he be success- our ariny be, as this writer asserts it is, ful in his attempt at advancing to-day, and reduced by sickness and service, to whom be compelled to abandon his ground to- is the cause of that effect to be ascribed? If morrow, can he with reason be said to it be critically situated, that situation may have been victorious? It is in the results have been caused by the zeal, by the braof battles that we are to look for the proof very, by any other estimable quality in the of victory; and, if it belong to ministers commander; but, surely, common sense, to be the cause of the results, the merit of as well as common justice, forbid us to asall victories must remain with them.— cribe it to the ministers in England, who This writer says, that it must be grating have had no more to do in all probability, to Lord Wellington to find his most glo- in causing those movements which have rious victories followed by the necessity of placed the army in such a critical situation, retreat. Doubtless, it may have been than they had in gaining the victory of Sagrating to him; but then, who has he to lamanca.-It may suit the hireling who blame for it? The Spaniards, perhaps; writes in the Times newspaper, and it may those who ought, or whom he expected to suit the proprietor of the Morning Chronisecond his efforts; but, certainly, not cie, who condescends to make his columns those by whom those efforts were not com- subservient to the purposes of an insolent manded to be made. He was commander- and greedy faction of oligarchs; these, it in-chief; he was upon the spot; he, if may suit to give to Lord Wellington all the any one could, must have known the ex-merit of every advantage that he obtains tent of his own means and of those of the over the enemy with the immense means enemy; and if he was unable to perceive placed in his hands; and to give to thre military point of view; for of that any one in my situation can be but a poor judge; but, I should, in case of final failure, blame him, who must have such excellent means of obtaining information, for not discovering in time, that the cause was a cause not to be maintained. I do not pretend to the gift of prophecy; and I do not know how the contest may end; but, if we should be finally compelled to yield up the Peninsula to the French, I am not one of those who shall be disposed to lay all the blame upon the ministers, who cannot be so well informed as to many important points as those who have been upon the spot, and who have had such ample means of observation as well as of information. Of this way of thinking, however, is not our good hire ministers all the demerit of every reverse that he sustains. But, men in general do not, and will not, decide in this way. They will say, that, if to him belongs exclusively the glory of victory, to him also belongs exclusively, whatever attribute attaches to retreat; and I am sure, that, if the whole nation were put to the vote upon the subject, nine hundred and ninety-nine out of every thousand would say with me, that this writer, in supposing it possible, that Lord Wellington, now that he sees his army critically situated, should resign in disgust, and leave it to find its way back to Portugal as it could, has imputed to him the possible possession of a mind, the seat of baseness itself. What! A commander in chief, who has advanced into a country of his own accord; who has been absoluteling of the Times newspaper. He, on the master of his operations; who has had ascribed to him exclusively all the advantages he has gained; who has been covered with honours and rewards, in which even his posterity is to partake; shall such a man, when, before the close of the campaign, he finds himself beset with difficulties, resign in disgust! Shall he abandon his post," and, with it that army by the valour of whom he has gained a profusion of titles" and of pecuniary compensation! The very idea must fill every man of honour, every man who has the ordinary sentiments of" morality, with indignation and abhorrence." If ever there was a commander who had no reason to complain of being thwarted in his plans and operations, Lord Wellington appears to me to be in that state. He has had, and has, every thing within his reach," under his absolute control. He is commander in chief of the English forces; he has long been generalissimo of the Portuguese army, and he is now generalissimo" of the Spanish army. His brother is our ambassador to the Spanish government; the political parties at home have vied with each other in their praises of him and his deeds. No fault has ever been found of any among many of the Civil Authorities,— thing that he has done: advancing or re- "the numbers, composition, and discipline treating behind his lines and in the open "of the army were defective, and many field, capturing fortresses or raising sieges;" of its chief officers were notoriously instill has he been praised; with him the "capable, or disaffected. If these defects tide of titles and rewards has never ceased were now wholly removed, it is utterly to flow. It is, therefore, most abomina- "incredible, that Spain should not have bly unjust towards the government to pre"shaken off her invaders like dew-drops tend, that they are answerable for every "from the lion's mane;" but if the defects reverse that may happen to him. I, for "exist, we say they argue not merely an my part, should rather be inclined to say, "imbecility in Spain, but here in England, that if the war should finally prove disas-"-here, at the head-quarters of the cause. trous, the fault was his, or at least, as "Our Ministers are to blame, if they do much his as theirs. I do not mean in a "not exercise the weight they possess in contrary, would lay the sins even of the Spanish government, as it is called, upon our ministers, that is to say, upon the present set, without Lord Wellesley amongst them, whom he denominates the "first Statesman in Europe." He says, "the Govern"ment of Spain is new. It needs the guidance of experience. It requires to be protected and to be directed. Protection has been afforded to it by the blood and "treasure of the British nation; to give "it direction and advice is the proper task of the British Ministry. Three years ago it was stated, that there was no ab. "solute want of resources in the country, no inherent or incorrigible defects in the "materials of which the body of the Army was composed, and no perverse or untractable disposition in the mass of the people of Spain, yet at that time no system had been established by which "the deficiencies of one district could be supplied from the abundance of another, or by which the resources of any oue "province could be made properly avail"able for its own or the general defence; 66 66 66 there were corruption and treachery of Spain is perfectly ridiculous, and especially as the writer, whose words we have quoted, obviously aims at the introduction into power of Lord Wellesley and Mr. Canning, one or the other of whom has always been in place until February, ever since the war in the Peninsula began. If they could do nothing to rouse the people of Spain, when they were in power before, why should they be able to effect that object if they were in power again! It would be difficult, I believe, for the hireling of the Times to answer this question; yet, until he can answer it, he may be assured that it is full as well for him to hold his tongue. WM. COBBETT. "Spain, to improve her internal system, "they are infinitely more to blame, if "they possess no weight in that country. "We have heretofore censured them for "not sending a larger British army into "the field; we now charge it on them as a fault, that they have not sent, or "caused to be sent into the field, a larger, "beller equipped, and better disciplined "Spanish army. If they should say, they "6 are unable to effect this, we must own "that we should partly believe them; but we are convinced, that there are others "who would be able to effect it; we are "convinced, that until it is effected, the "heavy burden of taxation in this coun66 try will be borne the more impatiently, "because it will appear to the multitude to "be borne in vain."-At the close of this paragraph one cannot help smiling. There are others who would be able to effect the desirable object of drawing forth the peo-Downing-Street, Nov. 17.-Dispatches, ple of Spain to assist us in driving out the French. That is to say, if the ministers would but make room for the patrons of this writer, we should see all the people in Spain armed against the French, and fighting like Christian heroes, under the banners of St. Dominick, to drive the French across the Pyrennees. Alas! The people of Spain neither know nor care who are ministers in England, any more than they know or care about what is passing in the moon. They have no interest in the question of who is to enjoy the sinecure places, and who is to have the giving away of commissions, leases, grants, and the like, in England. They have their eye stedfastly fixed upon one thing, and that is, who is doing in their country that which is best for them, and they are very likely to regard him as their friend who shall seem disposed to suffer them to have the greatest share of victuals and drink. Spain is in a state of revolution. There are two armies, two foreign armies, fighting in the country, and, like all other people in a similar situation, the Spaniards are rather spectators than actors in the scene. The deception so fatal to us, has been, that we have continually been told that the Spaniards were unanimously on our side. If this had been true, the French must long ago have been driven from the country. When we shall be convinced of our error I know not. Very likely the delusion. may last for a year or two longer, though I do not think that that is very probable. At any rate this notion, that a change of ministry in England would effect a change of disposition in the people Bolley, Thursday, 26th Nov. 1812. WAR IN SPAIN.. of which the following are extracts, have been this day received at Earl Bathurst's Office, addressed to his Lordship by General the Marquis of Wellington, dated Cubeçon, 26th and 28th October, Rueda, 31st October, and 3d November, 1812. Cabeçon, 26th October, 1812.. I have been so much occupied by the movements and operations of the army since the 18th inst. that I have not been. able to write to your Lordship.The operations of the Castle of Burgos conti-. nued nearly in the state in which they were when I addressed your Lordship on the 11th instant, till the 18th. Having at that time received a supply of musket ammunition from Santander, and having, while waiting for that necessary article, completed a mine under the church of St. Roman, which stood in an outwork of the second line, I determined that the breach which we had effected in the second line should be stormed on that evening, at the moment this mine should explode; and that at the same time the line should be attacked by escalade. The mine succeeded, and Lieutenant Colonel Browne lodged a party of the 9th Cacadores, and a detachment of Spanish troops of the regiment of Asturias in the out-work. A de-. tachment of the King's German Legion, under Major Wurmb, carried the breach, and a detachment of the Guards succeeded in escalading the line; but the enemy brought such a fire upon these two last detachments, from the third line, and the body of the castle itself, and they were at army likewise assembled in the neighbour- I requested Lieutenant General Sir Edward supposed to amount to not less than seventy tacked by numbers so superior, before they could receive the support, allotted to them, that they were obliged to retire, suffering considerable loss. Major Wurmb was unfortunately killed.-- It is impossible to represent in adequate terms my sense of the conduct of the Guards and German Legion upon this occasion; and I am quite satisfied, that if it had been postunity of striking a blow upon the enemy, sible to maintain the posts which they had gained with so much gallantry, these troops would have maintained them. Some of the men stormed even the third line, and one was killed in one of the embrasures of that line; and I had the satisfaction of seeing that if I could breach the wall of the Castle we should carry the place.Another mine was commenced under the second line from the church of St. Roman, of which we remained in possession.The enemy had on the 13th moved forward a considerable body of infantry, and six squadrons of cavalry from Briviesca to reconnoitre our out-posts at Monasterio. They The enemy's force in Valencia was attacked the picquet at the bridge in front of that town, but were repulsed by the fire of a detachment of the Infantry of the Brunswick Legion. In this affair, Lieutenant Colonel the Honourable Frederick Ponsonby, who commanded at Monasterio, was wounded, but not severely, and I hope I shall soon again have the benefit of his assistance.. I had long had reports of the enemy's intention to advance for the relief of the Castle of Burgos with the army of Portugal, reinforced by troops recently arrived from France, and with that part of the army of the North which was disposable; and they did advance in considerable force against the post at Monasterio on the evening of the 18th. The subaltern of the Brunswick Legion, who commanded a picquet in St. Olalla, disobeyed his orders in remaining in that village upon the approach of the enemy, and he was taken with his picquet. The enemy consequently obtained possession of the heights which commanded the town of Monasterio, and our outpost was obliged to retire on the morning of the 19th to the Burgos side of the town. I assembled the troops, excepting those necessary for carrying on the operations of the siege, as soon as it appeared by the enemy's movement of the 18th, that they entertained serious intentions of endeavouring to raise it, and placed the allied army on the heights, having their right at beas, on the Arlanzon, the centre at Rio Vena and Magaradas, and the left at Soto Pallacio. The enemy's -I had desired Lieutenant General Sir Rowland Hill to retire from his position on the Tagus, if he should find that he could not maintain himself in it with advantage; and it was necessary that I should be near him, in order that the corps under my command might not be insulated, in consequence of the movements which he should find himself under the necessity of making; I therefore raised the siege of Burgos on the night of the 20th, and moved the whole army back towards the Douro. -I felt severely the sacrifice I was thereby obliged to make. Your Lordship is aware that I was never very sanguine in my expectations of success in the siege of Burgos, notwithstanding that I considered success was attainable, even with the means in my power, within a reasonably limited period. If the attack made on the first line on the 22d or the 29th had succeeded, I believe we should have taken the place, notwithstanding the ability with which the Governor conducted the defence, and the gallantry with which it was executed by the garrison. Our means were limited; but it appeared to me, that if we should succeed, the advantage to the cause would be great, and the final success of the campaign would have been certain. -I had every reason to be satisfied with the conduct of the officers and troops dur ing the siege of Burgos, particularly with of the 16th dragoons, having had his horse the brigade of Guards.During the lat- shot, was taken prisoner. The delay ter part of the siege the weather was very occasioned by this misfortune enabled the unfavourable, and the troops suffered much enemy to bring up a very superior body of from the rain. The officers at the head of cavalry, which was charged by Major the artillery and engineer departments General Bock's and Major General Anson's Lieutenant Colonel Robe, and Lieutenant brigades, near the Venta del Pozo, but Colonel Burgoyne, and Lieutenant Colonel unsuccessfully, and our rear-guard was Dickson, who commands the reserve ar- hardly pressed. The enemy made their tillery, rendered me every assistance; and charges on the two light battalions of the the failure of success is not to be attributed King's German Legion, formed in squares, to them. By their activity we carried off but were always repulsed with considerevery thing in the course of one night, ex-able loss by the steadiness of these two cepting three eighteen pounders destroyed by the enemy's fire, and the eight pieces of cannon which we had taken from the enemy on the night of the 19th ultimo ined them. The exertions and conduct of the storm of the hornwork. Having sent Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, and of our cattle to meet the equipment expected the officers and staff attached to him from Santander, we had not the means of throughout this day, were highly meritomoving the latter. The enemy was not rious, and although the charge made by aware of our movement, and did not fol- the cavalry was not successful, I had the low us till late on the 22d, when ten thou- satisfaction of observing great steadiness in sand men encamped on this side of Burgos. their movements. Major Bull's troop of horse artillery, under Major Downman and Captain Ramsay, distinguished themselves. : battalions. They suffered no loss, and I cannot sufficiently applaud their conduct and that of Colonel Halkett who command -The army continued its march on the 24th, and took up its ground on the Carrion, with its right at Duenas, and its left at Villa Muriel, and the 1st battalion 1st Guards joined us from Corunna.-Į halted here on the 25th, and the enemy attacked our left at Villa Muriel. They were repulsed, however, by the 5th division of infantry, under the command of Major General Oswald, in the absence of Lieutenant Leith on account of indisposition.I had directed the third battalion of the Royals to march to Palencia, to protect the destruction of the bridges over the Carrion at that place, but it appears that the enemy assembled in such force at that point, that Lieutenant Colonel Campbell' thought it necessary to retire upon Villa Muriel, and the enemy passed the Carrion at Palencia. This rendered it necessary to change our front, and I directed Major General Oswald to throw back our left, and the Spanish troops upon the heights, and to maintain the Carrion with the right of the fifth division. The bridge of Villa Muriel was destroyed; but the enemy discovered a ford, and passed over a consi The British army encamped at Celada del Camino and Hornillos, with the light cavalry at Estepan and Baniel. We continued our march on the following day, the right of the army to Torquemada, the left of Cordevilla, at which places we crossed the Pisuerga.The enemy followed our movement with their whole army. Our rear-guard consisted of two light battalions of the King's German Legion, under Colonel Halkett, and of Major General Anson's brigade of cavalry and Major General Bock's brigade was halted at the Venta del Pozo to give them support. The whole under the command of Lieutenant General Sir Stapleton Cotton. Don Julian Sanchez marched on the left of the Arlanzon; and the party of Guerillas, heretofore commanded by the late Martinez, on the hills on the left of our rear-guard.Major General Anson's brigade charged twice with great success, in front of Celada del Camino, and the enemy was detained above three hours by the troops under Lieutenant General Sir S. Cotton, in the passage of the Hormaza, in front of that village.The rear-guard continued to fall back in the best order, till the Guerillas on the left having been driven in, they rode towards the flank of the rear-derable body of infantry and cavalry. I guard of Major General Anson's brigade, and four or five squadrons of the enemy mixed with them. These were mistaken for Spaniards, and they fell upon the flank and rear of our troops. We sustained some loss, and Lieutenant Colonel Pelly, made Major General Pringle and Major General Barnes attack these troops under the orders of Major General Oswald; in which attack the Spanish troops co-operated, and they were driven across the river with considerable loss. The fire |